Matter of Ellis v. Frito Lay Inc. , 30 N.Y.S.3d 394 ( 2016 )


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  •                           State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: April 28, 2016                    520961
    ________________________________
    In the Matter of GAVIN ELLIS,
    Claimant,
    v
    FRITO LAY INC. et al.,                      MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    Appellants.
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD,
    Respondent.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   March 21, 2016
    Before:   Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch, Devine and Clark, JJ.
    __________
    Morrison Mahoney LLP, New York City (Jacqulyn N. Simmons of
    counsel), New York City, for appellants.
    Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City
    (Marjorie S. Leff of counsel), for Workers' Compensation Board,
    respondent.
    __________
    Egan Jr., J.
    Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board,
    filed July 7, 2014, which ruled that claimant sustained a work-
    related injury and awarded him workers' compensation benefits.
    Claimant, a warehouse worker, was unloading a trailer by
    himself when he fell down some stairs and injured his back and
    neck. He subsequently applied for workers' compensation
    benefits. Following a hearing, a Workers' Compensation Law Judge
    found that claimant had sustained a work-related injury and
    awarded benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed that
    -2-                520961
    decision, and this appeal ensued.
    We affirm. Initially, although there is a presumption that
    an unwitnessed workplace accident arose out of the course of the
    claimant's employment pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 21
    (1), the Board correctly noted in its decision that the
    presumption cannot be used to establish that an accident actually
    occurred (see Matter of Neville v Jaber, 46 AD3d 1137, 1138
    [2007]; Matter of Santiago v Otisville Correctional Facility, 39
    AD3d 1109, 1110 [2007]). Rather, such a determination is a
    factual question for the Board to resolve, and its determination
    will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence (see
    Matter of Hopkins v Emcor Group, Inc., 130 AD3d 1114, 1114
    [2015]; Matter of Gardner v Nurzia Constr. Corp., 63 AD3d 1385,
    1386 [2009]). Here, claimant testified that he slipped while
    walking down some stairs to check a trailer. According to
    claimant, the stairs had a coating of snow on them, and he
    injured his back and neck as a result of the fall. Claimant
    immediately used his cell phone to notify his supervisor, who was
    in an office on the premises, and to later call an ambulance. In
    contrast, the employer presented evidence supporting its
    contention that claimant fabricated his claim in light of an
    impending disciplinary action against him and in retaliation for
    the denial of his request to leave early on the day of the
    accident. Claimant's supervisor also presented testimony that
    contradicted certain aspects of claimant's account of the
    accident and the hours following the accident. Inasmuch as "the
    Board has broad authority to make credibility determinations and
    to draw reasonable inferences from record evidence" (Matter of
    Klamka v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 84 AD3d 1527,
    1528 [2011]; see Matter of Cicciarelli v Westchester Health Care
    Corp., 86 AD3d 733, 734 [2011]), its finding that claimant
    established that a workplace accident had occurred is supported
    by substantial evidence.1
    1
    While its decision is somewhat unclear, we are satisfied
    that the Board properly undertook the inquiry into whether
    claimant demonstrated that an accident had occurred without
    relying on the statutory presumption.
    -3-                  520961
    As such, it is presumed that the accident and injury arose
    out of claimant's employment, and the employer may overcome the
    presumption of compensability by presenting substantial evidence
    to the contrary (see Matter of Stevenson v Yellow Roadway Corp.,
    114 AD3d 1057, 1059 [2014]; Matter of Richman v NYS Unified Ct.
    Sys., 91 AD3d 1014, 1015 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 811 [2012]).
    To that end, the employer relied on written reports from its
    fitness instructor indicating that claimant had reported
    suffering from discomfort in his lower back "on and off for
    years" to argue that he had a preexisting condition. Notably,
    however, the record also contains the medical reports of
    claimant's treating physician, claimant's chiropractor and a
    physician who performed an independent medical examination on
    claimant. All three found claimant to be temporarily totally
    disabled from performing the duties of a warehouse worker and
    concluded that his condition was causally related to his
    employment. In light of the foregoing, we will not disturb the
    Board's determination that the employer's evidence was
    insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption. The employer's
    remaining claims have been considered and found to be without
    merit.
    Garry, J.P., Lynch, Devine and Clark, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 520961

Citation Numbers: 138 A.D.3d 1363, 30 N.Y.S.3d 394

Judges: Egan, Garry, Lynch, Devine, Clark

Filed Date: 4/28/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/1/2024