State v. Hawkins (Slip Opinion) , 2019 Ohio 4210 ( 2019 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
    v. Hawkins, Slip Opinion No. 
    2019-Ohio-4210
    .]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
    advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
    promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
    South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
    formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
    the opinion is published.
    SLIP OPINION NO. 
    2019-OHIO-4210
    THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HAWKINS, APPELLANT.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as State v. Hawkins, Slip Opinion No. 
    2019-Ohio-4210
    .]
    When an officer encounters a vehicle the whole of which is painted a different color
    from the color listed in the vehicle-registration records and the officer
    believes, based on his experience, that the vehicle or its displayed license
    plates may be stolen, the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
    criminal activity and is authorized to perform an investigative traffic stop.
    (No. 2018-1177—Submitted April 24, 2019—Decided October 16, 2019)
    CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Fayette County,
    No. CA2017-07-013, 
    2018-Ohio-1983
    .
    __________________
    KENNEDY, J.
    {¶ 1} This case was accepted as a certified conflict between judgments of
    the Twelfth District and Fifth District Courts of Appeals. The Twelfth District
    certified the issue in conflict as follows:
    Supreme Court of Ohio
    “Does the discrepancy between the paint color of a vehicle
    and the paint color listed in vehicle registration records accessed by
    a police officer provide the officer with reasonable articulable
    suspicion to perform a lawful investigative traffic stop where the
    officer believes the vehicle or its displayed license plates may be
    stolen[?]”
    
    153 Ohio St.3d 1474
    , 
    2018-Ohio-3637
    , 
    106 N.E.3d 1259
    , quoting the court of
    appeals’ journal entry.
    {¶ 2} We answer the question in the affirmative and hold, based on these
    facts, that when an officer encounters a vehicle the whole of which is painted a
    different color from the color listed in the vehicle-registration records and the
    officer believes, based on his experience, that the vehicle or its displayed license
    plates may be stolen, the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
    activity and is authorized to perform an investigative traffic stop.
    {¶ 3} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of
    Appeals.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Traffic Stop
    {¶ 4} Around 3:00 a.m. on May 20, 2016, Washington Court House Police
    Officer Jeffery Heinz was completing a traffic stop when a vehicle drove past his
    patrol car and Heinz heard his license-plate reader beep. A license-plate reader
    (“reader”) is a computer-controlled camera system installed in some law-
    enforcement vehicles. The cameras, which are mounted to the trunk of the vehicle,
    capture images of the license plates of cars nearby. The system beeps to alert the
    officer that a plate has been captured, and an image of the plate is displayed on the
    computer’s screen.
    2
    January Term, 2019
    {¶ 5} Upon hearing the beep, Heinz looked at the computer screen and saw
    an image of a license plate with a Franklin County sticker. He ran the license-plate
    number and was informed by the dispatcher that the license plate was registered to
    a white 2001 GMC SUV. Heinz looked in his rearview mirror and saw that the
    vehicle, a GMC SUV, was black. He finished the traffic stop and began searching
    for the vehicle.
    {¶ 6} Heinz located the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. The driver,
    appellant, Justin Hawkins, pulled over. Heinz explained to Hawkins that the color
    discrepancy was the reason for the stop and asked to see Hawkins’s identification.
    Hawkins told Heinz that he did not have identification with him. Heinz was able
    to verify that the vehicle’s identification number matched the number registered
    with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) while he was attempting to learn
    Hawkins’s personal information.
    {¶ 7} Hawkins provided Heinz with a Social Security number; however, the
    dispatcher informed Heinz that the number was not associated with the name
    Hawkins. Heinz then verified with Hawkins his name and date of birth and asked
    him again for his Social Security number. Hawkins provided a second Social
    Security number. At this time, Hawkins informed Heinz that he was running low
    on gas. Heinz told Hawkins the location of a gas station.
    {¶ 8} Hawkins pulled away, and Heinz followed in his patrol car. While
    following Hawkins, Heinz was notified by the dispatcher that the second Social
    Security number also was not Hawkins’s. Heinz, still following Hawkins, then
    provided the dispatcher with Hawkins’s name and date of birth. The dispatcher
    advised Heinz that Hawkins did not have a valid driver’s license and that there was
    an outstanding warrant out of Delaware County for Hawkins’s arrest.
    {¶ 9} Heinz activated his lights to initiate a second traffic stop. Hawkins
    pulled his vehicle over, and Heinz approached. Heinz informed Hawkins of the
    outstanding warrant, and Hawkins sped away at a high rate of speed.
    3
    Supreme Court of Ohio
    {¶ 10} Hawkins was apprehended after crashing the vehicle and fleeing on
    foot. Upon his arrest, the vehicle was inventoried and two credit cards that had
    been reported stolen were found in the glove compartment.
    Trial-Court Proceedings
    {¶ 11} On June 3, 2016, Hawkins was indicted on two counts of receiving
    stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A) and (C), felonies of the fifth degree,
    and one count of failing to comply with an order or signal of a police officer in
    violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(5)(a)(ii), a felony of the third degree. He
    moved to suppress the evidence obtained relating to the traffic stop on the basis that
    Heinz had lacked reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.
    {¶ 12} At the suppression hearing, Heinz was the only witness to testify.
    He explained the basis for initiating the traffic stop. He stated that in his experience
    the discrepancy between the color in the BMV registration and the actual color of
    the vehicle could indicate that the vehicle and the license plates had been stolen.
    “[W]ith my experience, if someone would steal a vehicle, they would just go
    through a parking lot anywhere and find a vehicle that would match the vehicle in
    which they were driving. Throw [the license plate from that vehicle] on there and
    then drive around.” He indicated that he had never encountered this personally, but
    he knew that it had occurred in the Washington Court House area.
    {¶ 13} The trial court overruled Hawkins’s motion to suppress. After a jury
    trial, Hawkins was convicted of failure to comply and acquitted of receiving stolen
    property. The trial court imposed a sentence of 36 months in prison.
    Appellate-Court Proceedings
    {¶ 14} Hawkins appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals and
    advanced one assignment of error. He argued that the color discrepancy did not
    amount to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity on which to
    base the traffic stop.
    4
    January Term, 2019
    {¶ 15} The appellate court disagreed. It affirmed the trial court, concluding
    that the color discrepancy was sufficient to raise Heinz’s suspicion that the vehicle
    was either stolen or that the license plate had been taken from another vehicle.
    
    2018-Ohio-1983
    , 
    101 N.E.3d 520
    , ¶ 21. However, the Twelfth District granted
    Hawkins’s motion to certify that its judgment was in conflict with the Fifth
    District’s judgment in State v. Unger, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016 CA 00148, 2017-
    Ohio-5553. We recognized that a conflict exists. 
    153 Ohio St.3d 1474
    , 2018-Ohio-
    3637, 
    106 N.E.3d 1259
    .
    ANALYSIS
    Standard of Review
    {¶ 16} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a
    mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St.3d 152
    , 2003-Ohio-
    5372, 
    797 N.E.2d 71
    , ¶ 8. An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings
    of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. See State v. Fanning,
    
    1 Ohio St.3d 19
    , 20, 
    437 N.E.2d 583
     (1982). But the appellate court must decide
    the legal questions independently, without deference to the trial court’s decision.
    Burnside at ¶ 8.
    The Fourth Amendment and Investigatory Stops
    {¶ 17} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
    papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
    shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
    cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
    the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
    {¶ 18} We have held that in felony cases, Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio
    Constitution provides the same protection as the Fourth Amendment to the United
    5
    Supreme Court of Ohio
    States Constitution. State v. Jones, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 266
    , 
    2015-Ohio-483
    , 
    37 N.E.3d 123
    , ¶ 12.
    {¶ 19} “The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops * * *
    when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for
    suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” Navarette v.
    California, 
    572 U.S. 393
    , 396, 
    134 S.Ct. 1683
    , 
    188 L.Ed.2d 680
     (2014), quoting
    United States v. Cortez, 
    449 U.S. 411
    , 417-418, 
    101 S.Ct. 690
    , 
    66 L.Ed.2d 621
    (1981). This rule traces its beginning to Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 
    88 S.Ct. 1868
    ,
    
    20 L.Ed.2d 889
     (1968), and therefore, the type of stop involved is referred to as a
    “Terry stop.” In Terry, the United States Supreme Court “implicitly acknowledged
    the authority of the police to make a forcible stop of a person when the officer has
    reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be
    engaged in criminal activity.” (Emphasis deleted.) United States v. Place, 
    462 U.S. 696
    , 702, 
    103 S.Ct. 2637
    , 
    77 L.Ed.2d 110
     (1983).
    {¶ 20} Precisely defining “reasonable suspicion” is not possible, and as
    such, the reasonable-suspicion standard is “ ‘not readily, or even usefully, reduced
    to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 695-696, 
    116 S.Ct. 1657
    , 
    134 L.Ed.2d 911
     (1996), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 231,
    
    103 S.Ct. 2317
    , 
    76 L.Ed.2d 527
     (1983). The reasonableness of a Terry stop
    “depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to
    personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” United States v.
    Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S 873, 878, 
    95 S.Ct. 2574
    , 
    45 L.Ed.2d 607
     (1975). The
    level of suspicion required to meet the reasonable-suspicion standard “is obviously
    less demanding than that for probable cause,” and “is considerably less than proof
    of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence” but is “something more than
    an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.” ’ ”        United States v.
    Sokolow, 
    490 U.S. 1
    , 7, 
    109 S.Ct. 1581
    , 
    104 L.Ed.2d 1
     (1989), quoting Terry at 27.
    6
    January Term, 2019
    {¶ 21} To determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct
    a Terry stop, the “totality of circumstances” must be considered and “viewed
    through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must
    react to events as they unfold.” State v. Andrews, 
    57 Ohio St.3d 86
    , 87-88, 
    565 N.E.2d 1271
     (1991). “This process allows officers to draw on their own experience
    and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the
    cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained
    person.’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 273, 
    122 S.Ct. 744
    , 
    151 L.Ed.2d 740
     (2002), quoting Cortez at 411.
    {¶ 22} “A determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need
    not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” 
    Id. at 277
    . In permitting
    detentions based on reasonable suspicion, “Terry accepts the risk that officers may
    stop innocent people.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. 119
    , 126, 
    120 S.Ct. 673
    , 
    145 L.Ed.2d 570
     (2000).
    Heinz Had Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion to Stop Hawkins
    {¶ 23} In this case, Heinz’s suspicions were aroused when he saw a vehicle
    the entirety of which was a different color from the color indicated in the BMV
    records for the vehicle associated with the license plate that was captured by
    Heinz’s reader. The facts that the color discrepancy itself is not a crime and that
    there may be an innocent explanation for the discrepancy do not mean that the
    discrepancy may be disregarded in determining whether Heinz had reasonable
    suspicion. See Arvizu at 274 (reviewing the totality of the circumstances requires
    consideration of an observation that “was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent
    explanation”).   To assign noncriminal behavior no weight would “seriously
    undercut the ‘totality of the circumstances’ principle which governs the existence
    vel non of ‘reasonable suspicion.’ ” Id. at 274-275. Behavior and circumstances
    that are noncriminal by nature may “be unremarkable in one instance * * * while
    quite unusual in another.” Id. at 276. An officer is “entitled to make an assessment
    7
    Supreme Court of Ohio
    of the situation in light of his specialized training and familiarity with the customs
    of the area’s inhabitants.” Id.
    {¶ 24} In this case, Heinz testified that in his experience, the color
    discrepancy could signify that the vehicle either was stolen or had an illegal license
    plate. He knew that in the past, car thieves in the area had stolen a vehicle and then
    switched the license plates with a vehicle of the same make and model. Based on
    his professional experience, Heinz suspected that Hawkins was engaged in criminal
    activity. Therefore, we hold that under the totality of the circumstances, Heinz met
    the reasonable-and-articulable-suspicion standard necessary to perform a lawful
    investigative traffic stop.
    CONCLUSION
    {¶ 25} Based on these facts, when an officer encounters a vehicle the whole
    of which is painted a different color from the color listed in the vehicle-registration
    records and the officer believes, based on his experience, that the vehicle or its
    displayed license plates may be stolen, the officer has a reasonable, articulable
    suspicion of criminal activity and is authorized to perform an investigative traffic
    stop.
    {¶ 26} We affirm the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals.
    Judgment affirmed.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
    STEWART, J., concurs in judgment only.
    DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion.
    _________________
    DONNELLY, J., dissenting.
    {¶ 27} This certified-conflict case began here with a poorly worded
    question, and it has ended with an erroneous answer. I would answer the conflict
    8
    January Term, 2019
    question in the negative and reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of
    Appeals.
    {¶ 28} It is not reasonable for a police officer to infer that a vehicle’s driver
    has stolen the vehicle, stolen license plates from a second vehicle, and switched the
    license plates whenever the officer notices a discrepancy between the color of a
    vehicle and the color listed in its registration records. In direct response to the
    conflict question, I would hold that such a discrepancy, by itself, does not provide
    the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory seizure pursuant to
    Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 
    88 S.Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L.Ed.2d 889
     (1968).
    {¶ 29} Additionally, although the certified question focuses on the specific
    context of vehicle-registration records, I have grave concerns about the state using
    the holding in this case in broader contexts. I would hold that a totality-of-the-
    circumstances analysis is inapplicable in cases in which only one fact is relied upon
    to justify an investigatory seizure. I would also hold that a police officer’s
    knowledge of secondhand anecdotal information from an unidentified source does
    not constitute personal experience or specialized training.
    {¶ 30} This case is a far cry from Terry and United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 
    122 S.Ct. 744
    , 
    151 L.Ed.2d 740
     (2002), both of which involved multiple
    facts that cumulatively led an officer to infer criminal activity, requiring a totality-
    of-the-circumstances analysis. Here, instead of having a single inference based
    upon a wealth of assorted facts, we have a wealth of inferences based upon a single
    fact. And the single fact in this case is that a 15-year-old black GMC SUV was
    registered as a 15-year-old white GMC SUV.
    {¶ 31} Rather than asking whether such a color discrepancy alone provides
    a police officer with reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or its license plates may
    be stolen, the certified question asks whether such a color discrepancy and the
    officer’s belief that the vehicle or license plates may be stolen provides a police
    9
    Supreme Court of Ohio
    officer with reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or its license plates may be stolen.
    My belief is that the certifying appellate court confounded an officer’s inferences
    from the circumstances with the circumstances themselves in order to portray the
    case as one requiring a consideration of the totality of multiple circumstances.
    {¶ 32} In a review of a police officer’s assertion of reasonable suspicion,
    “due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
    ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from
    the facts.” (Emphasis added.) Terry, 
    392 U.S. at 27
    , 
    88 S.Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L.Ed.2d 889
    .     An officer’s experience and background are certainly important
    considerations when determining whether the inferences he drew from the facts
    were reasonable. Id.; Arvizu at 273. But an officer’s inferences drawn from the
    facts, as well as the background and experience informing those inferences, are not
    part of the facts themselves. Thus, in this case, Officer Jeffery Heinz’s background
    and his personal belief that the vehicle driven by Hawkins might have been stolen
    cannot be used to pad the sole fact supporting his investigatory seizure of Hawkins
    in order to justify a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
    {¶ 33} In addition to accepting the false premise that this case involves the
    consideration of multiple facts, the majority defends the reasonableness of Officer
    Heinz’s inferences by referencing the notion that police officers “ ‘draw on their
    own experience and specialized training’ ” when making inferences about those
    facts. Majority at ¶ 21, quoting Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. at 273
    , 
    122 S.Ct. 744
    , 
    151 L.Ed.2d 740
    . But Officer Heinz did not testify as to any personal experience or specialized
    training to justify the connection he drew between vehicle/registration color
    discrepancies and the switching of license plates on stolen vehicles.
    {¶ 34} If anything, Officer Heinz’s testimony regarding his personal
    experience on the police force suggested that license-plate-switching was not likely
    to have happened. Officer Heinz testified that he had been a police officer in
    10
    January Term, 2019
    Washington Court House for over 14 years. Over the course of his career, he had
    investigated more vehicle thefts than he could count. He had investigated both
    vehicle thefts and license-plate thefts. But he had not once in his entire 14-year
    career encountered a situation in which a person had stolen a vehicle and replaced
    its license plates with plates that he had stolen from a similar vehicle of a different
    color. He assured the court, though, that “it is done.” He did not cite any
    specialized training that had led to his understanding that “it is done.” He simply
    indicated that such a crime had occurred one or more times in his city. The majority
    quotes a portion of Officer Heinz’s testimony in which he implies that his
    knowledge of these crimes comes from his own experience. Majority opinion at
    ¶ 12. But that testimony was clarified when the officer was asked whether he had
    personal experience involving stolen vehicles with switched plates and he said that
    he did not.
    {¶ 35} Because Officer Heinz’s belief was based on secondhand anecdotal
    information from an unknown source rather than personal experience or specialized
    training, his personal belief does not add much weight to the analysis, let alone
    dispositive weight.     More importantly, Officer Heinz’s testimony about his
    secondhand information seemed to be an attempt to demonstrate the likelihood that
    a car thief might switch license plates in order to evade detection. But his testimony
    in no way demonstrated the likelihood that anyone driving a car with a
    vehicle/registration color discrepancy might be a car thief who had switched license
    plates.
    {¶ 36} Ohio’s laws and regulations governing vehicle registration, R.C.
    Chapter 4503 and Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-7, do not address vehicle color at all, let
    alone require a driver to immediately file a new registration application to update
    or correct a vehicle’s registered color. There is nothing unlawful in Ohio about
    11
    Supreme Court of Ohio
    driving a vehicle whose color does not match the color listed on the vehicle’s
    registration. The baseline here, then, is that driving such a vehicle is consistent
    with innocent conduct. If behavior is consistent with innocent conduct, it must be
    combined with additional conduct if it is to be used to establish reasonable
    suspicion of illegal conduct. Terry, 
    392 U.S. at 22
    , 
    88 S.Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L.Ed.2d 889
    ;
    United States v. Sokolow, 
    490 U.S. 1
    , 9-10, 
    109 S.Ct. 1581
    , 
    104 L.Ed.2d 1
     (1989);
    United States v. Cortez, 
    449 U.S. 411
    , 419-420, 
    101 S.Ct. 690
    , 
    66 L.Ed.2d 621
    (1981); United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 
    457 F.3d 928
    , 935 (9th Cir.2006)
    (“Seemingly innocuous behavior does not justify an investigatory stop unless it is
    combined with other circumstances that tend cumulatively to indicate criminal
    activity”).
    {¶ 37} It is true that the proper inquiry for making a determination of
    reasonable suspicion is not whether each individual act is innocent or guilty.
    Sokolow at 10, citing Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 243, 
    103 S.Ct. 2317
    , 
    76 L.Ed.2d 527
     (1983), fn. 13. But it is also true that the reasonable-suspicion inquiry
    requires that some acceptable “degree of suspicion” must attach to a noncriminal
    act. 
    Id.
     So what degree of suspicion attaches here? Is driving a vehicle with a
    color that does not match the color listed on the vehicle’s registration the kind of
    behavior to which reasonable suspicion of illegal activity readily attaches, as is true
    of running away after seeing police, Illinois v. Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. 119
    , 124, 
    120 S.Ct. 673
    , 
    145 L.Ed.2d 570
     (2000), or smelling distinctively of marijuana, United
    States v. Ramos, 
    443 F.3d 304
    , 308 (3d Cir.2006)? Or is this the kind of behavior
    that, although unusual, does not yield a high enough degree of suspicion on its own
    to justify an investigatory seizure, such as possessing luggage that smells of an
    unidentified chemical, United States v. Little, 
    18 F.3d 1499
    , 1506 (10th Cir.1994),
    wearing a wig and sunglasses, People v. Tate, 
    367 Ill.App.3d 109
    , 116-117, 853
    12
    January Term, 
    2019 N.E.2d 1249
     (2006), or having more than one air freshener in a vehicle, United
    States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 
    884 F.3d 661
    , 670 (7th Cir.2018)?
    {¶ 38} I believe that driving a vehicle that is a color other than the color
    listed on its registration falls solidly in the second category. The majority of
    jurisdictions addressing this issue tend to agree: so long as a color discrepancy does
    not constitute a violation of state law, then the discrepancy, standing alone, does
    not adequately support reasonable suspicion absent some other indicia of criminal
    activity. United States v. Uribe, 
    709 F.3d 646
     (7th Cir.2013); Schneider v. State,
    
    2015 Ark. 152
    , 
    459 S.W.3d 296
    ; State v. Teamer, 
    151 So.3d 421
     (Fla.2014);
    Commonwealth v. Mason, Va.App. No. 1956-09-2, 
    2010 WL 768721
     (Mar. 9,
    2010) (unpublished decision); State v. O’Neill, N.H.Super. Nos. 06-S-3456 and 06-
    S-3457, 
    2007 WL 2227131
     (Apr. 17, 2007). Compare Smith v. State, 
    713 N.E.2d 338
    , 342 (Ind.App.1999) (court upheld traffic stop; held that mismatch in color
    constituted a traffic violation under Indiana law).
    {¶ 39} In this case, it was within the realm of possibility that Hawkins stole
    a black 2001 GMC SUV, drove around until he found another 2001 GMC SUV
    (which happened to be white), stole the license plates from the white 2001 GMC
    SUV, and put those plates on the black 2001 GMC SUV. It was also quite possible
    that the vehicle was originally white but was painted black at some point in the
    previous 15 years. And it was also quite possible that the vehicle had always been
    black and a mistake was made at some point in the Bureau of Motor Vehicles’
    (“BMV’s”) record keeping or in the transfer of the vehicle-registration information
    to the police.1 Although it is unusual for a vehicle’s color not to match the color
    listed on its registration, there is nothing in Hawkins’s suppression hearing
    1. The latter circumstance seems to have been the case for the vehicle that Hawkins was driving:
    all of the BMV records prior to June 2016 that are in the record before this court do not indicate any
    color for the 2001 GMC SUV, and the only document indicating the color as white is a document
    that was printed from police records and was submitted by the state.
    13
    Supreme Court of Ohio
    establishing that the drivers of such vehicles are not, by and large, innocent
    travelers. Thus, subjecting all such drivers to random investigatory seizures offends
    the Fourth Amendment’s basic protections. See Reid v. Georgia, 
    448 U.S. 438
    ,
    441, 
    100 S.Ct. 2752
    , 
    65 L.Ed.2d 890
     (1980).
    {¶ 40} Officer    Heinz’s     testimony    did    not    establish   that   a
    vehicle/registration color discrepancy, alone, gives rise to a reasonable suspicion
    that the vehicle’s driver is engaged in criminal activity. Instead, Officer Heinz’s
    testimony established that he had a hunch that this might be one of those instances
    in which the innocent conduct might not actually be innocent. Because nothing
    more than an inchoate suspicion of criminal activity was present in this case, I
    would reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals.
    _________________
    Jess C. Weade, Fayette County Prosecuting Attorney, and John M. Scott Jr.,
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Shannon M. Treynor, for appellant.
    _________________
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018-1177

Citation Numbers: 2019 Ohio 4210

Judges: Kennedy, J.

Filed Date: 10/16/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2019

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State v. Gideon (Slip Opinion) , 2020 Ohio 6961 ( 2020 )

State v. Bennett , 2021 Ohio 937 ( 2021 )

State v. Willoughby , 2021 Ohio 2611 ( 2021 )

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