Larmon v. Queens Berry Correctional ( 2024 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DANIEL LARMON, Plaintiff, 24-CV-1976 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER QUEENS BERRY CORRECTIONAL, et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is held at the Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center, brings this pro se action against “Queens Berry Correctional,” Officer White, Sergeant Tomas, and Officer Kelly.1 For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). 1 Plaintiff refers to the sergeant as both “Tomas” and “Thomas.” (ECF 1, at 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights at “Queens Berry Correctional” in March 2023. Because the Court is unable to find a facility by that name either in this district or in New York, the Court assumes that Plaintiff is referring to Queensboro Correctional Facility (“Queensboro”), which is located in Long Island City, Queens County, New York, which falls within the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112. Along with the facility, Plaintiff also names as defendants Officer White, Sergeant Tomas, and Officer Kelly, who are presumably employed at Queensboro, but he does not plead the residence of these officers. Because it is unknown where the named officer resides, it is unclear whether venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(1) in either this District or the Eastern District of New York. Even if the Court did assume that the officer resides in this District and that venue is proper here under Section 1391(b)(1), because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims appeared to have occurred in Queensboro, venue also would be proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a case is filed in a jurisdiction where venue is proper, a court may transfer the case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded less deference where the plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events appeared to have occurred in Queens, where it is reasonable to expect that all relevant documents and witnesses would be located. The Eastern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case. The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: March 19, 2024 New York, New York /s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge