Zito v. New York City Office of Payroll Administration ( 2015 )


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  •                             State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: July 23, 2015                       518293
    ________________________________
    STEPHANIE L. ZITO,
    Appellant,
    v
    NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF PAYROLL               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    ADMINISTRATION et al.,
    Respondents,
    et al.,
    Defendant.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   May 27, 2015
    Before:   Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Garry and Devine, JJ.
    __________
    Stephanie L. Zito, Davenport, appellant pro se.
    Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City
    (Elizabeth I. Freedman of counsel), for New York City Office of
    Payroll Administration and others, respondents.
    __________
    Peters, P.J.
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Lambert, J.),
    entered December 6, 2013 in Delaware County, which, among other
    things, granted defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint.
    From 1987 through 1992, plaintiff was employed part time by
    defendant New York City Department of Education (hereinafter DOE)
    as a substitute teacher and was required to pay a Federal
    Insurance Contributions Act (hereinafter FICA) tax on her
    earnings. In 1988, the Court of Appeals held that part-time city
    employees were entitled to join the New York City Employees'
    Retirement System (see Doctors Council v New York City Employees'
    -2-                518293
    Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669, 677 [1988]) and, as a result of
    that decision, the Social Security Administration and the
    Internal Revenue Service determined that part-time city employees
    were entitled to a refund of FICA taxes that they had erroneously
    paid. To obtain the refund, eligible part-time employees were
    required to sign a consent form authorizing defendant New York
    City Office of Payroll Administration (hereinafter OPA) to apply
    for the refund on his or her behalf.
    With assistance from DOE and defendant United Federation of
    Teachers (hereinafter UFT), OPA identified plaintiff as an
    employee eligible for the refund and mailed letters to her last
    known address in 1994, 1997 and 1998, requesting that she
    complete and return the enclosed claim authorization form.
    Plaintiff, who had moved in 1992, never received the letters and,
    thus, did not submit a claim authorization form before the
    Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration
    ceased accepting refund claims in 2006. Plaintiff learned of the
    refund program in 2007 and, in the years that followed, made
    numerous unsuccessful efforts to obtain her refund.
    Plaintiff commenced this action against DOE, OPA and
    defendants New York City Comptroller John C. Liu and former New
    York City Comptroller William C. Thompson Jr. (hereinafter
    collectively referred to as the City defendants), as well as UFT,
    asserting causes of action sounding in, among other things,
    negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The City defendants and
    UFT separately moved to dismiss the complaint, and plaintiff
    moved for a default judgment against the City defendants on the
    basis that their motion was untimely served. Supreme Court
    denied plaintiff's motion and granted defendants' motions.
    Plaintiff appeals.1
    We affirm, albeit primarily on different grounds than
    relied upon by Supreme Court. Initially, the causes of action
    sounding in negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and
    1
    This Court granted plaintiff's motion to withdraw and
    discontinue her appeal against UFT (2015 NY Slip Op 65159[U]
    [2015]).
    -3-                518293
    breach of the duty of fair representation – specifically, the
    second, third, fourth and seventh causes of action – must be
    dismissed against the City defendants because plaintiff did not
    serve a notice of claim upon them (see General Municipal Law §
    50-e [1] [a]; Montano v City of Watervliet, 47 AD3d 1106, 1109
    [2008]; Serkil, L.L.C. v City of Troy, 259 AD2d 920, 922 [1999],
    lv denied 93 NY2d 811 [1999]). Indeed, service of a notice of
    claim upon a municipality is a condition precedent to maintaining
    a tort claim against municipal defendants (see General Municipal
    Law §§ 50-e [1] [a]; 50-i [1]; Barchet v New York City Tr. Auth.,
    20 NY2d 1, 4 [1967]; Smith v Town of Long Lake, 40 AD3d 1381,
    1384 [2007]; Matter of Tara V. v County of Otsego, 12 AD3d 984,
    985 [2004]).
    Plaintiff's remaining causes of action must be dismissed
    for failure to state a claim. In resolving a motion to dismiss
    for failure to state a cause of action, we "liberally construe
    the complaint, 'accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as
    true, accord [the] plaintiff[] the benefit of every possible
    favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as
    alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" (Beesmer v
    Besicorp Dev., Inc., 72 AD3d 1460, 1461-1462 [2010], quoting Leon
    v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994] [internal citation
    omitted]). However, we will not accept as true factual
    allegations and legal conclusions that are "'inherently
    incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence'"
    (Mesiti v Mongiello, 84 AD3d 1547, 1549 [2011], quoting Quail
    Ridge Assoc. v Chemical Bank, 162 AD2d 917, 918 [1990], lv
    dismissed 76 NY2d 936 [1990]).
    Applying these principles here, we conclude that
    plaintiff's first, fifth, sixth and eighth causes of action fail
    to state a claim. In her first cause of action, plaintiff merely
    alleges damages, without specifying how she is legally entitled
    to them (see Union Brokerage v Dover Ins. Co., 97 AD2d 732, 733
    [1983]). Plaintiff's fifth cause of action, in which she alleged
    that OPA, Thompson and Liu violated their duties "in the
    management and disposition of corporate assets committed to
    [their] charge" (Banking Law § 7017 [1] [a] [1]), also fails, as
    plaintiff did not timely authorize the United States Treasury to
    release her FICA refund to OPA. As for her sixth cause of
    -4-                  518293
    action, even if properly asserted against OPA and DOE, Labor Law
    § 727 does not provide plaintiff with a private right of action
    to enforce a union "officer's financial reporting and accounting
    obligations" (Ash v Scanlon, 19 AD3d 187, 188 [2005]). Finally,
    plaintiff's eighth cause of action, which alleged that the City
    defendants violated the Court of Appeals' ruling in Doctors
    Council v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. (71 NY2d 669
    
    [1988], supra
    ), patently lacks merit because OPA obtained
    plaintiff's last known address from DOE and UFT, sent a claim
    authorization form to this address on three separate occasions
    and obtained FICA refunds for eligible employees who completed
    and returned the form. Accordingly, the City defendants' motion
    to dismiss the complaint was properly granted.
    Plaintiff's remaining contentions, to the extent they have
    not been rendered academic by our decision, have been considered
    and rejected.
    Lahtinen, Garry and Devine, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 518293

Judges: Peters

Filed Date: 7/23/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/1/2024