POPE, MARTIN O., PEOPLE v ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •            SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    630
    KA 14-01744
    PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, CARNI, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    MARTIN O. POPE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    FRANK J. NEBUSH, JR., PUBLIC DEFENDER, UTICA (PATRICK J. MARTHAGE OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    SCOTT D. MCNAMARA, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, UTICA (STEVEN G. COX OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal   from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Michael L.
    Dwyer, J.),   rendered May 22, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant,
    upon a jury   verdict, of criminal contempt in the first degree (two
    counts) and   criminal contempt in the second degree (three counts).
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
    following a jury trial of, inter alia, two counts of criminal contempt
    in the first degree (Penal Law § 215.51 [b] [iv]). Defendant “failed
    to preserve for our review [his] contention that County Court, in
    determining the sentence to be imposed, penalized [him] for exercising
    [his] right to a jury trial” (People v Garner, 136 AD3d 1374, 1374, lv
    denied ___ NY3d ___ [Apr. 18, 2016]; see People v Coapman, 90 AD3d
    1681, 1683-1684, lv denied 18 NY3d 956). In any event, that
    contention is without merit. “The mere fact that a sentence imposed
    after trial is greater than that offered in connection with plea
    negotiations is not proof that defendant was punished for asserting
    [his] right to trial . . . , and there is no indication in the record
    before us that the sentencing court acted in a vindictive manner based
    on defendant’s exercise of the right to a trial” (Garner, 136 AD3d at
    1374-1375 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, “[g]iven
    that the quid pro quo of the bargaining process will almost
    necessarily involve offers to moderate sentences that ordinarily would
    be greater, it is also to be anticipated that sentences handed out
    after trial may be more severe than those proposed in connection with
    a plea” (People v Martinez, 26 NY3d 196, 200 [internal quotation marks
    omitted]). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
    Entered:    July 1, 2016                           Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 14-01744

Filed Date: 7/1/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/7/2016