Matter of Holleran v. Faucett ( 2016 )


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  •                            State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: October 27, 2016                    521476
    ________________________________
    In the Matter of JOHN
    HOLLERAN,
    Respondent,
    v                                      MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    JENNIFER FAUCETT,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:    September 7, 2016
    Before:    Peters, P.J., Garry, Rose and Mulvey, JJ.
    __________
    Diane V. Bruns, Ithaca, for appellant.
    Christopher Pogson, Binghamton, for respondent.
    Donna C. Chin, Ithaca, attorney for the child.
    __________
    Rose, J.
    Appeals from two orders of the Family Court of Chemung
    County (Rich Jr., J.), entered June 19, 2015 and June 23, 2015,
    which partially granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding
    pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order of
    custody and visitation.
    Petitioner (hereinafter the father) and respondent
    (hereinafter the mother) are the unmarried parents of a son (born
    in 2001). Pursuant to a 2012 custody and visitation order
    entered on consent, the parties shared joint legal custody of the
    child and the mother had sole physical custody. In August 2014,
    another consent order was entered that specified that the father
    was to have visitation with the child every other weekend.
    Thereafter, in March 2015, the father commenced this modification
    -2-                521476
    proceeding seeking sole custody of the child. After fact-finding
    and Lincoln hearings were held, Family Court awarded the parties
    joint legal custody, with primary physical custody to the father.
    A second order entered shortly thereafter granted the mother
    visitation with the child. The mother appeals from both orders.
    The mother's sole argument is that Family Court erred in
    finding that a change in circumstances had occurred since the
    entry of the August 2014 consent order (see generally Matter of
    Miller v Bush, 141 AD3d 776, 776-777 [2016]; Matter of Jacob R. v
    Nadine Q., 141 AD3d 772, 773 [2016]; Matter of Tara AA. v Matthew
    BB., 139 AD3d 1136, 1137 [2016]). We cannot agree, as it is
    undisputed that, subsequent to the entry of the August 2014
    order, the child was absent from school on 45 occasions, only 11
    of which were excused, and late for school on another seven
    occasions. Further, the child had a failing grade in at least
    two core subjects, and the evidence also established that the
    mother had withheld the child from visitations with the father.
    In addition, although the father has a serious medical condition
    that had previously rendered him unable to be the child's primary
    care provider, his condition has since become stabilized and
    controlled to the point that it no longer affects his ability to
    provide primary care to the child. Moreover, Family Court
    credited the testimony indicating that the child was subjected to
    violence, yelling and chaotic conditions in the mother's home.
    Contrary to the mother's contention, Family Court
    adequately set forth its factual findings on the record (see CPLR
    4213 [b]; Family Ct Act § 165 [a]; Matter of Molina v Lester, 84
    AD3d 1462, 1463 [2011]). Also, although not dispositive, the
    attorney for the child expressed at the hearing that the child –
    who was 13 years old at the time – preferred to live with the
    father (see Matter of Coleman v Millington, 140 AD3d 1245, 1246-
    1247 [2016]; Matter of Parchinsky v Parchinsky, 114 AD3d 1040,
    1041 [2014]). Thus, according due deference to Family Court's
    credibility determinations and factual findings (see Matter of
    Andrew L. v Michelle M., 140 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2016]), our review
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    of the record, including the Lincoln hearing transcript,1 reveals
    that the father established a change in circumstances so as to
    warrant a review of the existing custody order (see Matter of
    Gasparro v Edwards, 85 AD3d 1222, 1223 [2011]; Matter of Paul T.
    v Ann-Marie T., 75 AD3d 788, 790 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 713
    [2010]).
    Finally, the mother raises no issue with Family Court's
    best interests determination and, in any event, it is supported
    by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of
    Tara AA. v Matthew BB., 139 AD3d at 1137-1138).
    Peters, P.J., Garry and Mulvey, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the orders are affirmed, without costs.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    1
    Although we must agree with the mother's argument that
    Family Court erred in revealing the substance of the child's
    statements made during the Lincoln hearing, reversal is not
    justified here (see Matter of Rohde v Rohde, 135 AD3d 1011, 1013
    n [2016]; Matter of Lawrence v Kowatch, 119 AD3d 1004, 1006 n 1
    [2014]; Matter of Rivera v LaSalle, 84 AD3d 1436, 1437 [2011]).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 521476

Judges: Rose, Peters, Garry, Mulvey, Ordered

Filed Date: 10/27/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/1/2024