HENDERSON, CURTIS N., PEOPLE v ( 2016 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1146
    KA 14-01213
    PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    CURTIS N. HENDERSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PIOTR BANASIAK OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (ROMANA A. LAVALAS
    OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County
    (John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered September 20, 2010. The judgment
    convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the
    first degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the case is held, the decision is
    reserved and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Onondaga County,
    for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum:
    Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of
    guilty of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]).
    Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency
    of the Miranda warnings provided to him prior to his interrogation is
    preserved for our review (see People v Smith, 22 NY3d 462, 465; cf.
    People v Louisias, 29 AD3d 1017, 1018-1019, lv denied 7 NY3d 814), we
    conclude that it is without merit. “[T]he warnings adequately
    conveyed that defendant had the right not only to have a lawyer
    present during the entire questioning but to ask for or access that
    lawyer at any point during the questioning” (People v Barber-
    Montemayor, 138 AD3d 1455, 1455, lv denied 28 NY3d 926).
    We reject defendant’s further contention that Supreme Court
    abused its discretion in denying his pro se request to withdraw his
    guilty plea without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court
    afforded defendant the requisite opportunity to present his
    contentions (see People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927), and defendant’s
    claim that he pleaded guilty because of duress arising from, inter
    alia, an alleged assault by a jail deputy was belatedly raised (see
    People v Nash [appeal No. 1], 288 AD2d 937, 937, lv denied 97 NY2d
    686; People v Hanley, 255 AD2d 837, 838, lv denied 92 NY2d 1050),
    contradicted by his statements during the plea colloquy (see People v
    McKoy, 60 AD3d 1374, 1374, lv denied 12 NY3d 856; Hanley, 255 AD2d at
    837-838), and entirely uncorroborated (see Nash, 288 AD2d at 937;
    -2-                          1146
    KA 14-01213
    People v Morris, 107 AD2d 973, 974-975; cf. People v Flowers, 30 NY2d
    315, 317-319). Under those circumstances, the court was entitled to
    determine that defendant’s allegation was “a belated maneuver that had
    no foundation in truth,” and thus that an evidentiary hearing was not
    required (People v Cannon [appeal No. 1], 78 AD3d 1638, 1638, lv
    denied 16 NY3d 742; cf. People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113, 116). In
    addition, we conclude that the record does not support defendant’s
    contention that defense counsel took a position adverse to him in
    connection with the plea withdrawal request (see People v Pimentel,
    108 AD3d 861, 862-863, lv denied 21 NY3d 1076; People v Sylvan, 108
    AD3d 869, 871, lv denied 22 NY3d 1091; cf. People v King, 129 AD3d
    992, 993).
    We agree with defendant, however, that the court erred in failing
    to determine at sentencing whether he should be afforded youthful
    offender status (see People v Rudolph, 21 NY3d 497, 501). Contrary to
    the People’s contention, the court’s statements during the plea
    proceeding to the effect that it was not inclined to grant defendant
    youthful offender status do not obviate the need for remittal (see
    People v Eley, 127 AD3d 583, 584; see also People v Gutierrez, 140
    AD3d 407, 408; People v Munoz, 117 AD3d 1585, 1585). Moreover,
    inasmuch as a youthful offender determination must be made “in every
    case where the defendant is eligible” (Rudolph, 21 NY3d at 501), we
    reject the People’s contention that remittal “would be futile and
    pointless” here. We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and
    remit the matter to Supreme Court to make and state for the record a
    determination whether defendant should be afforded youthful offender
    status. In view of our determination, we do not address
    defendant’s challenge to the severity of the sentence.
    Entered:   December 23, 2016                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 14-01213

Filed Date: 12/23/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/23/2016