ADAMS, ELIJAH W., PEOPLE v ( 2015 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    360
    KA 11-00686
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    ELIJAH W. ADAMS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    (APPEAL NO. 1.)
    TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES ECKERT OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (ROBERT J. SHOEMAKER OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Vincent M.
    Dinolfo, J.), rendered February 24, 2011. The judgment convicted
    defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon
    in the second degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from three judgments rendered by
    County Court on the same day. In appeal Nos. 1 and 2, defendant
    appeals from judgments convicting him upon his pleas of guilty of,
    respectively, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree
    (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) and criminal possession of a controlled
    substance in the third degree (§ 220.16 [1]). In appeal No. 3,
    defendant appeals from a judgment entered upon his admission that he
    violated the terms and conditions of his probation, revoking his
    probation, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of incarceration of
    2a to 7 years on the underlying conviction of assault in the second
    degree (§ 120.05 [3]), attempted assault in the second degree (§§
    110.00, 120.05 [2]), and reckless endangerment in the first degree (§
    120.25).
    We reject defendant’s contention in appeal Nos. 1 and 2 that the
    search by the probation officers of his home and a safe located
    therein was unlawful. Although probationers and parolees have a
    constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
    seizures (see People v Hale, 93 NY2d 454, 459; People v Johnson, 94
    AD3d 1529, 1531, lv denied 19 NY3d 974), “ ‘what may be unreasonable
    with respect to an individual who is not on parole [or probation] may
    be reasonable with respect to one who is’ ” (Johnson, 94 AD3d at 1531,
    quoting People v Huntley, 43 NY2d 175, 181). The conditions of
    -2-                           360
    KA 11-00686
    defendant’s probation regarding drug and alcohol use and prohibiting
    his ownership of firearms were a proper basis for the probation
    officers’ search of his home and property therein (see Hale, 93 NY2d
    at 462; People v Wheeler, 99 AD3d 1168, 1170, lv denied 20 NY3d 989).
    The search was carried out as part of the probation officers’ duties
    as probation officers, and “the assistance of police officers at the
    scene did not render the search a police operation” (People v Johnson,
    54 AD3d 969, 970; see Johnson, 94 AD3d at 1532; People v Scott, 93
    AD3d 1193, 1194, lv denied 19 NY3d 967, reconsideration denied 19 NY3d
    1001).
    Defendant contends that we must reverse the judgment in appeal
    No. 3 in the event that we reverse the judgments in appeal Nos. 1 and
    2 (see generally People v Pichardo, 1 NY3d 126, 129). We reject
    defendant’s contention, inasmuch as we are affirming the judgments in
    appeal Nos. 1 and 2. We conclude, however, that the sentence in
    appeal No. 3 must be vacated. Assault in the second degree is a class
    D violent felony for which an indeterminate sentence is not authorized
    (see Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [c]; [2] [b]; People v Delorenzo, 34 AD3d
    868, 869; see generally People v Endresz, 1 AD3d 888, 888-889). In
    addition, the indeterminate term of 2a to 7 years’ imprisonment
    exceeded the authorized sentence for the class E nonviolent felony of
    attempted assault in the second degree (see § 70.00 [2] [e]; [3] [b];
    [4]). “ ‘Although this issue was not raised before the [sentencing]
    court or on appeal, we cannot allow an [illegal] sentence to stand’ ”
    (People v Davis, 37 AD3d 1179, 1180, lv denied 8 NY3d 983). We
    therefore modify the judgment in appeal No. 3 by vacating the
    sentence, and we remit the matter to County Court “to afford defendant
    the opportunity to accept an amended lawful sentence or to withdraw
    his admission to the violation of probation” (People v Jones, 118 AD3d
    1361, 1362).
    Entered:   March 20, 2015                      Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 11-00686

Filed Date: 3/20/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/7/2016