PERRAH, LUKE M., PEOPLE v ( 2012 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1048
    KA 11-01154
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    LUKE M. PERRAH, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES ECKERT OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from an order of the Monroe County Court (Frank P. Geraci,
    Jr., J.), entered April 26, 2011. The order determined that defendant
    is a level two risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: On appeal from an order adjudicating him to be a
    level two risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA]
    Correction Law § 168 et seq.), defendant contends that County Court
    erred in making an upward departure to a risk level two from the
    presumptive level one risk. We reject that contention. An upward
    departure from a presumptive risk level is warranted where “ ‘there
    exists an aggravating . . . factor of a kind, or to a degree, not
    otherwise adequately taken into account by the [risk assessment]
    guidelines’ ” (People v McCollum, 41 AD3d 1187, 1188, lv denied 9 NY3d
    807; see People v Howe, 49 AD3d 1302, 1302). “There must exist clear
    and convincing evidence of the existence of special circumstance[s] to
    warrant an upward or downward departure” (People v Hamelinck, 23 AD3d
    1060, 1060 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Sawyer, 78
    AD3d 1517, 1518, lv denied 16 NY3d 704; People v Gandy, 35 AD3d 1163,
    1164), and such evidence must be established by “[r]eliable hearsay,”
    including case summaries, presentence reports, and grand jury
    testimony (People v Mingo, 12 NY3d 563, 572-573; see People v
    Gardiner, 92 AD3d 1228, 1229, lv denied 19 NY3d 801; People v
    Alvarado, 79 AD3d 1719, 1719, lv denied 16 NY3d 707).
    Here, the court properly relied on the case summary, the
    presentence reports, and defendant’s own testimony at the SORA hearing
    in determining that the upward departure was justified based upon two
    factors not reflected in the risk assessment instrument: (1)
    “defendant’s denial or at least hedging about the prior sexual abuse”
    -2-                          1048
    KA 11-01154
    - as evidenced by his denial of wrongdoing in his 2006 presentence
    report with respect to a conviction of endangering the welfare of a
    child, as well as his explanation of that crime in court; and (2) his
    “lack of candor about his own history of abuse,” as evidenced by
    defendant’s failure to disclose that abuse in connection with his
    first presentence report. Furthermore, as the People correctly
    contend, defendant’s commission of the instant offense while engaged
    in sex offender counseling for the prior offense demonstrated that
    counseling and probation supervision did not curb his dangerous
    propensities, and that is another factor not reflected in the risk
    assessment instrument. The court’s upward departure was thus amply
    supported by the record.
    Entered:   October 5, 2012                      Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 11-01154

Filed Date: 10/5/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016