Matter of Dickson (Commr. of Labor) ( 2015 )


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  •                           State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: July 23, 2015                     519638
    ________________________________
    In the Matter of the Claim of
    STACEY A. DICKSON,
    Respondent.
    EXAMONE WORLD WIDE INC.,                    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    Appellant.
    COMMISSIONER OF LABOR,
    Respondent.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   June 2, 2015
    Before:   Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Garry and Lynch, JJ.
    __________
    DLA Piper, LLP, New York City (Erin Carney D'Angelo of
    counsel), for appellant.
    Francis J. Smith, Albany, for Stacey A. Dickson,
    respondent.
    __________
    Lahtinen, J.
    Appeals from three decisions of the Unemployment Insurance
    Appeal Board, filed November 20, 2013, which ruled, among other
    things, that ExamOne World Wide Inc. is liable for unemployment
    insurance contributions on remuneration paid to claimant and
    others similarly situated.
    Claimant was a mobile medical examiner for ExamOne World
    Wide Inc., and the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board upheld a
    decision that she was an employee and not, as argued by ExamOne,
    an independent contractor. For the reasons set forth in Matter
    of Lawlor (ExamOne World Wide Inc.–Commissioner of Labor) (___
    -2-                519638
    AD3d ___ [decided herewith]), as well as Matter of Scinta
    (ExamOne World Wide Inc.–Commissioner of Labor) (113 AD3d 959
    [2014]), we are unpersuaded by ExamOne's argument that the
    Board's decisions must be reversed.
    ExamOne raises the additional argument that claimant herein
    did not have sufficient earnings after voluntarily leaving her
    job to qualify for benefits. Under the statute in effect at the
    relevant time, a person who voluntarily left employment without
    good cause did not qualify for unemployment benefits until that
    person had "subsequently worked in employment and earned
    remuneration at least equal to five times his or her weekly
    benefit rate" (Labor Law former § 593 [1] [a]).1 Determining
    whether a claimant had sufficient subsequent earnings "is a
    factual question for the Board to resolve and its decision will
    not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of
    Santiago [Commissioner of Labor], 63 AD3d 1357, 1357 [2009]).
    Claimant's benefit rate was $217 and, thus, she was required to
    earn $1,085 after voluntarily leaving ExamOne before being
    eligible for benefits. ExamOne failed to establish the specific
    date in January 2012 that claimant's relationship with it
    terminated, but the proof put such date between January 12, 2012
    and January 26, 2012. During the first quarter of 2012 – a time
    period that included when claimant was working for ExamOne as
    well as subsequent thereto – claimant earned $3,174.92 from
    another employer, and it is uncontested that $855.85 of such
    amount was earned in February 2012. Therefore, she needed to
    earn only an additional $229.15 during the pertinent base period
    after leaving ExamOne to reach the $1,085 necessary for
    eligibility. The Board determined that, of the remaining
    $2,319.07 earned from the other employer (i.e., $3,174.92 total
    earned minus $855.85 accounted for February 2012), at least
    $229.15 of it was earned after claimant left ExamOne and during
    the pertinent period. Inasmuch as this factual determination is
    supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. The remaining
    arguments are unpersuasive.
    1
    The statute now requires subsequent earnings of at least
    10 times the weekly benefit rate (see Labor Law § 593 [1] [a], as
    amended by L 2013, ch 57).
    -3-                   519638
    Peters, P.J., Garry and Lynch, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the decisions are affirmed, without costs.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 519638

Filed Date: 7/23/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/23/2015