SMALLS, JR., ERVIN, PEOPLE v ( 2012 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1128
    KA 08-01315
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, FAHEY, CARNI, AND VALENTINO, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    ERVIN J. SMALLS, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    (APPEAL NO. 1.)
    TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (MARK C. DAVISON OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    ERVIN J. SMALLS, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
    SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County
    (Francis A. Affronti, J.), rendered April 22, 2008. The judgment
    convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second
    degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment
    convicting him upon a jury verdict of burglary in the second degree
    (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]) and, in appeal No. 2, he appeals from a
    judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of burglary in the
    third degree (§ 140.20). We agree with defendant in appeal No. 1 that
    Supreme Court erred in allowing the People to present the testimony of
    a police officer that bolstered the complainant’s identification
    testimony, because such testimony “provid[ed] official confirmation of
    the complainant’s identification of the defendant” (People v German,
    45 AD3d 861, 862, lv denied 9 NY3d 1034; see People v McCullen, 63
    AD3d 1708, 1709, lv denied 13 NY3d 747). We further conclude,
    however, that the error is harmless (see generally People v Crimmins,
    36 NY2d 230, 241-242). “[T]he bolstering testimony . . . confirmed
    only the bald fact of the identification. It went into no particulars
    of such identification or the means by which the victim reached her
    conclusion. Beyond the fact that she did identify him, there was
    nothing to shore up the reliability or probative worth of her
    identification. Unquestionably defendant had been identified; the
    erroneously admitted bolstering testimony went no further than to
    corroborate that uncontroverted fact” (People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969,
    971). We further note that defense counsel conceded those facts in
    -2-                          1128
    KA 08-01315
    his opening statement and stated that the complainant told the officer
    that defendant was the perpetrator.
    Contrary to the further contention of defendant in appeal No. 1,
    viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged
    to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we conclude
    that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see
    generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). “The credibility of
    the victim and the weight to be accorded her testimony were matters
    for the jury” (People v Halwig, 288 AD2d 949, 949, lv denied 98 NY2d
    710; see People v McCray, 96 AD3d 1480, 1480; People v Gray, 15 AD3d
    889, 890, lv denied 4 NY3d 831). Furthermore, “[d]efendant was
    identified by the victim, who was acquainted with defendant and knew
    him by name” (People v Ortiz, 50 AD3d 336, 336, lv denied 10 NY3d 962;
    see People v Noakes, 57 AD3d 280, 281, lv denied 12 NY3d 786).
    Defendant also contends in appeal No. 1 that the court erred in
    admitting evidence of consciousness of guilt and in failing to give a
    proper jury instruction with respect to that evidence. Defendant
    failed to object on the grounds raised on appeal, and he thus failed
    to preserve those contentions for our review (see People v Smith, 90
    AD3d 1565, 1567, lv denied 18 NY3d 998; see generally People v
    McMillon, 77 AD3d 1375, 1375-1376, lv denied 16 NY3d 897; People v
    Smith, 24 AD3d 1253, 1253, lv denied 6 NY3d 818). We decline to
    exercise our power to review those contentions as a matter of
    discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).
    Although we agree with the further contention of defendant in
    appeal No. 1 that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of
    proof to him based on a comment on summation, we conclude that the
    prosecutor’s “single improper comment was not so egregious that
    defendant was thereby deprived of a fair trial” (People v Willson, 272
    AD2d 959, 960, lv denied 95 NY2d 873). We note in particular that the
    court sustained defendant’s objection to the improper comment and
    instructed the jury to disregard it, and the jury is presumed to have
    followed the court’s instructions (see generally People v Wallace, 59
    AD3d 1069, 1070, lv denied 12 NY3d 861). Moreover, “the court clearly
    and unequivocally instructed the jury that the burden of proof on all
    issues remained with the prosecution” (People v Pepe, 259 AD2d 949,
    950, lv denied 93 NY2d 1024; see People v Matthews, 27 AD3d 1115,
    1116).
    The sentences imposed in appeal Nos. 1 and 2 are not unduly harsh
    or severe. We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions,
    including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief, and conclude
    that they are without merit.
    Entered:   November 9, 2012                     Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 08-01315

Filed Date: 11/9/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016