AERC Saw Mill Village, Inc. v. Franklin County Board of Revision , 127 Ohio St. 3d 44 ( 2010 )


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  • [Cite as AERC Saw Mill Village, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    127 Ohio St. 3d 44
    ,
    2010-Ohio-4468.]
    AERC SAW MILL VILLAGE, INC., APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD
    OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.
    [Cite as AERC Saw Mill Village, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision,
    
    127 Ohio St. 3d 44
    , 2010-Ohio-4468.]
    Real property tax — Valuation complaints — R.C. 5715.19(D) — Relation of
    continuing-complaint provision and carryover provision to reappraisal.
    (No. 2009-1765 — Submitted July 6, 2010 — Decided September 28, 2010.)
    APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2007-A-764 and 2008-A-157.
    __________________
    BROWN, C.J.
    {¶ 1} This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals
    (“BTA”) in a real property valuation case.             The Franklin County auditor
    determined that a value that had been stipulated by the parties for tax year 2002 in
    a case pending before the BTA should be carried over to tax years 2005 and 2006.
    The auditor made that determination even though the stipulation occurred after
    the auditor had conducted the reappraisal for tax year 2005 and had already
    determined a lower value for the property for that year.
    {¶ 2} When the owner objected to the carryover, the Franklin County
    Board of Revision (“BOR”) upheld the auditor’s determination, and thereafter, the
    BTA affirmed. The owner has appealed and argues that the auditor and the BOR
    should have retained the lower reappraisal valuation for tax years 2005 and 2006.
    {¶ 3} We must decide whether the carryover provision of R.C.
    5715.19(D) required the county auditor to undo the 2005 reappraisal retroactively
    and to use instead the value stipulated for tax year 2002 as the value for tax years
    2005 and 2006. We conclude that the taxing authorities and the BTA erred, and
    we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Facts
    {¶ 4} Appellant, AERC Saw Mill Village, Inc. (“AERC”), owns a 340-
    unit residential apartment complex that was constructed in 1986 on a 22.6-acre
    parcel located in the city of Columbus/Dublin City Schools taxing district. For
    tax year 2005, the Franklin County auditor performed the reappraisal of property
    in the county that R.C. 5713.01 requires every six years (the “sexennial
    reappraisal”), and the auditor determined that the true value of AERC’s property
    was $17,900,000.
    {¶ 5} Subsequently, in August 2006, AERC decided to settle a dispute
    concerning the value of the property for tax year 2002 by stipulating to a value of
    $20,100,000 for that year in BTA case No. 2005-M-377. The BTA adopted the
    stipulated value in a decision and order dated September 1, 2006. That decision
    ordered the auditor to “adjust his tax records for January 1, 2002,” in accordance
    with the stipulated taxable value of $7,035,000.1                   In accordance with the
    stipulation, the decision also ordered that the “stipulated values be carried forward
    according to law.”
    {¶ 6} After the BTA’s decision, the auditor changed his valuation and
    assessment for tax year 2005.             The auditor restated the value for 2005 at
    $20,100,000, based on the theory that the BTA decision required him to carry
    over the value stipulated for tax year 2002 to tax year 2005. As a matter of
    course, the 2005 value was also applied to tax year 2006, which was the next year
    of the new triennial period.
    {¶ 7} Because the period for filing a complaint against 2005 valuation
    had expired at the end of March 2006, R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), AERC challenged the
    carryover for 2005 by a letter to the BOR that invoked the “continuing complaint”
    jurisdiction of the board pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(D). As for tax year 2006,
    1. Because the taxable value of real property in Ohio is 35 percent of the property’s true value, a
    taxable value of $7,035,000 correlates to a true value of $20,100,000.
    2
    January Term, 2010
    AERC filed a valuation complaint on March 28, 2007, seeking to restore the
    reappraisal value of $17,900,000 for tax year 2006. The BOR held separate
    hearings for the two tax years, and at each hearing, counsel for AERC advanced
    the legal argument that the auditor should not have carried the 2002 valuation
    over to tax years 2005 and 2006.
    {¶ 8} The BOR rejected AERC’s contention as to both tax years. The
    BOR concluded that because AERC presented no affirmative evidence of value,
    the auditor’s carryover of the $20,100,000 valuation should be retained. AERC
    appealed both decisions to the BTA. The appeals were consolidated. At the
    BTA, the parties waived a hearing and submitted the case on a stipulated
    evidentiary record that, in addition to the transcript certified by the BOR,
    consisted of the county’s formal responses to AERC’s request for admissions,
    along with attached documentation.
    {¶ 9} The BTA issued a single decision that addressed both tax years.
    AERC Saw Mill Village, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Sept. 1, 2009),
    BTA Nos. 2007-A-764 and 2008-A-157, 
    2009 WL 2846576
    . Citing Columbus
    Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999), 
    87 Ohio St. 3d 305
    , 
    720 N.E.2d 517
    , and its own earlier decision in David W. Swetland Bldg. Co. v.
    Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (June 30, 2005), BTA Nos. 2003-A-1183, 2003-A-
    1184, 2003-A-2107, and 2003-A-2108, 
    2005 WL 1618198
    , the BTA stated,
    “With no complaint filed for tax year 2005 to otherwise suspend the application
    of the carryover provision, we find that the Franklin County Auditor properly
    carried the values determined by the BTA for tax year 2002 forward into tax year
    2005.” AERC Saw Mill Village, Inc., at 7. With respect to tax year 2006, the
    BTA observed that AERC in essence sought to carry forward the reappraisal
    value that the auditor had originally determined for tax year 2005. Because
    AERC had presented no evidence in support of the lower number, the BTA
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    concluded that the BOR properly retained the higher value for tax year 2006 as
    well. 
    Id. at 8-9.
    AERC has appealed, and we now reverse.
    Analysis
    The continuing-complaint provision of R.C. 5715.19(D) conferred jurisdiction
    on the BOR and the BTA to review the auditor’s reappraisal and
    redetermination of value for tax year 2005
    {¶ 10} Although no party has asserted a lack of jurisdiction for tax year
    2005, the court has a duty to ensure that the tribunals below did have jurisdiction
    with respect to tax year 2005. As the BTA stated, AERC did not file a complaint
    regarding tax year 2005, but the filing of such a complaint was not necessary
    under the circumstances for the tribunals below to obtain jurisdiction.       R.C.
    5715.19(D) states as follows:
    {¶ 11} “If a complaint filed under this section for the current year is not
    determined by the board within the time prescribed for such determination, the
    complaint and any proceedings in relation thereto shall be continued by the board
    as a valid complaint for any ensuing year until such complaint is finally
    determined by the board or upon any appeal from a decision of the board. In such
    case, the original complaint shall continue in effect without further filing by the
    original taxpayer, the original taxpayer’s assignee, or any other person or entity
    authorized to file a complaint under this section.”
    {¶ 12} This is known as the continuing-complaint provision, and its
    operation is triggered when the BOR does not issue a decision within the time
    frame set forth in R.C. 5715.19(C). We have summarized the operation of these
    divisions of the statute by stating that “when a board of revision has not rendered
    its decision within the statutorily prescribed 90 days, ‘the complaint and any
    proceedings in relation thereto shall be continued by the board as a valid
    complaint for any ensuing year until such complaint is finally determined.’ ”
    Fogg–Akron Assoc., L.P. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    124 Ohio St. 3d 112
    ,
    4
    January Term, 2010
    2009-Ohio-6412, 
    919 N.E.2d 730
    , ¶ 8, quoting R.C. 5715.19(D).             Once the
    continuing-complaint provision has been triggered, the original complaint – in
    this case, the complaint filed for the 2002 tax year – continues as a valid
    complaint through the year in which the final decision, by the board of revision or
    on appeal, is rendered in the proceedings on that complaint. Columbus Bd. of
    Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999), 
    87 Ohio St. 3d 305
    , 307, 
    720 N.E.2d 517
    .
    {¶ 13} From the foregoing, it follows that if the BOR in the 2002-tax-year
    case had issued its decision within 90 days of the filing of the valuation complaint
    pertaining to that earlier tax year, then the continuing-complaint provision would
    not apply. As a result, the BOR would not have had jurisdiction to consider the
    auditor’s reappraisal for tax year 2005 or his decision to displace the reappraisal
    value with the stipulated value for 2002.
    {¶ 14} In the present case, no party has contended that the 90-day
    requirement was satisfied. Moreover, although the record in the tax-year-2002
    case is not before us, we do not question the applicability of the continuing-
    complaint provision for two reasons. First, the presumption of regularity requires
    that we presume that the lower tribunals predicated their merits rulings upon a
    proper jurisdictional basis. Dayton–Montgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. Montgomery
    Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    113 Ohio St. 3d 281
    , 2007-Ohio-1948, 
    865 N.E.2d 22
    , ¶ 13,
    quoting Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Evatt (1944), 
    143 Ohio St. 71
    , 
    28 Ohio Op. 21
    , 
    54 N.E.2d 132
    , paragraph seven of the syllabus. Second, the BTA decision in the
    2002-tax-year case bears a 2005 case number at the BTA, indicating that the BOR
    decision in the 2002 case was not appealed to the BTA until 2005. Because an
    aggrieved party must appeal a board of revision decision to the BTA within 30
    days, R.C. 5717.01, it follows that the BOR issued its decision in late 2004 at the
    earliest. Therefore, the 2002 complaint was continued as a jurisdictionally viable
    5
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    means of reviewing property value in later years until tax year 2006 – the year
    when the 2002 value was finally determined.
    The carryover provision of R.C. 5715.19(D) should be read
    in pari materia with the statutes that require the auditor to reappraise
    and update the valuation of real property
    {¶ 15} On the merits, this case presents the question whether R.C.
    5715.19(D) required the auditor to use the 2002 stipulated value for tax year
    2005. When a BTA decision is appealed, this court looks to see if that decision
    was reasonable and lawful. R.C. 5717.04; Satullo v. Wilkins, 
    111 Ohio St. 3d 399
    ,
    2006-Ohio-5856, 
    856 N.E.2d 954
    , ¶ 14. In reviewing a BTA decision under this
    standard, we acknowledge that “ ‘[t]he BTA is responsible for determining factual
    issues and, if the record contains reliable and probative support for these BTA
    determinations,’ this court will affirm them.” 
    Id., quoting Am.
    Natl. Can Co. v.
    Tracy (1995), 
    72 Ohio St. 3d 150
    , 152, 
    648 N.E.2d 483
    . On the other hand, the
    court “ ‘will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect
    legal conclusion.’ ” 
    Id., quoting Gahanna–Jefferson
    Local School Dist. Bd. of
    Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 
    93 Ohio St. 3d 231
    , 232, 
    754 N.E.2d 789
    . The issue of how
    to apply R.C. 5715.19(D) to the undisputed facts requires us to decide a purely
    legal issue.2
    {¶ 16} The starting point for that analysis is to examine the statutory
    language at issue. R.C. 5715.19(D) states:
    {¶ 17} “Liability for taxes and recoupment charges for such year and each
    succeeding year until the complaint is finally determined and for any penalty and
    2. The school board argues that AERC invited or acquiesced in the carryover of the 2002
    stipulated value to tax year 2005 based on the language of the stipulation submitted to the BTA in
    connection with the 2002-tax-year valuation. We disagree. The language of the stipulation and
    the BTA decision merely provide that the 2002 value should be “carried forward according to
    law.” It follows that AERC did not explicitly agree to carry the value forward to 2005 and also
    that the issue before us is whether the law required the auditor to carry the 2002 value forward to
    2005.
    6
    January Term, 2010
    interest for nonpayment thereof within the time required by law shall be based
    upon the determination, valuation, or assessment as finally determined.”
    {¶ 18} Appellee Dublin City Schools Board of Education urges that the
    auditor, the BOR, and the BTA correctly applied the quoted carryover language in
    this case. According to the school board, because the tax-year-2002 complaint
    was not “finally determined” until the BTA decision in September 2006, the tax
    officials acted properly in carrying the stipulated 2002 value of $20,100,000 over
    to tax years 2005 and 2006. In response, AERC does not question the school
    board’s reading of the statute but instead points to the auditor’s duties under other
    statutes – duties that stand in potential conflict with the mandate that the
    redetermined value for an earlier tax year be carried over to the next year.
    {¶ 19} As the county’s tax assessor, the county auditor is required to value
    and assess property tax against the taxable property in the county.             R.C.
    5713.01(B) and 5713.03.       Specifically, the auditor must reappraise property
    values once every six years and update the values at the interim three-year point.
    R.C. 5713.01(B), 5713.03, 5715.33, and 5715.24; Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-
    16(B); Cleveland Mun. School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 
    105 Ohio St. 3d 404
    , 2005-Ohio-
    2285, 
    827 N.E.2d 306
    , ¶ 2. In addition to the periodically required adjustments,
    the auditor is under a standing duty to “revalue and assess at any time all or any
    part of the real estate in such county * * * where the auditor finds that the true or
    taxable values thereof have changed.” R.C. 5713.01(B). This duty might be
    triggered by an arm’s-length sale; the statutes require the auditor to consider the
    sale price to be the value of the property. R.C. 5713.03. Or the reporting of an
    improvement or casualty to the property might lead to a revaluation and
    reassessment.   See Cummins Property Servs., L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of
    Revision, 
    117 Ohio St. 3d 516
    , 2008-Ohio-1473, 
    885 N.E.2d 222
    , ¶ 43.
    {¶ 20} In this case, the auditor encountered potentially conflicting duties.
    Having carried out his statutory duty to reappraise the property at issue for tax
    7
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    year 2005, the auditor would have been led by the statutes to use and retain that
    value for 2005 and 2006. But instead, the auditor treated the 2006 stipulation of
    value for tax year 2002 as retroactively superseding the 2005 reappraisal value.
    AERC argues that this conflict in the auditor’s duties under different statutes calls
    for a harmonizing construction that gives effect to the various statutes while
    avoiding absurd and unintended outcomes.
    {¶ 21} We agree. To give full literal effect to the carryover provision and
    allow it to supersede the auditor’s ongoing duty to value and revalue real property
    leads to the absurd result that the assessor arrived at in the present case. Here, a
    revaluation of the property for tax year 2005 was displaced by a different value
    stipulated for January 1, 2002, that no one had determined or agreed constituted
    the value on January 1, 2005, or January 1, 2006.
    {¶ 22} To be sure, the carryover does properly apply to a subsequent year
    in which the auditor has not performed a new valuation of the property pursuant
    to his statutory duties. But to allow the carryover to displace a new valuation both
    defeats the purposes of the valuation statutes and thwarts the constitutional
    mandate that “[l]and and improvements thereon” be “taxed by uniform rule
    according to value.” Section 2, Article XII, Ohio Constitution.
    {¶ 23} Our cases have recognized situations, both generally and in regard
    to construing R.C. 5715.19, in which conflicting statutes and competing mandates
    must be read in a manner designed to harmonize the different statutory provisions.
    See Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996),
    
    74 Ohio St. 3d 639
    , 642, 
    660 N.E.2d 1179
    (construing “competing portions” of
    R.C. 5715.19 in a manner designed to “harmonize” them); United Tel. Co. v.
    Limbach (1994), 
    71 Ohio St. 3d 369
    , 372, 
    643 N.E.2d 1129
    (“in reading such
    statutes in pari materia, and construing them together, this court must give such a
    reasonable construction as to give the proper force and effect to each and all such
    statutes”); State ex rel. Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 
    122 Ohio St. 3d 234
    ,
    8
    January Term, 2010
    2009-Ohio-2610, 
    910 N.E.2d 432
    , ¶ 25, citing Maxfield v. Brooks (1924), 
    110 Ohio St. 566
    , 
    144 N.E.2d 725
    , paragraph two of the syllabus; Couts v. Rose
    (1950), 
    152 Ohio St. 458
    , 461, 
    40 Ohio Op. 482
    , 
    90 N.E.2d 139
    .
    {¶ 24} Indeed, our reasoning in Cincinnati School Dist. controls in the
    present case. In Cincinnati, the property value for 1989 had been challenged by
    complaint and was adjusted on appeal.        Meanwhile, the owner filed a new
    complaint for tax year 1990, which was the year of a triennial update in Hamilton
    County. The school board did not offer evidence of value below but argued on
    appeal that the valuation as determined on the 1989 complaint should be carried
    over to 1990. We disagreed, holding that “the filing of a valid new complaint in
    the second triennium stops, for the tax year at issue and succeeding years, the
    automatic carryover of the value determined under a prior complaint.” 74 Ohio
    St.3d at 642-643, 
    660 N.E.2d 1179
    . Accord Fogg–Akron Assoc., 
    124 Ohio St. 3d 112
    , 2009-Ohio-6412, 
    919 N.E.2d 730
    , ¶ 10.
    {¶ 25} Just as the school board in the present case argues that the
    carryover provision trumps the 2005 sexennial appraisal, the board of education in
    Cincinnati contended that the plain language of the carryover provision trumped
    the board of revision’s duty to hear the fresh complaint for the new triennium.
    We rejected that contention, finding that the owner’s right to file a complaint for
    the new triennium potentially conflicted with the carryover and continuing-
    complaint provisions.    That conflict necessitated a harmonizing construction,
    under which the fresh complaint prevailed against the carryover. By the same
    logic, the carryover provision should not have displaced the statutory reappraisal
    in this case.
    Under the case law, the auditor may perform the triennial update and the
    sexennial reappraisal in spite of the carryover provision of R.C. 5715.19(D)
    {¶ 26} Cincinnati School Dist. is also instructive in another respect. In
    that case, the first complaint concerned tax year 1989, and the second complaint
    9
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    concerned tax year 1990, which was the first year of the new triennial interim
    period in Hamilton County.       By allowing the consideration of the second
    complaint, the court continued the practice in previous cases of applying the
    carryover only within one triennium. See Wolf v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision
    (1984), 
    11 Ohio St. 3d 205
    , 208, 11 OBR 523, 
    465 N.E.2d 50
    (holding that the
    value determined for first year of triennial period should be carried forward to the
    next two years); Oberlin Manor, Ltd. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 
    69 Ohio St. 3d 1
    , 2, 
    629 N.E.2d 1361
    (“The final determination of Oberlin Manor’s
    complaint as to the assessment of real property taxes for 1982 applies to the
    subsequent years in the same triennium” [emphasis added]).
    {¶ 27} On this point, an even more significant case is Columbus Bd. of
    Edn., 
    87 Ohio St. 3d 305
    , 
    720 N.E.2d 517
    .          While Cincinnati involved the
    collision of the carryover provision with the board of revision’s statutory duty to
    hear a fresh complaint, the court in Columbus Bd. of Edn. (often referred to as
    Inner City, after the property owner) addressed the interaction of the carryover
    and the triennial update.
    {¶ 28} In Inner City, the owner had filed a complaint for tax year 1993,
    which was finally determined at the BTA in August 1996. The county effectuated
    that decision by applying the reduced value to tax years 1993, 1994, and 1995.
    For 1996, however – a triennial update year – the county assessed the property at
    a standard 5 percent markup from the previous value. But instead of using the re-
    determined value for 1993, the auditor used the 1993 value as originally
    determined. The court held that the county had erred – the 5 percent markup
    should have been applied to the redetermined value, not to the value as originally
    determined.
    {¶ 29} The school board misconstrues the decision in Inner City. Inner
    City focused not on the carryover provision of R.C. 5715.19(D) but rather on the
    continuing-complaint provision of R.C. 5715.19(D): the court held that the board
    10
    January Term, 2010
    of revision had jurisdiction under the continuing-complaint provision to make the
    proper adjustment to the auditor’s 1996 valuation of the property.
    {¶ 30} The significant aspect of Inner City for this case is that the auditor
    was permitted to perform the update in spite of the carryover provision – the only
    effect of the earlier complaint being that the update percentage must be applied to
    the value of the earlier year as redetermined. By the same logic as applied in
    Inner City, the auditor’s sexennial reappraisal of AERC’s property should have
    been permitted to stand in the present case.
    {¶ 31} We emphasize that the point to be drawn from Cincinnati and
    Inner City is not that the carryover provision is effective only within a triennium,
    i.e., the three-year interim period between updates or reappraisals.3 See R.C.
    5715.19(A)(2) (defining “interim period”). Instead, the point established by the
    case law is that the carryover provision operates with full force only when the
    auditor is not under a separate statutory duty to adjust the value assigned to the
    property.
    {¶ 32} Typically, the auditor does carry over the value from the first year
    of a triennium to the next year, unless some event that triggers a need to change
    the valuation. In those instances, R.C. 5715.19(D) establishes that the figure the
    auditor uses when carrying forward a previous year’s value is the value as
    redetermined through the proceedings conducted on a valuation complaint. But
    when the auditor performs a new valuation pursuant to a separate statutory duty
    3. The school board regards Cleveland Mun. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of
    Revision, 
    105 Ohio St. 3d 404
    , 2005-Ohio-2285, 
    827 N.E.2d 306
    , as authority for a mandatory
    carryover of a value determined by the BTA into a new triennial period. The school board is
    mistaken, because the court in that case did not reach the issue of whether a BTA-determined
    value should be carried over into the new triennial period. Instead of addressing the merits of
    carrying over or reducing the value, the court declined to view the untimely filed complaint as
    invoking the continuing-complaint jurisdiction for certain earlier years and ordered dismissal for
    lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, the court observed that continuing-complaint jurisdiction still
    existed for two tax years, and the court held that the BTA’s affirmance of certain adjustments
    performed by the auditor for those two years was “premature.” 
    Id. at ¶
    23, 25.
    11
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    for any year subsequent to the filing of a valuation complaint, that newly
    determined value constitutes the value for that year. Moreover, that new value
    can be displaced only by a showing that some other value is correct.
    {¶ 33} The foregoing discussion establishes that the auditor erred by
    retroactively applying the carryover to displace his 2005 reappraisal value for the
    property. We therefore reverse the BTA’s determination in BTA No. 2008-A-157
    and order that the $17,900,000 reappraisal value be restored as the value of the
    property for tax year 2005. Moreover, as for the 2006 tax year, unless some event
    justified a change in valuation, the 2005 reappraisal value would ordinarily be
    assigned to the second year of the triennium. This principle leads us to reverse
    the BTA’s determination in BTA No. 2007-A-764 and order that the $17,900,000
    be assigned as the true value of the property for the 2006 tax year as well.
    The case is remanded to permit the school board to challenge the 2005
    reappraisal valuation of the property
    {¶ 34} Our conclusion that we must reverse the BTA’s decision raises the
    further question whether we should remand for further proceedings.
    {¶ 35} We have already discussed how the operation of the continuing-
    complaint provision permitted AERC to challenge the auditor’s decision to
    change the 2005-tax-year valuation (¶ 10-14, above).          By “continuing” the
    proceedings conducted under the complaint filed for an earlier tax year “as a valid
    complaint for any ensuing year until such complaint is finally determined,” R.C.
    5715.19(D) creates ongoing jurisdiction in the pending case to (1) carry over the
    value determined for the year at issue and (2) hear objections to later actions taken
    by the auditor that change the value of the property during those ensuing years.
    Any party to the 2002-tax-year proceedings may avail itself of the continuation of
    the complaint: the statute explicitly permits continued jurisdiction without further
    filing by “the original taxpayer, the original taxpayer’s assignee, or any other
    person or entity authorized to file a complaint under this section.”
    12
    January Term, 2010
    {¶ 36} It follows that the school board did not need to file a complaint in
    order to challenge the 2005 reappraisal value of $17,900,000. Moreover, as to the
    2006 tax year, AERC’s complaint and the school board’s countercomplaint
    created jurisdiction in the BOR to determine the value for that year.4
    {¶ 37} Because the auditor erroneously carried over the 2002 value and
    displaced the 2005 reappraisal value, the school board had no incentive to present
    any evidence that it might have supporting a value of $20,100,000 for the
    property as of January 1, 2005. Additionally, because the auditor also assigned
    $20,100,000 as the value of the property for tax year 2006, the school board was
    deprived of its incentive to present evidence in support of its countercomplaint
    regarding the property’s value on January 1, 2006.
    {¶ 38} Under these circumstances, we find it appropriate to remand the
    case to the BTA with the instruction that the school board be afforded an
    opportunity to present additional evidence of the property’s value for tax years
    2005 and 2006. On remand, the BTA may exercise discretion to determine
    whether additional hearings are necessary and whether evidence should be
    presented to the BTA itself or to the BOR.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 39} For the reasons set forth previously, we conclude that the BTA
    erred by upholding the carryover of the 2002 value to 2005 and 2006. We
    therefore reverse and remand in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
    Decision reversed
    and cause remanded.
    PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
    4. As an alternative to litigating a later value change in the pending proceedings, an affected
    person may file a fresh complaint that challenges the valuation in the later year. See Fogg–Akron
    Assoc., L.P., 
    124 Ohio St. 3d 112
    , 2009-Ohio-6412, 
    919 N.E.2d 730
    , ¶ 10. The filing of a
    jurisdictionally valid fresh complaint terminates the continuation of the earlier complaint under
    R.C. 5715.19(D). 
    Id. 13 SUPREME
    COURT OF OHIO
    O’DONNELL, J., concurs in reversing the decision of the Board of Tax
    Appeals but would not remand the cause.
    LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only.
    __________________
    Siegel, Siegel, Johnson & Jennings, L.P.A., J. Kieran Jennings, and Jason
    P. Lindholm, for appellant.
    Rich & Gillis Law Group, Mark H. Gillis, and Allison J. Crites, for
    appellee Dublin City Schools Board of Education.
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    14