State ex rel. Bradford v. Dinkelacker (Slip Opinion) ( 2017 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
    ex rel. Bradford v. Dinkelacker, Slip Opinion No. 
    2017-Ohio-1342
    .]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
    advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
    promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
    South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
    formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
    the opinion is published.
    SLIP OPINION NO. 
    2017-OHIO-1342
    THE STATE EX REL. BRADFORD, APPELLANT, v. DINKELACKER, JUDGE,
    APPELLEE.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as State ex rel. Bradford v. Dinkelacker, Slip Opinion No.
    
    2017-Ohio-1342
    .]
    Mandamus—Appellant had and has used adequate remedy in ordinary course of
    law—Court of appeals’ dismissal of petition affirmed.
    (No. 2016-0252—Submitted February 7, 2017—Decided April 13, 2017.)
    APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-150714.
    ________________
    Per Curiam.
    {¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals
    dismissing the petition of appellant, Pele K. Bradford, for a writ of mandamus.
    {¶ 2} Bradford seeks an order compelling appellee, Judge Patrick T.
    Dinkelacker of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, to vacate his
    sentence as void and to resentence him “according to the verdict returned by the
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    jury.” To obtain a writ of mandamus, Bradford must establish, by clear and
    convincing evidence, that he has a clear legal right to the requested relief, that Judge
    Dinkelacker has a clear legal duty to provide it, and that Bradford lacks an adequate
    remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 
    131 Ohio St.3d 55
    , 
    2012-Ohio-69
    , 
    960 N.E.2d 452
    , ¶ 6, 13.
    {¶ 3} Bradford’s mandamus claim asserts an error in sentencing.                   A
    sentencing error “does not patently and unambiguously divest the court or its judges
    of jurisdiction to enter judgment.” State ex rel. Pruitt v. Donnelly, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 498
    , 
    2011-Ohio-4203
    , 
    954 N.E.2d 117
    , ¶ 2. “In the absence of a patent and
    unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction
    can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an
    adequate remedy by appeal.” State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 264
    ,
    
    2008-Ohio-3838
    , 
    893 N.E.2d 485
    , ¶ 5.
    {¶ 4} In fact, in 2015, Bradford filed a “motion to correct the judgment entry
    pursuant to Criminal Rule 36,” arguing that the trial court had violated his
    constitutional right to a jury trial “when it effectively ‘amended’ the aggravated-
    murder verdict form by entering judgment convicting him under division (A), rather
    than division (B)” of R.C. 2903.01. State v. Bradford, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
    150207, 2 (May 18, 2016). The trial court denied his motion. On appeal, the First
    District affirmed and held that while the verdict form was subject to correction
    under Crim.R. 36, “the trial court, when it entered judgment convicting Bradford
    under division (A) of the aggravated-murder statute, effectively made that
    correction” and did not thereby abuse its discretion. 
    Id.,
     citing State v. Davie, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 311
    , 
    686 N.E.2d 245
     (1997) (holding that the trial court did not abuse
    its discretion in changing the wording in a verdict form after the jury was
    discharged when the change was not demonstrably prejudicial).1
    1
    We also note that the applicable sentences for a conviction under R.C. 2903.01 are the same
    whether the conviction is under division (A) or (B). R.C. 2903.01(F) and 2929.02(A).
    2
    January Term, 2017
    {¶ 5} “An appeal is generally considered an adequate remedy in the
    ordinary course of law sufficient to preclude a writ.” Shoop v. State, 
    144 Ohio St.3d 374
    , 
    2015-Ohio-2068
    , 
    43 N.E.3d 432
    , ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus.
    Comm., 
    11 Ohio St.2d 141
    , 
    228 N.E.2d 631
     (1967), paragraph three of the syllabus.
    Bradford had and has used an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by
    way of his 2015 motion and his appeal of the denial of that motion. Therefore, the
    court of appeals correctly dismissed his petition for a writ of mandamus.
    {¶ 6} Bradford has also filed a motion for reversal of judgment under
    S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.07(B). Bradford contends that he is entitled to judgment in his
    favor because Judge Dinkelacker failed to file a brief in this appeal. However,
    under S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.07(B), we “may accept the appellant’s statement of facts and
    issues as correct and reverse the judgment if the appellant’s brief reasonably
    appears to sustain reversal.”         (Emphasis added.)   Bradford’s brief does not
    reasonably appear to sustain reversal, and we therefore deny his motion for reversal
    of judgment.
    Judgment affirmed
    and motion denied.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ.,
    concur.
    FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., not participating.
    _________________
    Pele K. Bradford, pro se.
    _________________
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-0252

Judges: O'Connor, O'Donnell, Kennedy, French, O'Neill, Fischer, Dewine

Filed Date: 4/13/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/13/2024