KLUSS, DEBORAH, PEOPLE v ( 2016 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    841
    KA 14-00517
    PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    DEBORAH KLUSS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    CARA A. WALDMAN, FAIRPORT, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    VALERIE G. GARDNER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PENN YAN, FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Yates County Court (W. Patrick
    Falvey, J.), rendered November 19, 2013. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon a jury verdict, of offering a false instrument for
    filing in the first degree and welfare fraud in the fifth degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her,
    upon a jury verdict, of offering a false instrument for filing in the
    first degree (Penal Law former § 175.35) and welfare fraud in the
    fifth degree (§ 158.05). Defendant was convicted of failing to report
    her income from a part-time job on a recertification application for
    food stamp benefits that she submitted to the Yates County Department
    of Social Services (DSS).
    Defendant contends that she was denied effective assistance of
    counsel because counsel failed to request an adverse inference
    instruction based upon the destruction of one page of her
    recertification application. We reject that contention. “A single
    error may qualify as ineffective assistance, but only when the error
    is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a
    defendant’s right to a fair trial” (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152),
    and that is not the case here. Although an “adverse inference charge
    should be given where a defendant, using reasonable diligence, has
    requested evidence reasonably likely to be material, and where that
    evidence has been destroyed by agents of the State” (People v Handy,
    20 NY3d 663, 669), in this case the DSS employee who destroyed the
    document was not acting as an agent of the police or prosecution
    within the meaning of Handy at the time she destroyed the document
    (see generally People v Heise, 41 AD3d 1255, 1256, lv denied 9 NY3d
    1006). Indeed, the record establishes that the document was destroyed
    in accordance with the DSS employee’s normal practices approximately
    six months before DSS learned that defendant had a part-time job and
    -2-                           841
    KA 14-00517
    commenced the investigation that culminated in the instant conviction.
    In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant was entitled to
    an adverse inference charge and defense counsel erred in failing to
    request that charge, we conclude that the error did not deprive
    defendant of meaningful representation (see People v Blake, 24 NY3d
    78, 81-82; see generally People v Baldi, 5 NY2d 137, 147).
    Contrary to defendant’s contention, the evidence is legally
    sufficient to support the conviction (see generally People v Bleakley,
    69 NY2d 490, 495). The People established that defendant began
    working at her part-time job in October 2011 and knowingly failed to
    list the income from that job on a recertification application that
    she signed on November 19, 2011 with the intent to defraud DSS (see
    People v Hure, 16 AD3d 774, 775, lv denied 4 NY3d 854; see generally
    People v Oberlander, 60 AD3d 1288, 1291). Although defendant
    testified that she told a DSS employee about the income from her part-
    time job during a telephone call, and that she “most likely” listed
    that income on the page of the application that was destroyed by a DSS
    employee prior to trial, that DSS employee testified that she did not
    receive such a telephone call from defendant, and that the missing
    page of the application was destroyed because it contained no
    information other than a request to change the time of a scheduled
    appointment. Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the
    crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342,
    349), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the
    evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).
    Entered:   October 7, 2016                      Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 14-00517

Filed Date: 10/7/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/7/2016