WILSON, VERNIEL L., PEOPLE v ( 2016 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    772
    KA 13-02138
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    VERNIEL L. WILSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER, MULDOON, GETZ & RESTON
    (GARY MULDOON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    VERNIEL L. WILSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
    SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (ROBERT J. SHOEMAKER OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Douglas A.
    Randall, J.), rendered November 1, 2013. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon a jury verdict, of robbery in the first degree,
    robbery in the second degree and attempted robbery in the second
    degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury
    verdict of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]),
    robbery in the second degree (§ 160.10 [1]), and attempted robbery in
    the second degree (§§ 110.00, 160.10 [1]), defendant contends that
    County Court erred in refusing to suppress the identifications of him
    by the victims on the grounds that he was unlawfully detained by the
    police and that the showup procedures were unduly suggestive. We
    reject that contention. “The police had reasonable suspicion to stop
    and detain defendant for a showup identification based on . . . a
    radio transmission providing a general description of the
    perpetrator[s] of [the] crime[s, the] proximity of the defendant to
    the site of the crime[s], the brief period of time between the
    crime[s] and the discovery of the defendant near the location of the
    crime[s], and the [officers’] observation of the defendant, who
    matched the radio-transmitted description [of one of the
    perpetrators]” (People v Owens, 39 AD3d 1260, 1261, lv denied 9 NY3d
    849 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Smith, 128 AD3d
    1434, 1434, lv denied 26 NY3d 1011; People v Mitchell, 118 AD3d 1417,
    1418, lv denied 24 NY3d 963; People v Evans, 34 AD3d 1301, 1302, lv
    denied 8 NY3d 845). With respect to the showup procedures, we
    conclude that they were not unduly suggestive. “[T]he victim[s’]
    -2-                           772
    KA 13-02138
    observation of defendant being removed from a patrol car, and the fact
    that defendant was handcuffed, did not render the showup[s] unduly
    suggestive as a matter of law” (Smith, 128 AD3d at 1435; see People v
    Boyd, 272 AD2d 898, 899, lv denied 95 NY2d 850; People v Aponte, 222
    AD2d 304, 304-305, lv denied 88 NY2d 980).
    Contrary to defendant’s contention, defense counsel was not
    ineffective for failing to call a cross-racial identification expert
    at trial (see White v Georgia, 293 Ga 635, 636-637; see generally
    People v Jones, 85 AD3d 612, 614, affd 21 NY3d 449), especially
    considering that defendant was identified both by an individual of the
    same race and by an individual of a different race. Nor was counsel
    ineffective in failing to timely request a missing witness charge.
    Defendant was acquitted of the charge relating to the missing witness,
    and thus he suffered no prejudice from counsel’s alleged misstep in
    that regard (see People v Santana, 114 AD3d 557, 558, lv denied 23
    NY3d 1067; see generally People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277, 284, rearg
    denied 3 NY3d 702; People v Glanda, 18 AD3d 956, 960, lv denied 6 NY3d
    754, reconsideration denied 6 NY3d 848).
    In his pro se supplemental brief, defendant contends that the
    court erred in admitting testimony that violated his constitutional
    right of confrontation (see Crawford v Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 50-54).
    As defendant correctly concedes, however, that contention is not
    preserved for our review, and we decline to exercise our power to
    review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see
    CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). We have reviewed defendant’s remaining
    contentions, including the additional claim of ineffective assistance
    of counsel asserted in his pro se supplemental brief, and we conclude
    that they lack merit.
    Entered:   November 10, 2016                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 13-02138

Filed Date: 11/10/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/11/2016