CANAL, MEHMET v. MUNASSAR, ABDULAZIZ ( 2016 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1011
    CA 16-00356
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
    MEHMET CANAL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
    V                             MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    ABDULAZIZ MUNASSAR, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT,
    ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
    PIRRELLO, PERSONTE & FEDER, ROCHESTER (STEVEN E. FEDER OF COUNSEL),
    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
    LAFAY, BYRNE & LAFAY, P.C., ROCHESTER (ANTHONY P. LAFAY OF COUNSEL),
    FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (John M.
    Owens, A.J.), entered July 29, 2015. The order denied the motion of
    plaintiff for partial summary judgment and granted the cross motion of
    defendant Abdulaziz Munassar for summary judgment dismissing the
    amended complaint against him.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously modified on the law by denying the cross motion,
    reinstating the amended complaint against defendant Abdulaziz
    Munassar, granting the motion in part and dismissing the defense and
    counterclaim of that defendant for usury, and as modified the order is
    affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: Abdulaziz Munassar (defendant) borrowed $127,000
    from plaintiff for the purchase of a residence in the Town of Greece.
    The loan was secured by a mortgage on the property, and the total on
    both the note and the mortgage was $170,000. The note states that the
    interest rate during the term of the note would be “zero (0.00%)
    because of the religious beliefs and requirements of Borrower.” The
    difference of $43,000 between the principal set forth in the note and
    mortgage of $170,000 and the amount disbursed at closing of $127,000
    was stipulated by the parties to be “in the nature of interest.” In
    June 2013, approximately one year later, defendant defaulted on the
    loan by failing to make the required monthly and balloon payments, and
    plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action. In his answer to the
    amended complaint, defendant asserted a defense and counterclaim for
    usury. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment seeking, inter
    alia, dismissal of the usury defense and counterclaim, and defendant
    cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint
    against him based upon the defense of usury. The matter was referred
    to a judicial hearing officer (JHO) for a hearing on the issue of
    -2-                          1011
    CA 16-00356
    usury only. Following the hearing, the JHO issued a bench decision
    finding that the interest rate was 50.5% and that the loan was
    therefore usurious, and Supreme Court granted defendant’s cross motion
    for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint against him. We
    conclude that the court erred in granting the cross motion and instead
    should have granted that part of plaintiff’s motion for partial
    summary judgment dismissing defendant’s usury defense and
    counterclaim. We therefore modify the order accordingly.
    In determining whether the interest charged exceeded the usury
    limit, courts must apply the traditional method for calculating the
    effective interest rate as set forth in Band Realty Co. v North
    Brewster, Inc. (37 NY2d 460, 462, rearg denied 37 NY2d 937; see
    Oliveto Holdings, Inc. v Rattenni, 110 AD3d 969, 972). According to
    that method, “[s]o long as all payments on account of interest did not
    aggregate a sum greater than the aggregate of interest that could
    lawfully have been earned had the debt continued to the earliest
    maturity date, there would be no usury” (Band Realty Co., 37 NY2d at
    464 [internal quotation marks omitted]). In applying the traditional
    formula, “[t]he discount, divided by the number of years in the term
    of the mortgage, should be added to the amount of interest due in one
    year, and this sum is compared to the difference between the principal
    and the discount in order to determine the true interest rate”
    (Hammelburger v Foursome Inn Corp., 76 AD2d 646, 648, mod on other
    grounds 54 NY2d 580).
    Applying that formula to the case at bar, which involves a
    five-year mortgage of $170,000 with a $43,000 “discount” with no
    additional interest, we add $8,600, which is one-fifth of the
    discount, to the interest over the first year (0%), arriving at a sum
    of $8,600. Comparing the $8,600 figure to the difference between the
    principal and the discount retained by plaintiff, i.e., $127,000, the
    interest rate was 6.77% per annum. That interest rate is well below
    the civil usury rate of 16% per annum (see General Obligations Law
    § 5-501 [1]; Banking Law § 14-a [1]).
    Defendant attempts to base his claim of usury on his advanced
    interest payment, asserting that the annual interest rate should be
    calculated by dividing the total interest to be received over the
    five-year period, $43,000, by the total received at closing, $127,000,
    resulting in an annual interest rate of 33.8%. Defendant’s argument
    is unavailing, however, inasmuch as “the Court of Appeals has held
    that ‘interest on the whole amount of principal agreed to be paid at
    maturity, not exceeding the legal rate, may be taken in advance’ ”
    (Martell v Drake, 124 AD3d 1200, 1201, quoting Band Realty Co., 37
    NY2d at 463-464). Moreover, defendant’s argument fails to account for
    the fact that the loan here, unlike the one-year term at issue in Band
    Realty Co., Martell and Oliveto, is for a term of five years.
    Entered:   November 18, 2016                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 16-00356

Filed Date: 11/18/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/18/2016