Sim v. Farley Equipment Company LLC ( 2016 )


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  •                           State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: April 7, 2016                     521711
    ________________________________
    EDWARD R. SIM, Doing Business
    as PYRAMID EQUIPMENT, et al.,
    Respondents,
    v                                     MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    FARLEY EQUIPMENT COMPANY LLC
    et al.,
    Appellants.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   February 19, 2016
    Before:   Peters, P.J., Garry, Rose, Lynch and Clark, JJ.
    __________
    Fischer, Bessette, Muldowney & Hunter, LLP, Malone (John J.
    Muldowney of counsel), for appellants.
    Antonucci Law Firm, Watertown (David P. Antonucci of
    counsel), for respondents.
    __________
    Lynch, J.
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Main Jr., J.),
    entered March 26, 2015 in St. Lawrence County, which, among other
    things, partially denied defendants' motion to dismiss the
    complaint.
    Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that they entered
    into oral agreements permitting defendants to use two of their
    excavators in various construction projects, but that defendants
    failed to pay for the use of the excavators and also damaged the
    excavators. They asserted causes of action for prejudgment
    attachment, Lien Law article 3-A violations, breach of contract
    and quantum meruit. Defendants made a pre-answer motion to
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    dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see
    CPLR 3211 [a] [7]) and also asserted the statute of frauds as an
    alternative ground to dismiss the breach of contract cause of
    action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [5]). Supreme Court dismissed the
    cause of action that was labeled as being for prejudgment
    attachment, but otherwise denied defendants' motion. Defendants
    appeal.1
    We affirm. "When assessing the adequacy of a complaint in
    light of a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, the court must
    afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the
    allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff[s]
    . . . 'the benefit of every possible favorable inference'" (AG
    Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5
    NY3d 582, 591 [2005], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87
    [1994]). "Whether the plaintiff[s] 'can ultimately establish
    [their] allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a
    motion to dismiss'" (J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co.,
    21 NY3d 324, 334 [2013], quoting EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs &
    Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]). "Courts may consider affidavits
    submitted in opposition to such a motion to cure any defects in
    the complaint" (Torok v Moore's Flatwork & Founds., LLC, 106 AD3d
    1421, 1421 [2013]; see Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 531
    [2009]).
    With respect to the cause of action under Lien Law article
    3-A, such statute applies to improvements to real property and
    imposes certain obligations on entities or persons deemed
    trustees under the statute to ensure payment to beneficiaries
    (see Lien Law §§ 70, 71; Mount Vernon City School Dist. v Nova
    1
    The filing of an amended complaint while the motion was
    pending does not, as urged by plaintiffs, render this appeal
    moot. The amended complaint was served prior to the parties'
    appearance before Supreme Court to argue the motion. Moreover,
    the minor additions in the amended complaint did not
    substantively alter the challenged causes of action (see Marston
    v General Elec. Co., 121 AD3d 1457, 1457 n 1 [2014]; Aetna Life
    Ins. Co. v Appalachian Asset Mgt. Corp., 110 AD3d 32, 39 [2013]).
    -3-                521711
    Cas. Co., 19 NY3d 28, 37 [2012]; NY Professional Drywall of OC,
    Inc. v Rivergate Dev., LLC, 100 AD3d 216, 219 [2012]). The
    relevant statutory definitions provide, among other things, that
    a trustee includes a contractor or subcontractor (see Lien Law
    § 70 [2]), and a beneficiary includes a materialman (see Lien Law
    § 71 [2]). A materialman is defined as, among other things, one
    who furnishes "machinery" or "equipment" used by a contractor or
    subcontractor in a project improving real property (Lien Law § 2
    [12]; see Matter of P.J. Carlin Constr. Co. v A to Z Equip.
    Corp., 31 AD2d 546, 546 [1968]; 8-92 Warren's Weed, New York Real
    Property § 92.10 [5] [h] [2015]). In their pleadings, as well as
    affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion (including
    affidavits from former employees of defendants), plaintiffs
    indicated that the subject excavators were used by defendants to
    perform work improving real property for public and private
    entities on numerous construction projects where defendants were
    contractors or subcontractors. Plaintiffs further asserted that
    they entered into a series of oral agreements with defendants
    regarding the use of the excavators during such time period and
    that they were not paid any rental amounts. These allegations
    are sufficient to state a cause of action under Lien Law article
    3-A.2
    The remaining arguments do not require extended discussion.
    Although the nature, length and terms of the purported oral
    agreements between plaintiffs and defendants regarding the
    excavators are sharply contested, nevertheless, there are ample
    allegations in the pleadings and assertions in plaintiffs'
    affidavits to avoid CPLR 3211 (a) (7) dismissal of the causes of
    action for breach of contract and quantum meruit (see Hyman v
    Burgess, 125 AD3d 1213, 1214-1215 [2015]; Schultz Constr. v
    Franbilt, Inc., 285 AD2d 936, 937-938 [2001]). Nor was the
    statute of frauds defense under General Obligations Law § 5-701
    (a) (1) absolutely established since there are allegations
    indicating not simply a single agreement spanning more than a
    2
    Defendants' argument regarding the statute of limitations
    applicable to the Lien Law was raised for the first time in their
    reply brief and, as such, is not properly before us (see Matter
    of Claydon, 103 AD3d 1051, 1054 [2013]).
    -4-                  521711
    year, but, instead, a series of agreements. In such regard,
    defendants failed to show that the oral agreements alleged by
    plaintiffs, "by their terms, 'have absolutely no possibility in
    fact and law of full performance within one year'" (Cron v Hargro
    Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998], quoting D & N Boening v Kirsch
    Beverages, 63 NY2d 449, 454 [1984]; see Gizara v New York Times
    Co., 80 AD3d 1026, 1028 [2011]). Finally, contrary to the
    contention of defendant BS Industrial Contractors, Inc., there
    are sufficient allegations of its involvement in the purported
    agreements to avoid dismissal as to it at this procedural point
    in the litigation (see e.g. CR Best Rd., LLC v Camps Mogen
    Avraham, Heller, Sternberg, Inc., 103 AD3d 1075, 1076 [2013] [on
    an appeal from a CPLR 3211 motion, "a minimal showing of
    potential merit will avoid dismissal"]).
    Peters, P.J., Garry, Rose and Clark, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 521711

Judges: Lynch, Peters, Garry, Rose, Clark

Filed Date: 4/7/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/1/2024