MACHADO, JOSEPH, PEOPLE v ( 2016 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    936
    KA 14-01243
    PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    JOSEPH MACHADO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    STEPHEN J. BIRD, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    JOSEPH MACHADO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
    GREGORY J. MCCAFFREY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, GENESEO (JOSHUA J. TONRA OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Livingston County Court (Dennis S.
    Cohen, J.), rendered May 22, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant,
    upon a jury verdict, of robbery in the first degree (two counts),
    burglary in the first degree (two counts), grand larceny in the fourth
    degree (three counts) and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
    upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, two counts each of robbery in the
    first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [3], [4]) and burglary in the first
    degree (§ 140.30 [3], [4]). At trial, the victim testified that two
    men entered his home, placed a pillowcase over his head, and took many
    of his belongings, including a shotgun. Before leaving the victim’s
    home, one of the men held the shotgun to the victim’s head, and the
    victim noticed that one of the intruders wore red sneakers. One of
    the intruders testified at defendant’s trial that he and defendant
    committed the crimes, and that defendant had been wearing the red
    sneakers during the incident. The victim’s neighbor testified that
    defendant had been at his house the evening prior to the crimes, and
    that defendant was wearing red sneakers. The neighbor further
    testified that, while defendant was at his house, a video was recorded
    that depicted defendant’s red sneakers. Although the video did not
    show defendant’s face, the victim testified that the red sneakers
    depicted in the video were the same ones that he observed on one of
    the intruders.
    We reject defendant’s contention that County Court should have
    dismissed the indictment on the ground that the integrity of the grand
    jury proceeding was impaired. Although the People submitted some
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    KA 14-01243
    hearsay evidence to the grand jury, the remaining evidence was
    sufficient to sustain the indictment (see People v Huston, 88 NY2d
    400, 409; People v Butcher, 11 AD3d 956, 958, lv denied 3 NY3d 755).
    Defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to
    sustain the conviction of one count of robbery in the first degree
    (Penal Law § 160.15 [3]) and one count of burglary in the first degree
    (§ 140.30 [3]) because the People did not establish that the shotgun
    was used or threatened to be used as a dangerous instrument. We
    reject that contention. To establish that a gun is a dangerous
    instrument, the People must present evidence that it was loaded and
    operable or that it was used as a club or bludgeon (see People v
    Spears, 125 AD3d 1400, 1400, lv denied 25 NY3d 1172; People v Wilson,
    252 AD2d 241, 249). Here, the People established through
    circumstantial evidence that the weapon was a dangerous instrument
    inasmuch as it was loaded and operable (see People v Spears, 125 AD3d
    1401, 1402, lv denied 25 NY3d 1172). The shotgun was never recovered,
    but the victim testified that he kept it loaded and in his bedroom,
    and that he had fired it on previous occasions.
    Defendant further contends that the conviction on all counts
    should be reversed because there is legally insufficient evidence
    identifying him as the perpetrator. According to defendant, the
    People did not provide the required notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 that
    the victim would identify the red sneakers at trial and that
    identification testimony therefore should have been precluded. We
    conclude that no CPL 710.30 notice was required because there was no
    police-arranged identification procedure in which the victim
    identified defendant (see CPL 710.30 [1] [b]; People v Jackson, 71
    AD3d 1457, 1457-1458, lv dismissed in part and denied in part 17 NY3d
    774). We further conclude that the evidence, including the testimony
    of the second intruder identifying defendant and the testimony of the
    neighbor that defendant was wearing red sneakers around the time of
    the offense, is sufficient to establish defendant’s identity.
    Contrary to defendant’s further contention, upon viewing the evidence
    in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see
    People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we conclude that the verdict is
    not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v
    Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495).
    Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that
    he was denied a fair trial based on prosecutorial misconduct on
    summation (see People v Cullen, 110 AD3d 1474, 1475, affd 24 NY3d
    1014; People v Clark, 138 AD3d 1449, 1451, lv denied 27 NY3d 1130).
    In any event, any alleged improprieties were not so egregious as to
    deprive defendant of a fair trial (see Clark, 138 AD3d at 1451; People
    v Walker, 117 AD3d 1441, 1442, lv denied 23 NY3d 1044). Defendant
    also failed to preserve for our review his contention in his main
    brief that the prosecutor improperly bolstered the victim’s
    identification of the red sneakers worn by defendant, and his
    contention in his pro se supplemental brief that the prosecutor
    offered precluded testimony (see CPL 470.05 [2]). We decline to
    exercise our power to review those contentions as a matter of
    -3-                           936
    KA 14-01243
    discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).
    Viewing the evidence, the law and circumstances of this case, in
    totality and as of the time of representation, we reject defendant’s
    further contention in his main and pro se supplemental briefs that he
    was denied effective assistance of counsel (see generally People v
    Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh
    or severe.
    Entered:   November 18, 2016                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 14-01243

Filed Date: 11/18/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/18/2016