Matter of Shiner v. SUNY at Buffalo ( 2016 )


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  •                           State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: November 17, 2016                   522762
    ________________________________
    In the Matter of the Claim of
    LESLEY SHINER,
    Appellant,
    v
    SUNY AT BUFFALO et al.,                     MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    Respondents.
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD,
    Respondent.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   October 20, 2016
    Before:   McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Devine, Mulvey and Aarons, JJ.
    __________
    Law Office of Lindy Korn, PLLC, Buffalo (Richard Perry of
    counsel), for appellant.
    William O'Brien, State Insurance Fund, Buffalo, for SUNY at
    Buffalo and another, respondents.
    __________
    Mulvey, J.
    Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board,
    filed May 29, 2015, which ruled that claimant's failure to obtain
    the consent of her employer's workers' compensation carrier to
    the settlement of a third-party action barred her from receiving
    further benefits.
    One of claimant's supervisors, an associate dean,
    reportedly sexually harassed and groped her at an office holiday
    party in December 2010. She filed a claim for workers'
    compensation benefits, which was established for posttraumatic
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    stress disorder and neck injury. Claimant also commenced an
    action in federal court against her employer and the associate
    dean alleging a hostile work environment, discrimination, battery
    and assault. That action settled in August 2013 for $255,000,
    with both defendants contributing funds to the settlement and
    $65,000 specifically allocated for "back and front pay."
    Thereafter, the employer's workers' compensation carrier, the
    State Insurance Fund (hereinafter the carrier), asserted that
    claimant should be barred from future workers' compensation
    benefits because she had neither sought nor obtained its consent
    to the settlement as required by Workers' Compensation Law § 29
    (5). Claimant contended that the carrier's consent was not
    required because the federal action was not a third-party action
    within the meaning of the statute. A Workers' Compensation Law
    Judge determined that the federal action was a third-party
    action, which claimant had settled without seeking or obtaining
    the carrier's consent, and, accordingly, that she forfeited
    further benefits as of the date of the August 2013 settlement.
    The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed and claimant now
    appeals.
    We affirm. "Workers' Compensation Law § 29 (5) requires
    either the carrier's consent or a compromise order from the court
    in which the third-party action is pending for a claimant to
    settle a third-party action and continue receiving compensation
    benefits" (Matter of Johnson v Buffalo & Erie County Private
    Indus. Council, 84 NY2d 13, 19 [1994]; see Matter of Hulbert v
    Cortland County Sheriff's Dept., 69 AD3d 987, 988 [2010], lv
    denied 14 NY3d 710 [2010]; Matter of Wright v Golden Arrow Line,
    206 AD2d 759, 760 [1994]). Claimant urges that her federal
    lawsuit was not a third-party action since the statute addresses
    "the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ"
    (Workers' Compensation Law § 29 [1]) and the associate dean who
    harassed her had the same employer as her. The Court of Appeals,
    however, has recently reiterated that Workers' Compensation Law
    § 29, "'read in its entirety and in context, clearly reveals a
    legislative design to provide for reimbursement of the
    compensation carrier whenever a recovery is obtained in tort for
    the same injury that was a predicate for the payment of
    compensation benefits'" (Matter of Beth V. v New York State Off.
    of Children & Family Servs., 22 NY3d 80, 91 [2013], quoting
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    Matter of Petterson v Daystrom Corp., 17 NY2d 32, 39 [1966]).
    "The Court reasoned that "'[i]t would be unreasonable to read the
    statute as mandating a different result merely because the
    recovery came out of the pockets of a coemployee [or the
    employer] and not from the resources of a stranger'" (Ronkese v
    Tilcon N.Y., Inc., 129 AD3d 1273, 1275 [2015], lv dismissed ___
    NY3d ___ [Nov. 1, 2016], quoting Matter of Beth V. v New York
    State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 22 NY3d at 91). The fact
    that claimant included allegations of intentional conduct by a
    coemployee in her federal action does not, as urged by claimant,
    compel the conclusion that it was not a third-party action (see
    Matter of Beth V. v New York State Off. of Children & Family
    Servs., 22 NY3d at 91-92; Hanford v Plaza Packaging Corp., 2 NY3d
    348, 351, n 3 [2004]; but cf. Matter of Jackson v Richman & Co.,
    15 NY2d 877, 878-879 [1965] [exception found where there was a
    Board finding that an assault by a company/employer president
    was, under the existent narrow circumstances, tantamount to
    assault by the employer in furtherance of the employer's
    business]).
    Here, the Board's finding that, in her federal action,
    claimant "sought and received a recovery that was a predicate for
    the payment of compensation benefits" is supported by substantial
    evidence, including, among other things, the terms of the
    stipulation of settlement of that action. Given such finding,
    the Board's determination that the federal action was a third-
    party action is consistent with the case law construing Workers'
    Compensation Law § 29 notwithstanding the involvement of a
    coemployee and allegations of intentional conduct. It is
    undisputed that claimant did not seek or obtain the carrier's
    consent or a compromise order before settling such action. Under
    such circumstances, the Board's determination that claimant
    forfeited future benefits by entering into the settlement without
    the carrier's consent must be affirmed. The remaining issues
    were not raised before the Board and, thus, are not preserved for
    our review (see Matter of Duncan v John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 137
    AD3d 1430, 1431 [2016]; Matter of Thomas-Fletcher v New York City
    Dept. of Corr., 120 AD3d 867, 867 [2014]; Matter of Stewart v NYC
    Tr. Auth., 115 AD3d 1046, 1046-1047 [2014]).
    -4-                  522762
    McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Devine and Aarons, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 522762

Judges: Mulvey, McCarthy, Lynch, Devine, Aarons

Filed Date: 11/17/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/1/2024