GOODSON, TERREL A., PEOPLE v ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    827
    KA 14-01245
    PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, AND CURRAN, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    TERREL A. GOODSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (ALAN WILLIAMS OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATAVIA (WILLIAM G. ZICKL OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Genesee County Court (Robert C.
    Noonan, J.), rendered May 15, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant,
    upon a jury verdict, of predatory sexual assault against a child and
    sexual abuse in the first degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
    following a jury trial of, inter alia, predatory sexual assault
    against a child (Penal Law § 130.96). Defendant’s girlfriend lived in
    an apartment across the hall from the apartment of the 10-year-old
    victim’s mother. On the night of September 2, 2013, the 10-year-old
    victim slept at the apartment of defendant’s girlfriend. At some
    point in the evening, defendant’s girlfriend left, leaving only
    defendant, the victim, and the victim’s younger sister in the
    apartment. Later in the night, after the victim and her sister fell
    asleep, defendant allegedly sexually assaulted the victim. The
    victim’s sister remained asleep during the assault.
    Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as
    charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we
    conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence
    (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). “The People’s
    case rested largely on the credibility of the victim and,
    notwithstanding minor inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, there
    is no basis in the record for us to disturb the jury’s determination
    to credit the victim’s testimony” (People v Chrisley, 126 AD3d 1495,
    1496, lv denied 26 NY3d 1007; see People v Izzo, 104 AD3d 964, 966-
    967, lv denied 21 NY3d 1005; see generally People v Childres, 60 AD3d
    1278, 1279, lv denied 12 NY3d 913). Moreover, defendant’s arguments
    regarding the credibility of the victim’s mother and the lack of
    -2-                           827
    KA 14-01245
    forensic evidence corroborating the victim’s testimony are unavailing
    inasmuch as “the testimony of [the victim] can be enough to support a
    conviction” (People v Calabria, 3 NY3d 80, 82). “Sitting as the
    thirteenth juror . . . [and] weigh[ing] the evidence in light of the
    elements of the crime[s] as charged to the other jurors” (Danielson, 9
    NY3d at 349), we conclude that the jury did not fail to give the
    evidence the weight it should be accorded (see generally Bleakley, 69
    NY2d at 495; People v Kalen, 68 AD3d 1666, 1667, lv denied 14 NY3d
    842).
    Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that
    he was deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct during
    summation inasmuch as he “either failed to object to the alleged
    misconduct, or failed to request curative instructions or move for a
    mistrial when [County Court] sustained his objection[]” (People v
    Tolbert, 283 AD2d 930, 931, lv denied 96 NY2d 908; see People v
    Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 400; People v Lewis, 140 AD3d 1593, 1595). “In
    any event, ‘[t]he majority of the comments in question were within the
    broad bounds of rhetorical comment permissible during summations . .
    . , and they were either a fair response to defense counsel’s
    summation or fair comment on the evidence . . . Even assuming,
    arguendo, that some of the prosecutor’s comments were beyond those
    bounds, we conclude that they were not so egregious as to deprive
    defendant of a fair trial’ ” (People v Stanley, 108 AD3d 1129, 1131,
    lv denied 22 NY3d 959; see People v McEathron, 86 AD3d 915, 916, lv
    denied 19 NY3d 975).
    Contrary to the People’s assertion, defendant preserved his
    contention that the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of
    the victim regarding a prior, unrelated instance of sexual contact
    with a different individual (cf. generally People v Goossens, 92 AD3d
    1281, 1281, lv denied 19 NY3d 960), but we conclude that defendant’s
    contention lacks merit. “[T]he questions at issue were ‘speculative,
    and lacked a good faith basis, and the probative value of the matters
    sought to be elicited was outweighed by the danger that the main
    issues would be obscured and the jury confused’ ” (People v Baker, 294
    AD2d 888, 889, lv denied 98 NY2d 708; see People v Quinones, 210 AD2d
    176, 177).
    Defendant failed to preserve for our review his further
    contention that the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of
    the victim regarding the omission of certain facts from her direct
    examination and grand jury testimony and, in any event, that
    contention is without merit (see generally People v Bornholdt, 33 NY2d
    75, 88; People v Lester, 83 AD3d 1578, 1578-1579, lv denied 17 NY3d
    818). Defendant likewise failed to preserve for our review his
    contention that the court violated his constitutional rights by
    limiting his cross-examination of the victim, inasmuch as he failed to
    object on those grounds at trial (see People v Bryant, 93 AD3d 1344,
    1344-1345), and we decline to exercise our power to review that
    contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see
    CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).
    -3-                           827
    KA 14-01245
    Finally, we reject defendant’s contention that he was deprived of
    effective assistance of counsel. The record establishes that defense
    counsel made an omnibus motion, made an opening statement with the
    cogent theory that the victim was incredible, pursued that theory on
    cross-examination, delivered a summation consistent with that theory,
    and obtained an acquittal on the top count of the indictment. Viewing
    the evidence, the law and the circumstances of this case, in totality
    and as of the time of the representation, we conclude that defendant
    received meaningful representation (see People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137,
    147).
    Entered:   November 10, 2016                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 14-01245

Filed Date: 11/10/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021