Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Lindon (Slip Opinion) , 2021 Ohio 804 ( 2021 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
    Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Lindon, Slip Opinion No. 
    2021-Ohio-804
    .]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in
    an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested
    to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio,
    65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or
    other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be
    made before the opinion is published.
    SLIP OPINION NO. 
    2021-OHIO-804
    LORAIN COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. LINDON.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Lindon, Slip Opinion No.
    
    2021-Ohio-804
    .]
    Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the
    Rules for the Government of the Bar—No credit for time served under
    interim felony suspension—Indefinite suspension.
    (No. 2019-0216—Submitted January 27, 2021—Decided March 18, 2021.)
    ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
    Court, No. 2016-038.
    _______________________
    Per Curiam.
    {¶ 1} Respondent, James L. Lindon, of Avon, Ohio, Attorney 
    Registration No. 0068842,
     was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1997. On January
    15, 2010, we publicly reprimanded Lindon after he received a similar sanction
    from the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board. Disciplinary Counsel v. Lindon,
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    
    124 Ohio St.3d 1217
    , 
    2010-Ohio-507
    , 
    921 N.E.2d 651
    . On June 30, 2016, we
    suspended his license on an interim basis following his convictions on felony
    counts of theft, drug possession, and tampering with evidence, and that
    suspension remains in effect. See In re Lindon, 
    150 Ohio St.3d 1236
    , 2016-Ohio-
    4671, 
    79 N.E.3d 554
    .
    {¶ 2} In a September 2, 2016 complaint and again in an August 29, 2018
    first amended complaint, relator, Lorain County Bar Association, alleged that the
    conduct underlying Lindon’s criminal convictions violated the professional-
    conduct rules. The parties submitted stipulations of fact and misconduct and
    stipulated exhibits. After a hearing, the board issued a report finding that Lindon
    had engaged in the stipulated misconduct and recommending that we suspend him
    for two years, with one year stayed on conditions, and that we grant him no credit
    for the time served under the interim felony suspension. Lindon objected to the
    board’s recommendation that he receive no credit for the time served under his
    interim felony suspension and that he be required to participate in the Ohio
    Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”).                 We heard oral argument on those
    objections in September 2019.
    {¶ 3} While the matter remained pending before this court, relator
    discovered evidence that Lindon had been suspended on an interim basis and
    ultimately disbarred in Michigan as a result of his felony convictions in Ohio.1
    On January 16, 2020, relator filed an emergency motion asking this court to stay
    the case and remand it to the board for further proceedings. The next day,
    disciplinary counsel commenced a reciprocal-discipline case by filing a certified
    1. Lindon’s Ohio disciplinary proceedings were stayed for nearly two years while he appealed his
    criminal conviction. See Gov.Bar R. V(18)(C) (providing that any disciplinary proceeding based
    on a conviction of an offense shall not be brought to hearing until all direct appeals from the
    conviction are concluded). Michigan, however, has no rule comparable to Gov.Bar R. V(18)(C).
    Therefore, Lindon’s Michigan disciplinary proceedings based on his Ohio convictions went
    forward, despite his appeal. Disbarment in Michigan is not permanent; it is akin to an indefinite
    suspension in Ohio. Michigan’s disciplinary-procedure rules permit a disbarred attorney to
    petition for reinstatement after five years. See Mich.Ct.R. 9.123(B).
    2
    January Term, 2021
    copy of the Michigan order of disbarment with the clerk of this court. See
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Lindon, No. 2020-0093; Gov.Bar R. V(20). On March
    25, 2020, we granted relator’s motion, stayed both cases, and remanded the matter
    to the board for further proceedings.
    {¶ 4} In a second amended complaint filed on April 7, 2020, relator
    alleged that Lindon committed three additional ethical violations by giving false
    testimony about the status of his Michigan law license during the course of these
    disciplinary proceedings and failing to report his Michigan discipline to the Office
    of Disciplinary Counsel and the clerk of this court.         Lindon stood by his
    stipulations with respect to the original charges against him, but he denied having
    engaged in the additional misconduct.
    {¶ 5} The case is now before us on the February 11, 2019 and October 2,
    2020 reports of the Board of Professional Conduct finding that Lindon committed
    all of the charged misconduct and recommending that he be indefinitely
    suspended from the practice of law with no credit for the time served under his
    interim felony suspension. Neither party has objected to the board’s October
    2020 report.
    {¶ 6} Having independently reviewed the record, we adopt the board’s
    findings of misconduct and indefinitely suspend Lindon from the practice of law
    in Ohio with no credit for the time served under his interim felony suspension.
    Facts and Misconduct
    Lindon’s Criminal Conduct
    {¶ 7} While working as a pharmacist at the Cleveland Clinic, Lindon was
    the subject of an internal investigation into the possible theft of drugs from the
    pharmacy. On June 2, 2015, security personnel reviewed video footage of Lindon
    removing a bottle of hydrocodone tablets from a basket, dumping something into
    his hand, and then placing that hand in his pocket. Upon being approached by
    security personnel, Lindon removed something from his pocket and placed it in
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    his mouth. After being asked to empty his pockets, Lindon removed three pills—
    two were later identified as tramadol and one was later identified as hydrocodone.
    {¶ 8} Lindon was indicted on felony counts of theft, drug possession, and
    tampering with evidence. He represented himself at trial, and a jury found him
    guilty on all counts.     The trial court sentenced him to serve two years of
    community control and ordered him to complete regular drug testing, counseling,
    and inpatient drug treatment and to pay a fine of $750. As a result of Lindon’s
    convictions, his Ohio pharmacist license was permanently revoked.
    {¶ 9} In September 2016, Lindon appealed his convictions to the Eighth
    District Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to
    suppress the evidence obtained from his pocket. In June 2017, the court of
    appeals reversed the trial court’s decision denying Lindon’s motion to suppress
    and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to conduct an
    evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion to suppress. State v. Lindon, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104902, 
    2017-Ohio-4439
    , ¶ 18. The trial court conducted the
    hearing and again denied the motion on June 4, 2018.            Lindon has since
    completed his sentence.
    {¶ 10} In its February 2019 report, the board found that Lindon’s criminal
    conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an
    illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness) and
    8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty,
    fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The board also found that his conduct is
    sufficiently egregious to warrant a separate finding that he violated Prof.Cond.R.
    8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on
    the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), see Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 
    137 Ohio St.3d 35
    , 
    2013-Ohio-3998
    , 
    997 N.E.2d 500
    , ¶ 21.
    4
    January Term, 2021
    Lindon’s Michigan Discipline
    {¶ 11} At the July 16, 2020 panel hearing following our remand, relator
    presented evidence that the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board had suspended
    Lindon’s law license on an interim basis in June 2016 and disbarred him on
    February 21, 2017, based on his felony convictions in Ohio. At that hearing,
    Lindon testified that he had received notice that Michigan had suspended his
    license on an interim basis as a consequence of his felony convictions, but he
    stated that he had not received—or did not recall receiving—any correspondence
    from Michigan regarding the subsequent disbarment proceedings.
    {¶ 12} However, Lindon also admitted that he had received an April 4,
    2018 letter from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
    notifying him that the office had launched an investigation because he had been
    disbarred in Michigan. In addition, the deputy director of the Michigan Attorney
    Discipline Board submitted an affidavit to the board in which she averred that she
    had spoken with Lindon about his disbarment on June 4, 2018.           The board
    therefore determined that Lindon was aware of Michigan’s interim suspension
    and disbarment orders and the pending USPTO proceeding before his deposition
    on August 31, 2018.
    {¶ 13} When asked at that deposition whether he was licensed to practice
    in any other state, Lindon testified that he was licensed to practice law in
    Michigan and that that license was “just no longer active.” He acknowledged that
    he had been publicly reprimanded in Michigan in 2009, but when relator asked
    him whether there had been “any other disciplinary proceedings in [his] capacity
    as a lawyer,” he stated that there were “only two incidents that I know of. I mean
    the present one and the one from * * * 2009 or whatever it was.”
    {¶ 14} At his July 2020 disciplinary hearing, Lindon argued that his
    deposition testimony was not false for two reasons. First, he asserted that he had
    not lied about the status of his Michigan license because, after being publicly
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    reprimanded in 2009, he had asked “what was the fastest and easiest way that [he
    could] be done with the State of Michigan.” He stated that he was told that he
    could stop paying his dues and go on inactive status, which he did. But even if it
    was true that his Michigan license was inactive for his failure to pay dues, Lindon
    also knew that he had been disbarred in Michigan and failed to disclose that fact
    during his deposition.
    {¶ 15} Second, Lindon claimed that he had relied on a September 2017 e-
    mail that was purportedly sent to him and the Michigan Attorney Discipline
    Board by the assistant deputy administrator of Michigan’s Attorney Grievance
    Commission (the prosecuting arm of Michigan’s disciplinary process). That e-
    mail stated:
    As you are aware, the rules require that a discipline be
    vacated when the conviction from which it resulted is set aside.
    Mr. Lindon’s conviction was set aside and the matter remanded for
    retrial.
    We will be reopening our file in order to monitor the
    criminal proceedings.
    {¶ 16} Although that e-mail suggests that perhaps Lindon’s Michigan
    disbarment should have been vacated, it is important to note that the e-mail was
    not issued by the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board (i.e., the entity charged
    with imposing discipline in that state). And because Lindon had spoken on the
    telephone with the deputy director of the Michigan board about his disbarment on
    June 4, 2018—as sworn to by the deputy director in her affidavit—our Board of
    Professional Conduct found that he could not in good faith rely upon the earlier e-
    mail from the prosecuting arm of the Michigan disciplinary process to claim that
    6
    January Term, 2021
    he did not understand the status of his Michigan license at the time of his August
    2018 deposition.
    {¶ 17} The board therefore rejected Lindon’s attempts to justify his failure
    to disclose his Michigan disbarment and found that his conduct violated
    Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct
    that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) and Gov.Bar R. V(20)(A)
    (requiring an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Ohio to provide written
    notification of a disciplinary order issued in another jurisdiction to disciplinary
    counsel and the clerk of this court within 30 days of its issuance).
    {¶ 18} We adopt these findings of misconduct. Moreover, we emphasize
    that whether Lindon affirmatively misrepresented or knowingly omitted material
    facts regarding his Michigan disbarment, the result is the same—Lindon engaged
    in conduct that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation not only
    during relator’s investigation but also in his conduct before the board, which
    serves as an arm of this court. See, e.g., Miles v. McSwegin, 
    58 Ohio St.2d 97
    , 99,
    
    388 N.E.2d 1367
     (1979) (“It is well established that an action for fraud and deceit
    is maintainable not only as a result of affirmative misrepresentations, but also for
    negative ones, such as the failure of a party to a transaction to fully disclose facts
    of a material nature where there exists a duty to speak”).
    Sanction Recommended by the Board
    {¶ 19} When recommending the sanction to be imposed for attorney
    misconduct, the board considers all relevant factors, including the ethical duties
    that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar
    R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.
    {¶ 20} In its original report, the board found that three aggravating factors
    were present in this case—Lindon’s prior disciplinary record, his dishonest or
    selfish motive, and his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.
    See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (2), and (7). On remand it also found that Lindon
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process and submitted false statements or
    engaged in other deceptive practices during the disciplinary proceedings. See
    Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(5) and (6).
    {¶ 21} As mitigating factors, the board originally found that Lindon made
    full and free disclosure to the board and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward
    the disciplinary proceedings, submitted evidence of his good character and
    reputation, was subject to other penalties or sanctions (including criminal
    sanctions and the revocation of his pharmacist license), engaged in other interim
    rehabilitation efforts, and harmed no clients. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4), (5),
    (6), and (8). But on remand, the board withdrew its findings regarding Lindon’s
    cooperation and full and free disclosure because his additional misconduct proved
    that they were not true.
    {¶ 22} During his December 2018 disciplinary hearing, Lindon admitted
    that from 2005 until shortly before his criminal trial, he used opioids prescribed
    by his physician to treat a medical condition, but he denied that he had ever stolen
    them.   He testified that he was diagnosed with opiate-use disorder after his
    criminal trial and that he had completed a 30-day inpatient treatment program.
    However, he did not attempt to establish his substance-use disorder as a
    mitigating factor under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).
    {¶ 23} Lindon voluntarily entered into a contract with OLAP after his
    criminal trial and before sentencing. However, he testified that he was terminated
    from OLAP because he is an atheist, that the program did not offer any secular
    alternative to Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”), and that AA encourages its
    participants to believe in a higher power. Despite his objection to the religious
    aspects of AA, he had been attending weekly meetings until around the time of
    his 2018 disciplinary hearing—though he admitted that his attendance ceased
    sometime before the September 2019 oral argument in this case.
    8
    January Term, 2021
    {¶ 24} In its February 2019 report, the board noted that we have imposed
    sanctions ranging from two-year partially stayed suspensions to indefinite
    suspensions on attorneys who have been convicted of drug-related offenses
    comparable to Lindon’s. See, e.g., Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Peskin, 
    125 Ohio St.3d 244
    , 
    2010-Ohio-1811
    , 
    927 N.E.2d 598
     (imposing a two-year suspension with 18
    months conditionally stayed on an attorney who completed an intervention-in-
    lieu-of-conviction program that resulted in the dismissal of charges for possession
    of crack cocaine and resisting arrest). At that time, the board recommended that
    Lindon be suspended for two years, with one year stayed on several conditions,
    including that he enter into a two-year drug-related contract with OLAP. The
    board also recommended that Lindon receive no credit for the time served under
    his interim felony suspension.
    {¶ 25} Lindon objected to the board’s recommended sanction, arguing that
    the recommendations that he receive no credit for the time served under his
    interim felony suspension and that he be required to participate in OLAP were
    unjust, excessive, and inconsistent with our precedent. He argued that the failure
    to credit him for the time served under his interim felony suspension (much of
    which had then been occasioned by his criminal appeal) would result in an
    unconstitutional trial tax. He also claimed that his compelled participation in
    OLAP would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
    United States Constitution under the mistaken belief that OLAP does not offer
    any secular alternatives to 12-step programs that promote belief in a higher
    power.
    {¶ 26} Given the additional misconduct found on remand, the board now
    recommends that Lindon be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law and
    that he receive no credit for the time served under his interim felony suspension.
    In addition to the requirements set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(25)(D), the board also
    recommends that Lindon’s reinstatement be subject to the conditions set forth in
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    its first recommended sanction—with the exception that he shall not be required
    to participate in 12-step meetings and the additional requirement that he submit a
    prognosis from a qualified chemical dependency professional that he is able to
    return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law.
    {¶ 27} Lindon has not objected to the board’s second report or renewed
    his objections to the board’s original report. We note, however, that the board’s
    current recommendation and our decision today expressly state that Lindon shall
    not be required to participate in the 12-step programs that rendered his OLAP
    contract objectionable to him.      Furthermore, we find no merit in Lindon’s
    arguments in favor of credit for time served under his interim felony suspension
    given the additional delay that was occasioned by his own dishonesty regarding
    his Michigan disbarment.
    {¶ 28} Lindon’s wrongdoing began with misconduct in his role as a
    pharmacist that resulted in felony convictions for theft, drug possession, and
    tampering with evidence but also violated the most basic professional duty of an
    attorney—to act with honesty and integrity. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Assn. v.
    Newman, 
    127 Ohio St.3d 123
    , 
    2010-Ohio-5034
    , 
    937 N.E.2d 81
    , ¶ 12; Cincinnati
    Bar Assn. v. Blankemeyer, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 156
    , 
    2006-Ohio-2038
    , 
    846 N.E.2d 523
    ,
    ¶ 12. He continued to violate that duty of honesty and integrity by giving false
    and misleading testimony in his deposition and in the disciplinary hearing
    conducted by an arm of this court. We have recognized that a lawyer’s material
    misrepresentation to a court “ ‘strikes at the very core of a lawyer’s relationship
    with the court’ ” and that “ ‘[r]espect for our profession is diminished with every
    deceitful act of a lawyer.’ ” Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 
    131 Ohio St.3d 385
    ,
    
    2012-Ohio-909
    , 
    965 N.E.2d 971
    , ¶ 68, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v.
    Fowerbaugh, 
    74 Ohio St.3d 187
    , 190, 
    658 N.E.2d 237
     (1995).
    {¶ 29} In Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. McElroy, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 391
    ,
    
    2014-Ohio-3774
    , 
    18 N.E.3d 1191
    , we disciplined an attorney who had engaged in
    10
    January Term, 2021
    a pattern of dishonesty that included being convicted of forgery and tampering
    with evidence; allowing his counsel to make false statements about his criminal
    record in court without correction; making false statements in an affidavit, in his
    expungement filing, and in the resulting disciplinary proceedings; and failing to
    report his felony convictions to a disciplinary authority. Id. at ¶ 10, 13. Like
    Lindon, McElroy violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), (d), and (h). Id. at ¶ 14. Instead
    of failing to report discipline imposed in another jurisdiction as Lindon did,
    McElroy also violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(a) (requiring a lawyer to self-report
    ethical violations that raise a question about the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness,
    or fitness as a lawyer).    Id.     In contrast to Lindon, McElroy had no prior
    disciplinary record and acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct. Id. at
    ¶ 16. Nonetheless, we accepted the panel’s assessment that “[i]f an attorney
    cannot be trusted to reveal candidly unfavorable facts about his own behavior, we
    as a panel cannot be sanguine about whether he will be candid in his
    representations to courts or clients in other contexts.” Id. at ¶ 19. We indefinitely
    suspended McElroy from the practice of law in Ohio with no credit for the time
    served under his interim felony suspension. Id. at ¶ 24. We agree with the board
    that that is the appropriate sanction for Lindon’s misconduct in this case.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 30} Accordingly, James L. Lindon is indefinitely suspended from the
    practice of law in Ohio with no credit for the time served under the interim felony
    suspension imposed on June 30, 2016. In addition to the requirements set forth in
    Gov.Bar R. V(25)(D), Lindon’s reinstatement to the practice of law in Ohio shall
    be subject to the conditions that he (1) remain drug- and alcohol-free, (2) enter
    into a two-year drug-related contract with OLAP—though he shall not be required
    to participate in 12-step meetings, (3) submit to random drug screens, (4)
    participate in mental-health/substance-abuse counseling with a qualified
    chemical-dependency professional, notify OLAP of that professional’s name and
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    address, and execute the necessary waivers to allow the professional to send
    periodic reports to OLAP, (5) notify his OLAP counselor and his mental-
    health/substance-abuse counselor of the names and dosages of all drugs
    prescribed to him and waive the doctor-patient privilege with respect to any
    prescribing physician for the duration of his suspension, (6) submit proof that he
    has successfully completed a substance-abuse-treatment program, (7) submit a
    prognosis from a qualified chemical-dependency professional that he is able to
    return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law, (8) commit no
    further misconduct, and (9) pay the costs of these disciplinary proceedings. Costs
    are taxed to Lindon.
    Judgment accordingly.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART,
    and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
    _________________
    Wickens, Herzer, Panza and Daniel A. Cook; and O’Toole, McLaughlin,
    Dooley & Pecora Co., L.P.A., Matthew A. Dooley, and Michael R. Briach, for
    relator.
    James L. Lindon, pro se.
    _________________
    12