STATE OF NEW YORK v. PETERS, SCOTT ( 2016 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    993
    CA 15-01714
    PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
    IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF STATE OF
    NEW YORK, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
    V                             MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    SCOTT PETERS, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
    THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (NICHOLAS P. DIFONZO OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
    ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (LAURA ETLINGER OF
    COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Cattaraugus County
    (John L. Michalski, A.J.), entered April 3, 2015 in a proceeding
    pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The order, inter alia,
    committed respondent to a secure treatment facility.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: Respondent appeals from an order determining that he
    is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement pursuant to Mental
    Hygiene Law article 10. Respondent contends that the evidence is
    legally insufficient to support a finding that he suffers from a
    mental abnormality within the meaning of the statute because the
    testimony at the jury trial did not establish that he has “serious
    difficulty in controlling” his sex-offending behavior (§ 10.03 [i]).
    Even assuming, arguendo, that respondent preserved that contention for
    our review (cf. Matter of Vega v State of New York, 140 AD3d 1608,
    1609), we conclude that it is without merit. Petitioner presented the
    testimony of two psychologists who opined that respondent suffers
    from, among other things, pedophilic disorder and antisocial
    personality disorder, and that, as a result of those mental
    abnormalities, respondent has serious difficulty controlling his sex-
    offending behavior. One of the psychologists testified that her
    opinion was based upon respondent’s pattern of sexual misconduct, his
    failure to show improvement in controlling his behavior after sex
    offender treatment, and his poor prison disciplinary record, which
    included multiple instances of misbehavior of a sexual nature.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner, we
    conclude that petitioner “provided ‘[a] detailed psychological
    portrait’ of respondent that met [its] burden of demonstrating by
    clear and convincing evidence that he had ‘serious difficulty’ in
    -2-                           993
    CA 15-01714
    controlling his sex-offending conduct” (Matter of State of New York v
    Dennis K., 27 NY3d 718, 751; see Matter of State of New York v
    Williams, 139 AD3d 1375, 1378).
    We also reject respondent’s contention that the verdict with
    respect to mental abnormality is against the weight of the evidence.
    Although respondent’s psychologist testified that respondent suffered
    from posttraumatic stress disorder stemming from his own sexual abuse
    as a child and that his sex offenses did not support a diagnosis of
    pedophilic disorder or a conclusion that he suffers from a mental
    abnormality, the jury’s verdict is entitled to deference, and we
    conclude that the evidence does not “preponderate[] so greatly in
    [respondent’s] favor that the jury could not have reached its
    conclusion on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Matter of
    State of New York v Gierszewski, 81 AD3d 1473, 1474, lv denied 17 NY3d
    702 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Contrary to respondent’s
    contention, any failure by petitioner’s experts to adhere strictly to
    each criterion listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
    Mental Disorders (DSM-V) does not render their diagnosis of pedophilic
    disorder against the weight of the evidence. Here, petitioner’s
    experts testified that the DSM-V cannot be employed rigidly and
    expressly provides for the use of clinical judgment in the forensic
    setting, and the experts opined that the diagnosis was appropriate
    based upon their full assessments of respondent’s pattern of behavior
    (see Matter of State of New York v Pierce, 79 AD3d 1779, 1779-1780, lv
    denied 16 NY3d 712; Matter of State of New York v Shawn X., 69 AD3d
    165, 169-171, lv denied 14 NY3d 702; see generally Matter of State of
    New York v Shannon S., 20 NY3d 99, 106, cert denied ___ US ___, 130 S
    Ct 1500).
    We reject respondent’s further contention that the evidence
    presented at the dispositional hearing is not legally sufficient to
    establish that he requires confinement. Petitioner established by the
    requisite clear and convincing evidence that respondent “suffer[s]
    from a mental abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to
    commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that
    [he] is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if
    not confined to a secure treatment facility” (Mental Hygiene Law
    § 10.03 [e]; see Matter of Billinger v State of New York, 137 AD3d
    1757, 1758, lv denied 27 NY3d 911). Contrary to respondent’s
    contention, Supreme Court’s determination that he required confinement
    is not against the weight of the evidence. The court “was in the best
    position to evaluate the weight and credibility of the conflicting
    [expert] testimony presented . . . , and we see no reason to disturb
    the court’s decision to credit the testimony of petitioner’s experts”
    (Matter of State of New York v Parrott, 125 AD3d 1438, 1439, lv denied
    25 NY3d 911 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
    Entered:   November 18, 2016                   Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 15-01714

Filed Date: 11/18/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/18/2016