M., KEYON, MTR. OF ( 2011 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    645
    CAF 10-00925
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, LINDLEY, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ.
    IN THE MATTER OF KEYON M., AARIONNA M.,
    HIRAM S., AND LESTARIYAH A.
    -------------------------------------------       MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    MONROE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
    PETITIONER-RESPONDENT;
    KENYETTA M., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
    SHIRLEY A. GORMAN, BROCKPORT, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
    WILLIAM K. TAYLOR, COUNTY ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (CAROL L. EISENMAN OF
    COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
    TANYA J. CONLEY, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN, ROCHESTER, FOR KEYON M.,
    AARIONNA M., HIRAM S., AND LESTARIYAH A.
    Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Monroe County (John J.
    Rivoli, J.), entered April 15, 2010 in a proceeding pursuant to Social
    Services Law § 384-b. The order, among other things, terminated
    respondent’s parental rights.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: Respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter
    alia, revoked a suspended judgment and terminated her parental rights
    with respect to the minor children who are the subject of this
    proceeding. Contrary to the mother’s contention, “[a] hearing on a
    petition alleging the violation of a suspended judgment is part of the
    dispositional phase of a permanent neglect proceeding,” and thus
    Family Court properly permitted petitioner to introduce evidence at
    the hearing concerning the children’s best interests (Matter of Saboor
    C., 303 AD2d 1022, 1023; see Matter of Christopher J., 60 AD3d 1402;
    Matter of Seandell L., 57 AD3d 1511, lv denied 12 NY3d 708). “If
    [petitioner] establishes ‘by a preponderance of the evidence that
    there has been noncompliance with any of the terms of the suspended
    judgment, the court may revoke the suspended judgment and terminate
    parental rights’ ” (Matter of Shad S., 67 AD3d 1359, 1360; see Family
    Ct Act § 633 [f]; Matter of Terrance M., 75 AD3d 1147, 1147-1148).
    Here, contrary to the further contention of the mother, a
    preponderance of the evidence supports the court’s determination that
    she violated numerous terms of the suspended judgment and that it is
    in the children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights (see
    -2-                  645
    CAF 10-00925
    Terrance M., 75 AD3d at 1148).
    Entered:   June 10, 2011               Patricia L. Morgan
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CAF 10-00925

Filed Date: 6/10/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016