N., SKYE, MTR. OF ( 2017 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    80
    CAF 15-01417
    PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., LINDLEY, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
    IN THE MATTER OF SKYE N., STARR N., BRITTANI N.,
    AND MITCHELL N.
    ------------------------------------------------    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    ERIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
    PETITIONER-RESPONDENT;
    CARL N., SR., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
    DAVID J. PAJAK, ALDEN, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
    KATE NOWADLY, BUFFALO, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
    DAVID C. SCHOPP, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN, THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF
    BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (CHARLES D. HALVORSEN OF COUNSEL).
    Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Sharon M.
    LoVallo, J.), entered August 11, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to
    Family Court Act article 6 and Social Services Law § 384-b. The
    order, among other things, transferred guardianship and custody of the
    subject children to petitioner.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act
    article 6 and Social Services Law § 384-b, respondent father appeals
    from an order that, inter alia, terminated his parental rights with
    respect to the subject children on the ground of permanent neglect and
    transferred guardianship and custody of the children to petitioner.
    Petitioner commenced the underlying proceeding alleging that the
    father derivatively neglected the subject children when he repeatedly
    sexually abused his then 14-year-old stepdaughter, who is not a
    subject of this proceeding. The father subsequently pleaded guilty
    to, inter alia, rape in the first degree and course of sexual conduct
    against a child in the second degree relating to his conduct with his
    stepdaughter.
    Contrary to the father’s contention, petitioner demonstrated by
    the requisite clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent
    efforts to encourage and strengthen the parent-child relationship by
    “developing an appropriate service plan tailored to the situation,
    regularly updating the [father] on the children’s progress and
    continually reminding [him] to comply with the requirements of the
    service plan” (Matter of Deime Zechariah Luke M. [Sharon Tiffany M.],
    -2-                            80
    CAF 15-01417
    112 AD3d 535, 536, lv denied 22 NY3d 863; see Matter of Davianna L.
    [David R.], 128 AD3d 1365, 1365, lv denied 25 NY3d 914; Matter of
    Jaylysia S.-W., 28 AD3d 1228, 1228-1229). The father contends that he
    planned for the children’s return by planning to participate in sex
    offender treatment, but could not do so because such a program was not
    offered at the facility where he was incarcerated. We reject that
    contention, inasmuch as “petitioner was not required to provide
    ‘services and other assistance . . . so that problems preventing the
    discharge of the child[ren] from care [could] be resolved or
    ameliorated’ ” (Jaylysia S.-W., 28 AD3d at 1229, quoting Social
    Services Law § 384-b [7] [f] [3]; see Matter of Amanda C., 281 AD2d
    714, 716, lv denied 96 NY2d 714).
    Contrary to the father’s further contention, petitioner
    established that, despite its diligent efforts to reunite the father
    with the children, the father failed to plan for the children’s future
    “by neither acknowledging nor meaningfully addressing the conditions
    that led to the children’s removal in the first instance, namely, the
    underlying sexual abuse of another older daughter” (Matter of Iasha
    Tameeka McL. [Herbert McL.], 135 AD3d 601, 601; see Matter of Emerald
    L.C. [David C.], 101 AD3d 1679, 1680), and by failing to “provide any
    ‘realistic and feasible’ alternative to having the children remain in
    foster care until [his] release from prison” (Matter of Gena S. [Karen
    M.], 101 AD3d 1593, 1594, lv dismissed 21 NY3d 975; see Davianna L.,
    128 AD3d at 1365).
    Although the father requested a suspended judgment at the
    dispositional hearing and thus preserved for our review his contention
    that Family Court erred in failing to grant that relief, we reject
    that contention inasmuch as the record of the dispositional hearing
    establishes that “any progress that [the father] made ‘was not
    sufficient to warrant any further prolongation of the child[ren’s]
    unsettled familial status’ ” (Matter of Jose R., 32 AD3d 1284, 1285,
    lv denied 7 NY3d 718; see Matter of Kyla E. [Stephanie F.], 126 AD3d
    1385, 1386, lv denied 25 NY3d 910).
    Finally, to the extent that the father contends that the court
    improperly admitted in evidence records containing hearsay statements,
    we conclude that any such error is harmless “ ‘because the result
    reached herein would have been the same even had such [statements]
    been excluded,’ ” and “ ‘[t]here is no indication that the court
    considered, credited, or relied upon inadmissible hearsay in reaching
    its determination’ ” (Kyla E., 126 AD3d at 1386).
    Entered:   March 24, 2017                       Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAF 15-01417

Filed Date: 3/24/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/24/2017