Disciplinary Counsel v. Harris , 137 Ohio St. 3d 1 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Harris, 
    137 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2013-Ohio-4026
    .]
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HARRIS.
    [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Harris, 
    137 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2013-Ohio-4026
    .]
    Attorneys—Misconduct—Attorney not licensed in Ohio practicing in federal
    district court located in Ohio—Ohio has no authority to enforce Ohio
    Rules of Professional Conduct against attorney not licensed in Ohio—
    Complaint dismissed and matter referred to Board on Unauthorized
    Practice of Law for further proceedings.
    (No. 2012-1698—Submitted February 26, 2013—Decided September 26, 2013.)
    ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
    Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-077.
    ____________________
    O’DONNELL, J.
    {¶ 1} This issue in this case is whether Donald Harris, an attorney who is
    admitted to the practice of law in the District of Columbia and the Northern and
    Southern Districts of Ohio, but who is not admitted to the practice of law in the
    state of Ohio, is subject to the disciplinary authority of this court. Because Harris
    is not a member of the Ohio bar and has not taken an oath to be bound by the
    Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, these rules do not apply to him; rather, his
    conduct is subject to review by the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
    (“UPL Board”).
    {¶ 2} Accordingly, we dismiss the Aimee Skeel matter in deference to
    the authority of the bankruptcy court, and we dismiss the remaining matters and
    refer them to the UPL Board for further proceedings.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    {¶ 3} Donald Harris has never been admitted to the practice of law in the
    state of Ohio. However, as a member of the District of Columbia bar and of the
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    bars of the United States District Court for the Northern and Southern Districts of
    Ohio, he has focused his practice in bankruptcy law before the federal courts
    geographically located in Ohio.
    {¶ 4} In August 2011, disciplinary counsel filed a four-count complaint
    against Harris relating to his representation of an Ohio client in bankruptcy
    proceedings before the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    Ohio, his establishment of a limited-liability company on behalf of an Ohio client,
    his assistance to an Ohio client in a mortgage modification, and representations
    regarding the relationship between an Ohio-licensed attorney and the Donald
    Harris Law Firm. Disciplinary counsel maintains that since Harris is an out-of-
    state attorney practicing federal law within Ohio’s boundaries, he is subject to the
    disciplinary authority of this state pursuant to Prof.Cond.R. 8.5.
    {¶ 5} A hearing panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
    Discipline concluded that disciplinary counsel had properly filed the complaint
    against Harris pursuant to Prof.Cond.R. 8.5. The panel further found that Harris
    had engaged in numerous violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct
    and recommended that Harris be indefinitely suspended from representing Ohio
    citizens in the state of Ohio. Upon review, the board adopted the findings of fact,
    conclusions of law, and recommendation of the panel.
    {¶ 6} In his objections to the report and recommendation of the board,
    Harris asserts that Prof.Cond.R. 8.5 does not authorize this court to enforce the
    Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct against attorneys who are not licensed in
    Ohio. Moreover, Harris maintains that Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a)—which prohibits a
    lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of its regulation of the
    legal profession—applies only to attorneys licensed in Ohio who practice in
    another jurisdiction. And he further contends that the federal courts and the
    District of Columbia have jurisdiction over any disciplinary matters relating to his
    practice in the federal bankruptcy courts.
    2
    January Term, 2013
    The Court’s Authority to Regulate the Practice of Law in Ohio
    {¶ 7} Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g) of the Ohio Constitution grants this
    court “ ‘exclusive power to regulate, control, and define the practice of law in
    Ohio.’ ” Greenspan v. Third Fed. S. & L. Assn., 
    122 Ohio St.3d 455
    , 2009-Ohio-
    3508, 
    912 N.E.2d 567
    , ¶ 16, quoting Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement,
    Inc., 
    104 Ohio St.3d 168
    , 
    2004-Ohio-6506
    , 
    818 N.E.2d 1181
    , ¶ 39. We have
    explained that “[a]ny definition of the practice of law inevitably includes
    representation before a court, as well as the preparation of pleadings and other
    legal documents, the management of legal actions for clients, all advice related to
    law, and all actions taken on behalf of clients connected with the law.” Cleveland
    Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 
    111 Ohio St.3d 444
    , 
    2006-Ohio-6108
    , 
    857 N.E.2d 95
    , ¶ 22.
    {¶ 8} We have defined the unauthorized practice of law as “ ‘the
    rendering of legal services for another by any person not admitted to practice in
    Ohio under Rule I and not granted active status under Rule VI, or certified under
    Rule II, Rule IX, or Rule XI of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of
    the Bar of Ohio.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Kocak, 
    121 Ohio St.3d 396
    , 
    2009-Ohio-1430
    , 
    904 N.E.2d 885
    , ¶ 17, quoting former Gov.Bar R.
    VII(2)(A), 103 Ohio St.3d XCIX, CI.         Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A)(4) defines the
    unauthorized practice of law to include “[h]olding out to the public or otherwise
    representing oneself as authorized to practice law in Ohio by a person not
    authorized to practice law by the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the
    Bar or Prof.Cond.R. 5.5.” And controlling in this case is our own precedent: “a
    lawyer admitted to practice in another state, but not authorized to practice in
    Ohio, who counsels Ohio clients on Ohio law and drafts legal documents for them
    is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Ohio.” Cleveland Bar Assn. v.
    Moore, 
    87 Ohio St.3d 583
    , 584, 
    722 N.E.2d 514
     (2000), citing Cleveland Bar
    Assn. v. Misch, 
    82 Ohio St.3d 256
    , 
    695 N.E.2d 244
     (1998).
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Rules of Professional Conduct Do Not Apply to Harris
    {¶ 9} Although Harris is licensed to practice law in another jurisdiction,
    because he is not admitted to the Ohio bar, our Rules of Professional Conduct,
    designed to regulate conduct of attorneys admitted to practice law in Ohio, do not
    apply to him. He never subjected himself to them because he has never been
    admitted to practice law in this state.
    {¶ 10} Every lawyer who is admitted to practice law in Ohio takes an oath
    of office. See Gov.Bar R. I(1)(F). As part of that oath, the attorney swears or
    affirms to support the Constitutions of the United States and the state of Ohio and
    to “abide by the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.” Gov.Bar R. I(8)(A).
    {¶ 11} Harris never took that oath and never agreed to abide by our rules,
    and we are reluctant to impose our rules of conduct on him or other such attorneys
    who engage in the practice of law in our state. It appears that this is precisely
    why we have created the UPL Board and why we have defined the unauthorized
    practice of law as “ ‘[t]he rendering of legal services for another by any person
    not admitted to practice in Ohio.’ ” Kocak, 
    121 Ohio St.3d 396
    , 
    2009-Ohio-1430
    ,
    
    904 N.E.2d 885
    , ¶ 17, quoting former Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A), now Gov.Bar R.
    VII(2)(A)(1).
    {¶ 12} In this regard, Harris is no different from an accountant, a real
    estate agent, or a financial planner who undertakes activity that constitutes the
    practice of law and who becomes subject to discipline pursuant to the
    unauthorized practice of law framework. It is inconsistent to conclude that an
    attorney admitted in another jurisdiction who engages in the unauthorized practice
    of law in Ohio becomes subject to the Board of Commissioners on Grievances
    and Discipline when another professional, such as a real estate agent, who
    engages in the unauthorized practice of law becomes subject to the UPL Board.
    Similarly, our decision today is in accordance with Gov.Bar R. VI(3)(C), which
    provides:
    4
    January Term, 2013
    An attorney who is admitted to the practice of law in
    another state or in the District of Columbia, but not in Ohio, and
    who performs legal services in Ohio for his or her employer, but
    fails to register in compliance with this section or does not qualify
    to register under this section, may be referred for investigation of
    the unauthorized practice of law under Gov.Bar R. VII * * *.
    (Emphasis added.)
    {¶ 13} Additionally, our sanctions for serious violations of the Rules of
    Professional Conduct, suspension and disbarment, are ineffective and meaningless
    to Harris because he is not a member of the Ohio bar. We cannot suspend or
    disbar an attorney who is not a member of the Ohio bar. Thus, we consider these
    matters as alleged unauthorized practice of law violations.
    Harris’s Conduct
    The Bankruptcy Proceedings
    {¶ 14} Harris represented Aimee Skeel in two bankruptcy petitions filed
    in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio. We
    determine that Harris did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law when he
    represented Skeel because, as a member of the District of Columbia bar, and
    having been admitted to practice in the Northern District of Ohio, he was
    authorized to practice before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
    District of Ohio. As such, he becomes subject to the disciplinary authority of
    those federal courts.
    {¶ 15} As the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio
    explained, “[a] bankruptcy court has the power to regulate the practice of law in
    the cases before it.” In re Ferguson, 
    326 B.R. 419
    , 422 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2005),
    citing United States v. Johnson, 
    327 F.3d 554
    , 560 (7th Cir.2003); see also
    5
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 
    501 U.S. 32
    , 43, 
    111 S.Ct. 2123
    , 
    115 L.Ed.2d 27
    (1991) (“the Court has held that a federal court has the power to control admission
    to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it”). Specifically, Loc.R.
    2090-2(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio
    states that “[p]rofessional conduct and attorney discipline shall be governed by
    Local Civil Rule 83.7,” which provides that “any attorney admitted to practice
    before this Court may be subjected to such disciplinary action as the
    circumstances warrant.” Loc.Civ.R. 83.7(b)(1) of the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Ohio.
    {¶ 16} Here, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
    of Ohio exercised its authority and declined to sanction Harris or order the
    disgorgement of attorney fees for his representation of Skeel in bankruptcy
    proceedings. Because the alleged misconduct involving Skeel occurred before the
    United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio and because that
    court has the power to discipline Harris for his practice before it, we dismiss this
    charge in deference to the disciplinary authority of the United States Bankruptcy
    Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
    Formation of an L.L.C.
    {¶ 17} Darlene Martincak engaged Harris to file a petition in bankruptcy.
    She also asked Harris to help her transfer five properties owned by her company
    to Alexander Roussos. Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy, Harris met with
    Martincak and Roussos to discuss the property transfers and agreed to assist them.
    In relation to these transactions, during oral argument, Harris’s counsel admitted
    that Harris had formed an L.L.C. Harris did not inform Martincak or Roussos that
    he was not licensed to practice law in Ohio.
    {¶ 18} Harris has never been admitted to the practice of law in Ohio, does
    not have active status, and is not certified. By definition, then, Harris did not
    commit a disciplinary violation because he never became subject to our
    6
    January Term, 2013
    disciplinary rules by gaining admission to the bar of the state of Ohio. Rather,
    Harris may have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he assisted
    Roussos in establishing an L.L.C. in accordance with Ohio law and when he
    participated in transferring properties to that L.L.C. See Columbus Bar Assn. v.
    Verne, 
    99 Ohio St.3d 50
    , 
    2003-Ohio-2463
    , 
    788 N.E.2d 1064
    , ¶ 1-4. In addition,
    by his silence, he may have further engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by
    leading Roussos and Martincak to believe that he was a member of the Ohio bar.
    See Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A)(4), which defines the unauthorized practice of law to
    include holding out to the public or otherwise representing oneself as authorized
    to practice law. Thus, since Harris is not admitted to the Ohio bar and because the
    conduct with which he is charged has been defined by this court to constitute the
    unauthorized practice of law, we dismiss the disciplinary action and refer this
    matter to the UPL Board.
    Modification of a Mortgage
    {¶ 19} Harris also agreed to seek modification of a mortgage that Ronald
    Sharp—a client whom Harris had represented in two prior bankruptcy
    proceedings—held on his residence and failed to inform Sharp that he was not
    licensed to practice law in Ohio.
    {¶ 20} While we agree with the board that there is insufficient evidence to
    support the allegations that Harris committed any disciplinary violations relating
    to the modification of Sharp’s mortgage, we refer this matter to the UPL Board
    for its consideration and review.
    Violations Involving Information about Legal Services
    {¶ 21} Harris formed the Donald Harris Law Firm in 2004. The firm
    maintained a website, which indicated that unnamed attorneys in his firm were
    licensed in various states, including Ohio. In addition, Harris’s letterhead stated,
    “Attorneys at Law” below the firm name and listed Loretta Riddle, a member of
    the Ohio bar, as an attorney. However, the nature of the working relationship
    7
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    between Harris and Riddle is unclear. Thus, by holding out to the public that
    Riddle was a member of the Donald Harris Law Firm, he may have engaged in
    the unauthorized practice of law in Ohio. See Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A)(4). We
    therefore refer this matter to the UPL Board for its consideration and review.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 22} Because Harris is not a member of the Ohio bar, he is not subject
    to this court’s disciplinary authority. Rather, as an attorney not admitted to
    practice in Ohio, he may have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by
    rendering legal services in Ohio to Ohio clients.
    {¶ 23} Therefore, in conformity with our previous decisions in Moore and
    Misch and our longstanding definition of the unauthorized practice of law, we
    dismiss the Skeel matter in deference to the authority of the bankruptcy court.
    We further dismiss the Roussos/Martincak matter, the Sharp matter, and the
    charges relating to information about legal services and refer these matters to the
    UPL Board for further proceedings.
    So ordered.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and
    O’NEILL, JJ., concur.
    ____________________
    Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Philip A. King, Assistant
    Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
    Oglesby & Oglesby, Ltd., and Geoffrey L. Oglesby, for respondent.
    ________________________
    8