JONES, JEREMIAH, PEOPLE v ( 2014 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    679
    KA 12-01166
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., LINDLEY, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    JEREMIAH JONES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS., SYRACUSE (BRADLEY E. KEEM OF COUNSEL), FOR
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (MARIA MALDONADO
    OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Jeffrey R.
    Merrill, A.J.), rendered February 1, 2011. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of burglary in the third degree
    (two counts).
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
    upon his guilty plea of two counts of burglary in the third degree
    (Penal Law § 140.20). We agree with defendant that he did not
    knowingly waive his right to appeal. “Although the record establishes
    that defendant executed a written waiver of the right to appeal, there
    was no colloquy between County Court and defendant regarding the
    waiver of the right to appeal to ensure that it was knowingly,
    voluntarily and intelligently entered” (People v Carno, 101 AD3d 1663,
    1664, lv denied 20 NY3d 1060; see People v Briggs, 115 AD3d 1245,
    1246). Although defendant’s contention that the plea was not
    knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered thus is not
    precluded by the invalid waiver, he failed to preserve that contention
    for our review inasmuch as he did not move to withdraw the plea or to
    vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v Robinson, 112 AD3d
    1349, 1349). Contrary to his contention, “this case does not fall
    within the rare exception to the preservation requirement because
    nothing in the plea allocution calls into question the voluntariness
    of the plea or casts ‘significant doubt’ upon his guilt” (id. at 1349,
    quoting People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666). The court did not abuse
    its discretion in terminating defendant from the drug treatment
    program after he violated the conditions of the program (see CPL
    216.05 [9] [c]; People v Dawley, 96 AD3d 1108, 1109, lv denied 19 NY3d
    -2-                           679
    KA 12-01166
    1025).   The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
    Entered:   June 13, 2014                         Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 12-01166

Filed Date: 6/13/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/7/2016