GOLSON, RAKEEM, PEOPLE v ( 2012 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    307
    KA 09-00069
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CARNI, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                                MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    RAKEEM J. GOLSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    ANTHONY J. LANA, BUFFALO, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    MICHAEL J. VIOLANTE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (THOMAS H. BRANDT OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Niagara County Court (Sara S.
    Sperrazza, J.), rendered October 21, 2008. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon a jury verdict, of conspiracy in the fourth degree
    (two counts), burglary in the first degree (five counts), burglary in
    the second degree, robbery in the first degree (six counts), robbery
    in the second degree (two counts) and assault in the second degree
    (two counts).
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously modified on the law by reversing that part convicting
    defendant of burglary in the second degree and dismissing count eight
    of the indictment as and modified the judgment is affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
    after a jury trial of, inter alia, two counts of conspiracy in the
    fourth degree (Penal Law § 105.10 [1]) and five counts of burglary in
    the first degree (§ 140.30 [2 - 4]). As a preliminary matter, as we
    noted in the appeal of defendant’s codefendant, count eight, charging
    defendant with burglary in the second degree under Penal Law § 140.25
    (2), “must be dismissed as a lesser inclusory count of counts three
    through seven, charging defendant with burglary in the first degree”
    (People v Clark, 90 AD3d 1576, 1577). We therefore modify the
    judgment accordingly.
    Contrary to defendant’s contention, viewing the evidence in light
    of the elements of the remaining crimes as charged to the jury (see
    People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we conclude that the verdict is
    not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v
    Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Defendant was identified by only two
    prosecution witnesses; one is a drug addict who also was indicted for
    these crimes and who received a favorable plea agreement in exchange
    for her testimony, and the other has a lengthy criminal record. Thus,
    we agree with defendant that another result would not have been
    -2-                           307
    KA 09-00069
    unreasonable (see id. at 495). Nevertheless, we further conclude
    that, upon weighing the “ ‘relative strength of conflicting inferences
    that may be drawn from the testimony,’ ” the jury did not fail to give
    the evidence the weight it should be accorded (id.).
    Because he failed to object in a timely manner to the
    prosecutor’s failure to correct the testimony of a prosecution witness
    that she did not receive any benefit for her testimony, defendant
    failed to preserve for our review his contention that the People’s
    failure to correct that testimony deprived him of a fair trial (see
    People v Hendricks, 2 AD3d 1450, 1451, lv denied 2 NY3d 762). In any
    event, we conclude that, although the prosecutor has an obligation “to
    correct misstatements by a witness concerning the nature of a promise”
    (People v Novoa, 70 NY2d 490, 496), the error in failing to do so here
    is harmless because County Court instructed the jury that the witness
    also had been indicted for these crimes and had been permitted to
    plead guilty to lesser offenses in exchange for her testimony (see
    generally Hendricks, 2 AD3d at 1451).
    We also reject defendant’s contention that the court erred in
    permitting the People to present the testimony of a police witness
    regarding the out-of-court identification of defendant by a
    prosecution witness (see CPL 60.25). During her testimony, the
    witness mistakenly identified the codefendant as defendant, and
    explained that defendant had long hair with braids at the time of the
    crime. It is undisputed that defendant’s hair was short at the time
    of the trial. Thus, based upon defendant’s change of appearance, the
    court properly determined that the witness was unable to identify
    defendant on the basis of present recollection (see generally People v
    Quevas, 81 NY2d 41, 45-46; People v Nival, 33 NY2d 391, 394-395,
    appeal dismissed and cert denied 
    417 US 903
    ).
    Entered:   March 16, 2012                       Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 09-00069

Filed Date: 3/16/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016