MatterofSumariaD. ( 2014 )


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  •                             State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: October 16, 2014                     516695
    ________________________________
    In the Matter of SUMARIA D.,
    Alleged to be a Neglected
    Child.
    BROOME COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
    SOCIAL SERVICES,                           MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    Respondent;
    MADELYN D. et al.,
    Appellants.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   September 4, 2014
    Before:   Peters, P.J., Stein, Garry, Lynch and Devine, JJ.
    __________
    Alena E. Van Tull, Binghamton, for Madelyn D., appellant.
    Teresa C. Mulliken, Harpersfield, for Direll D., appellant.
    Philomena Stamato, Broome County Department of Social
    Services, Binghamton, for respondent.
    Christopher A. Pogson, Binghamton, attorney for the child.
    __________
    Stein, J.
    Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County
    (Connerton, J.), entered April 11, 2013, which, in a proceeding
    pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10, granted petitioner's motion
    for summary judgment adjudicating respondents' child to be
    derivatively neglected.
    -2-                516695
    Respondents are the married parents of seven children, the
    youngest of whom – Sumaria D. (born in 2012) – is the subject of
    this proceeding. At the time of Sumaria's birth, respondents'
    six other children had been removed from their custody as a
    result of, among other things, respondents' history of mutual
    acts of domestic violence committed in the children's presence.1
    Within days of Sumaria's birth, Family Court granted petitioner's
    pre-petition application for temporary removal of the child from
    respondents' custody. One week later, petitioner commenced this
    proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10, alleging that
    Sumaria had been derivatively neglected based upon respondents'
    neglect and permanent neglect of their other children.
    Petitioner further alleged that, among other things, respondents
    had failed to adequately address their domestic violence issues
    through available preventive services as required by prior
    dispositional orders.
    In January 2013, following a Family Ct Act § 1027 hearing,
    petitioner moved for summary judgment against both respondents on
    the neglect petition, as well as for an order dispensing with its
    obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunite Sumaria with
    respondent Direll D. (hereinafter the father). Family Court
    denied the latter request,2 but otherwise granted the motion for
    summary judgment and entered a finding of derivative neglect
    against respondents, who now appeal from that order.
    1
    Respondents' five oldest children (born in 2003, 2004,
    2005, 2006 and 2007) were adjudicated to be neglected in 2008 and
    permanently neglected in December 2011, and respondents' parental
    rights as to those children were terminated (Matter of Madelyn D.
    [Direll D.], 112 AD3d 1165 [2013]). Respondents' sixth child,
    Xiomara D. (born in 2010), was adjudicated to be derivatively
    neglected in 2010 (Matter of Xiomara D. [Madelyn D.], 96 AD3d
    1239 [2012]), and respondent Madelyn D. has since judicially
    surrendered her parental rights as to that child.
    2
    Petitioner has not appealed from that part of the order
    that denied such request.
    -3-                516695
    We affirm. "[P]roof of the abuse or neglect of one child
    shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse or neglect
    of any other child of . . . the respondent" (Family Ct Act § 1046
    [a] [i]). "Derivative neglect is established where the evidence
    demonstrates an impairment of parental judgment to the point that
    it creates a substantial risk of harm for any child left in that
    parent's care" (Matter of Xiomara D. [Madelyn D.], 96 AD3d 1239,
    1240 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];
    accord Matter of Karm'Ny QQ. [Steven QQ.], 114 AD3d 1101, 1102
    [2014]; Matter of Alyssa WW. [Clifton WW.], 106 AD3d 1157, 1158
    [2013]; see Matter of Michael N. [Jason M.], 79 AD3d 1165,
    1167-1168 [2010]). In this regard, "[a] prior determination [of
    neglect] should be sufficiently proximate in time to reasonably
    conclude that the problematic conditions continue to exist, but
    there is no bright-line, temporal rule beyond which we will not
    consider older child protective determinations" (Matter of Ilonni
    I. [Benjamin K.], 119 AD3d 997, 998 [2014] [internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted]). "Although it is a drastic
    procedural device, Family Court is authorized to grant summary
    judgment in a neglect proceeding where no triable issue of fact
    exists" (id. at 997 [internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted]; accord Matter of Alyssa WW. [Clifton WW.], 106 AD3d at
    1158; see Matter of Jadalynn HH. [Roy HH.], 93 AD3d 1112, 1113
    [2012]; Matter of Quinton GG. [Jessica HH.], 82 AD3d 1557, 1558
    [2011]).
    Here, the papers proffered by petitioner in support of the
    motion for summary judgment included, among other things, the
    prior neglect orders, which were based upon respondents'
    admissions to mutual acts of domestic violence in the children's
    presence, at least one of which required respondent Madelyn D.
    (hereinafter the mother) to seek medical treatment at a local
    hospital and resulted in physical injury to the father as well.
    The parties admitted to engaging in "continuing and escalating"
    domestic violence, and the father also admitted to violating a
    prior court order. The parties' conduct led to the termination
    of the father's parental rights as to five of their seven
    -4-                516695
    children in 2012,3 following the revocation of a suspended
    judgment, in addition to the finding of derivative neglect as to
    Xiomara. Further, it is evident from the record that neither
    parent has demonstrated the ability to appreciate the severity of
    the domestic violence and the safety concerns for their children
    raised thereby. Notably, just two weeks after the May 2008
    neglect adjudications, there was a reported incident of domestic
    violence that involved the father wielding a screwdriver against
    the mother. Petitioner's caseworker also described two reported
    incidents of domestic violence and/or aggressive acts by the
    father toward the mother in April 2011 and July 2011,
    respectively, one of which resulted in the father being
    criminally charged.
    Notably, petitioner's submissions in support of its motion
    also establish that respondents have failed either to undertake
    or to successfully complete certain court-ordered services.
    Moreover, despite the existence of a no-contact order of
    protection, respondents continued to have regular contact with
    one another, and Sumaria apparently was conceived during the
    pendency of that order. Under these circumstances, we find that
    petitioner made a prima facie showing that the conditions that
    gave rise to the previous neglect findings were not so remote in
    time as to preclude a finding of derivative neglect and, in fact,
    continue to exist (see Matter of Ilonni I. [Benjamin K.], 119
    AD3d at 998; Matter of Xiomara D. [Madelyn D.], 96 AD3d at 1240;
    compare Matter of Jamakie B. [Gwendolyn J.], 119 AD3d 939, 940
    [2014]). Respondents' contentions in opposition to petitioner's
    motion that, among other things, they have completed some
    therapeutic services, are insufficient to raise a material
    question of fact as to the continued existence of the
    circumstances that gave rise to the prior neglect adjudications
    (see Matter of Xiomara D. [Madelyn D.], 96 AD3d at 1240).
    Accordingly, petitioner established its entitlement to judgment
    as a matter of law on the issue of respondents' derivative
    neglect of the child.
    3
    The mother executed a judicial surrender of the five
    older children.
    -5-                  516695
    As to the mother's assertion that Family Court should not
    have considered her hospital records – which petitioner
    improperly obtained without the mother's authorization or a
    subpoena – we note that, while the physician/patient and related
    privileges do not bar the admissibility of such records (see
    Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vii]), the record does not reflect that
    they were obtained pursuant to a subpoena, as required (see
    Family Ct Act § 1038 [a]).4 We do not condone petitioner's
    failure to follow the statutory protocol for obtaining the
    mother's records. However, given that the information contained
    in the records was offered to prove a fact – that respondents
    were residing together before Sumaria's birth – that is readily
    gleaned from other evidence, Family Court's consideration of such
    records is not a basis for reversal. To the extent not
    specifically addressed herein, respondents' remaining contentions
    have been considered and found to be lacking in merit.
    Peters, P.J., Garry, Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    4
    Petitioner's reliance upon Social Services Law § 415 is
    misplaced, as that statute pertains to a report made by a
    mandated reporter that results in an investigation of child abuse
    or maltreatment, and there is no indication in the record here
    that the records in question were obtained by petitioner as a
    result of a report made by the hospital.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 516695

Filed Date: 10/16/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014