Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc. , 121 Ohio St. 3d 488 ( 2009 )


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  • [Cite as Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., 
    121 Ohio St.3d 488
    , 2009-
    Ohio-1525.]
    ESTATE OF STEVIC ET AL., APPELLEES, v. BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATION OF
    OHIO, INC., D.B.A. FMC DIALYSIS SERVICES OF RICHLAND COUNTY,
    APPELLANT, ET AL.
    [Cite as Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc.,
    
    121 Ohio St.3d 488
    , 
    2009-Ohio-1525
    .]
    Limitation of actions — R.C. 2305.113(A) — Definition of “medical claim.”
    (No. 2008-0392 — Submitted December 17, 2008 — Decided April 8, 2009.)
    APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County,
    No. 2006 CA 0095, 
    2008-Ohio-33
    .
    __________________
    SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
    For the purposes of the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations, a
    “medical claim” under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is a claim that both arises out
    of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and is asserted
    against one or more of the statutorily enumerated medical providers.
    __________________
    CUPP, J.
    {¶ 1} In this appeal, appellant-defendant contends that it may claim the
    benefit of the one-year “medical claim” statute of limitations contained in R.C.
    2305.113(A) against a claim arising out of the medical diagnosis, care, or
    treatment of a person even though the claim is not asserted against one of the
    medical professionals or facilities (“providers”) specifically listed in R.C.
    2305.113(E)(3).
    {¶ 2} Because R.C. 2305.113(E) defines a “medical claim” for purposes
    of R.C. 2305.113(A) not only as a claim that arises out of the medical diagnosis,
    care, or treatment of a person but also as one that is asserted against one of the
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    enumerated providers, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand
    the case to the trial court.
    I
    {¶ 3} In October 2003, Donald Stevic went to the Richland County
    Kidney Dialysis Center for dialysis treatment.             Appellant, Bio-Medical
    Application of Ohio, Inc., d.b.a. FMC Dialysis Services of Richland County
    (“Bio-Medical”), owns and operates the Richland County Kidney Dialysis Center.
    According to the complaint, employees of the center either physically dropped
    Stevic or allowed him to fall from a mechanical lift device that was used to move
    him from a wheelchair and into position for dialysis. As a result of the fall, Stevic
    suffered a fractured hip, abrasions, and other injuries. In February 2004, Stevic
    died.
    {¶ 4} Almost two years later, in October 2005, appellee Betty Stevic, as
    widow and executor of appellee the estate of Donald Stevic, filed a complaint for
    personal injuries and other tort damages against appellant, Bio-Medical.
    {¶ 5} Bio-Medical filed an answer and a motion for judgment on the
    pleadings.    Bio-Medical asserted that notwithstanding Stevic’s styling of the
    claims as claims for personal injury, the claims nevertheless arose in the course of
    medical treatment, were essentially medical claims falling within the R.C.
    2305.113(E)(3) definition of “medical claims,” and were subject to the R.C.
    2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations. Further, Bio-Medical contended that
    the claims were time-barred because Stevic’s complaint was filed more than one
    year after the date of the injury. In a one-sentence entry without any supporting
    rationale, the trial court granted Bio-Medical’s motion for judgment on the
    pleadings and dismissed Stevic’s suit.
    {¶ 6} Upon review, a divided appellate court concluded that it was not
    clear from the face of Stevic’s complaint whether or not claims based on Mr.
    Stevic’s injuries constituted R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) medical claims, which are
    2
    January Term, 2009
    subject to the one-year statute of limitations. Specifically, the court stated that it
    could not unambiguously determine whether the complained-of injuries occurred
    while Stevic was under the care and direction of a medical provider or in a facility
    specified in the R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) definition of “medical claim.” Estate of
    Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., Richland App. No. 2006 CA
    0095, 
    2008-Ohio-33
    , ¶ 20. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial
    court and remanded the case for a determination of whether Stevic’s complaint
    alleged an R.C.2305.113(E)(3) medical claim. Id., ¶ 20, 23.
    {¶ 7} Thereafter, Bio-Medical appealed to this court, and we accepted
    review under our discretionary jurisdiction.              Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical
    Application of Ohio, Inc., 
    118 Ohio St.3d 1432
    , 
    2008-Ohio-2595
    , 
    887 N.E.2d 1202
    .
    II
    {¶ 8} Although an action for bodily injury must generally be brought
    within two years after the cause of action accrues, R.C. 2305.10(A), certain
    medical claims are subject to the shorter one-year statute of limitations set forth at
    R.C. 2305.113.1 This one-year limitation statute specifically lists and defines the
    types of claims included within its ambit.
    {¶ 9} As pertinent to this appeal, “medical claim” has the following
    specific, defined statutory meaning:
    {¶ 10} “(3) ‘Medical claim’ means any claim that is asserted in any civil
    action against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, or residential facility,
    against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, or
    residential facility, or against a licensed practical nurse, registered nurse,
    advanced practice nurse, physical therapist, physician assistant, emergency
    1. Although not pertinent to this appeal, the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations also
    applies to dental, optometric, and chiropractic claims.
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    medical      technician-basic, emergency medical                technician-intermediate, or
    emergency medical technician-paramedic, and that arises out of the medical
    diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.                 ‘Medical claim’ includes the
    following:
    {¶ 11} “(a) Derivative claims for relief that arise from the medical
    diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person;
    {¶ 12} “(b) Claims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or
    treatment of any person and to which either of the following applies:
    {¶ 13} “(i) The claim results from acts or omissions in providing medical
    care.
    {¶ 14} “(ii) The claim results from the hiring, training, supervision,
    retention, or termination of caregivers providing medical diagnosis, care, or
    treatment.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2305.113(E)(3).
    {¶ 15} Further, the statute also lists and defines the medical providers
    included within the R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) definition of “medical claim.”2
    {¶ 16} Both parties in this appeal assert that the definition of “medical
    claim” set forth in R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is plain and unambiguous. We agree.
    Therefore, our analysis is limited to applying the legislature’s enactment and
    giving it effect according to its plain meaning. Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 
    66 Ohio St. 621
    , 
    64 N.E. 574
    , paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.
    III
    {¶ 17} Bio-Medical argues that the R.C. 2305.113(A) limitations period
    applies even if only one portion of the R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) definition is satisfied.
    Specifically, Bio-Medical asserts that Stevic’s claim meets the definition of
    2. For instance, the following terms are also defined: physician, podiatrist, hospital, home,
    residential facility, licensed practical nurse, registered nurse, advanced practice nurse, physical
    therapist, physician assistant, emergency medical technician-basic, emergency medical technician-
    intermediate, and emergency medical technician-paramedic. R.C. 2305.113(E)(1), (2), (4), (8),
    (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19).
    4
    January Term, 2009
    “medical claim” through the sole application of this clause: “ ‘Medical claim’
    includes * * * [c]laims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment
    of any person [when the] claim results from acts or omissions in providing
    medical care.” R.C. 2305.113(E)(3)(b). According to Bio-Medical, because Mr.
    Stevic’s injury resulted from the acts or omissions of the dialysis center’s staff in
    connection with his dialysis treatment, Stevic presented a medical claim within
    the purview of R.C. 2305.113(E)(3).
    {¶ 18} Bio-Medical may be correct that Stevic’s claim arises out of the
    diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person. However, Bio-Medical ignores the
    portion of the statute that also requires that the claim be asserted against one or
    more of the specific medical professionals or facilities listed in R.C.
    2305.113(E)(3). The term “medical claim” as defined in R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) has
    two components that the statute states in the conjunctive: (1) the claim is asserted
    against one or more of the specifically enumerated medical providers and (2) the
    claim arises out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment. We must give full
    meaning to all of the express statutory language. See, e.g., In re Estate of Roberts
    (2002), 
    94 Ohio St.3d 311
    , 314, 
    762 N.E.2d 1001
    ; Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948),
    
    149 Ohio St. 231
    , 237, 
    36 O.O. 554
    , 
    78 N.E.2d 370
    .
    {¶ 19} Therefore, based on the plain meaning of the legislature’s
    enactment, we hold that for the purposes of the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute
    of limitations, a medical claim under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is a claim that both (1)
    arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and (2) is
    asserted against one or more of the statutorily enumerated medical providers.
    {¶ 20} Moreover, as the appellate court correctly concluded, because
    Stevic’s complaint did not clearly indicate whether any of her claims were
    asserted against medical providers enumerated in R.C. 2305.113(E), the trial
    court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Bio-Medical was premature.
    Remand is appropriate because further proceedings in the trial court are required
    5
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    to determine whether Stevic’s complaint alleges a medical claim within the
    purview of R.C. 2305.113.
    IV
    {¶ 21} For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court of appeals is
    affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    Judgment affirmed
    and cause remanded.
    MOYER,     C.J.,   and     PFEIFER,    LUNDBERG   STRATTON,   O’CONNOR,
    O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur.
    __________________
    Benham & Ream Co., L.P.A., Jeffery S. Ream, and Frank L. Benham, for
    appellees.
    Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., Jane F. Warner, and Susan M. Audey, for
    appellant.
    ______________________
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2008-0392

Citation Numbers: 2009 Ohio 1525, 121 Ohio St. 3d 488, 905 N.E.2d 635

Judges: Cupp, Moyer, Pfeifer, Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger

Filed Date: 4/8/2009

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024