CLARK, JASON L., PEOPLE v ( 2016 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    738
    KA 10-02421
    PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, DEJOSEPH, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    JASON L. CLARK, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JON P. GETZ OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LEAH R. MERVINE OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County
    (Francis A. Affronti, J.), rendered October 26, 2010. The judgment
    convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second
    degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury
    verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]),
    defendant contends that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying
    that part of his omnibus motion seeking funds to retain an
    investigator and a ballistics expert pursuant to County Law § 722-c.
    We reject that contention inasmuch as defendant failed to establish
    that such services were “necessary to his defense” (People v Clarke,
    110 AD3d 1341, 1342, lv denied 22 NY3d 1197; see People v Brown, 67
    AD3d 1369, 1370, lv denied 14 NY3d 886; People v Coleman, 45 AD3d 432,
    433, lv denied 10 NY3d 763).
    Inasmuch as defendant did not object to the charge conference
    being held off the record in chambers, his contention that the court
    erred in failing to record the charge conference stenographically is
    not preserved for our review (see People v Vasquez, 89 NY2d 521, 534,
    cert denied 
    522 US 846
    ; People v Samuels, 291 AD2d 823, 824, lv denied
    98 NY2d 655; see generally Judiciary Law § 295). In any event,
    “defendant failed to show any prejudice he suffered as a result of
    that conference not being transcribed” (People v Richard, 30 AD3d 750,
    754, lv denied 7 NY3d 869; see generally People v Harrison, 85 NY2d
    794, 796). Moreover, we conclude that any challenge by defendant to
    the adequacy of the jury charge is not preserved for our review
    because defendant failed to object to the jury charge as given (see
    CPL 470.05 [2]; Richard, 30 AD3d at 754-755; see generally People v
    -2-                           738
    KA 10-
    02421 Robinson, 88
     NY2d 1001, 1001-1002). To the extent that defendant
    asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the ground that
    defense counsel could have sought certain jury charges, that claim
    involves matters outside the record on appeal in this case and thus is
    properly raised by way of a motion pursuant to CPL article 440 (see
    generally People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709).
    We reject defendant’s contention that the evidence is legally
    insufficient to support the conviction. “It is well settled that,
    even in circumstantial evidence cases, the standard for appellate
    review of legal sufficiency issues is whether any valid line of
    reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to
    the conclusion reached by the [jury] on the basis of the evidence at
    trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People” (People v
    Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 62, rearg denied 97 NY2d 678 [internal quotation
    marks omitted]; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495).
    Here, “[t]he fact that no one saw defendant fire the shot that killed
    the victim does not render the evidence legally insufficient, inasmuch
    as there was ample circumstantial evidence establishing defendant’s
    identity as the shooter” (People v Moore [appeal No. 2], 78 AD3d 1658,
    1659, lv denied 17 NY3d 798). Viewing the evidence in light of the
    elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson,
    9 NY3d 342, 349), we reject defendant’s further contention that the
    verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley,
    69 NY2d at 495). “Even assuming, arguendo, that a different verdict
    would not have been unreasonable, [we note that] ‘the jury was in the
    best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and, on this
    record, it cannot be said that the jury failed to give the evidence
    the weight it should be accorded’ ” (People v Chelley, 121 AD3d 1505,
    1506, lv denied 24 NY3d 1218, reconsideration denied 25 NY3d 1070).
    Finally, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or
    severe.
    Entered:   September 30, 2016                   Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 10-02421

Filed Date: 9/30/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/7/2016