State v. Gordon , 2021 Ohio 1803 ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Gordon, 2021-Ohio-1803.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellant Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
-vs-
Case No. 2020 CA 00076
ROBERT F. GORDON
Defendant-Appellee O P I N IO N
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Licking County Municipal
Court, Case No. 20TRC04632
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 25, 2021
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
J. MICHAEL KING SCOTT E. WRIGHT
Assistant Law Director 7662 Slate Ridge Blvd.
City of Newark Reynoldsburg, Ohio 43068
40 West Main Street, Fourth Floor
Newark, Ohio 43055
Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00076 2
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant state of Ohio appeals the December 9, 2020 Judgment
Entry entered by the Licking County Municipal Court, which granted defendant-appellee
Robert F. Gordon’s motion to suppress.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On August 13, 2020, Trooper Zachariah Maust of the Ohio State Highway
Patrol initiated a traffic stop after observing Appellee’s vehicle travel left of center.
Appellee was cited with driving left of center, in violation of R.C. 4511.25, and operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)
and (A)(2).
{¶3} Appellee filed a motion to suppress on September 23, 2020. The state filed
a memorandum contra. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on November
5, 2020.
{¶4} Trooper Maust testified he was on duty, working the third shift, on August
13, 2020. He was in uniform and operating a marked cruiser with a working visible light
bar. At approximately 10:21 p.m., as he was traveling on Reddington Road toward Cherry
Valley Road in Newark, Licking County, Ohio, Trooper Maust testified he observed, in his
rearview mirror, a vehicle which was traveling in the opposite direction go left of center.
Appellee was subsequently identified as the driver of the vehicle, a pickup truck. The
trooper turned his cruiser around in order to further observe Appellee.
{¶5} As Trooper Maust approached the intersection of Main Street and Redding
Road, which he noted becomes Thornwood Drive, he again caught sight of Appellee.
Trooper Maust explained a blue sedan had turned onto Thornwood Drive from Main
Street and was between his cruiser and Appellee. Trooper Maust stated, despite the
Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00076 3
other vehicle, he observed Appellee travel completely over the center line after crossing
railroad tracks. The trooper drove around the blue sedan and observed Appellee weaving
within his lane then cross over the fog line on the right-hand side. Trooper Maust
activated his overhead lights and a traffic stop.
{¶6} Trooper Maust acknowledged the second left of center violation cannot be
seen in the recording from his cruiser’s video camera. He explained the video camera is
situated on the passenger side of the cruiser; therefore, the video only provides a center-
right view of the road. Trooper Maust added, from his position in the driver’s seat, he was
able to watch the center line.
{¶7} On cross-examination, Trooper Maust indicated Appellee was able to
successfully navigate the twists and turns, and the eight elevation changes in the road.
The trooper stated the left of center violation occurred near the intersection of Thornwood
Drive and Irving Wick Drive. Trooper Maust again acknowledged the recording from his
cruiser’s video camera does not show a lane violation. He added the blue sedan
obstructed the view of where the double line began. Trooper Maust explained the location
of the video camera prevented a view of the center lane given the blue sedan in front of
him. Trooper Maust testified Appellee was able to bring his vehicle to a stop without
incident after executing a left turn, also without incident.
{¶8} On re-direct examination, Trooper Maust stated, after he made contact with
Appellee, he advised Appellee he had stopped him for going left of center. On the video,
Appellee can be heard responding, “Yeah.” On re-cross examination, Trooper Maust
indicated the left of center violation occurred between the railroad tracks and Irving Wick
Drive.
Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00076 4
{¶9} After hearing Trooper Maust’s testimony and listening to the parties’
arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
{¶10} Via Judgment Entry filed December 9, 2020, the trial court granted
Appellee’s motion to suppress. The trial court found Trooper Maust did not have probable
cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop of Appellee.
{¶11} It is from this judgment entry the state appeals, raising the following
assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE
APPELLEEE’S [SIC] MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE STOP.
I
{¶12} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio
St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 597 N.E.2d
1141(1991); State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 621 N.E.2d 726(1993). Second, an
appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the
findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing
an error of law. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (1993). Finally,
assuming the trial court's findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the
evidence and it has properly identified the law to be applied, an appellant may argue the
Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00076 5
trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to
suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate court must independently
determine, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the
appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 641
N.E.2d 1172 (1994); State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 620 N.E.2d 906 (1993);
Guysinger, supra. As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S.
690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), “... as a general matter
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo
on appeal.”
{¶13} When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier
of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 1995–Ohio–243, 652 N.E.2d
988; State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982).
{¶14} The state submits the trial court’s findings were not supported by
competent, credible evidence, and the trial court incorrectly decided the ultimate issue.
{¶15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government. State v. Martin, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2018-09-105,
2019-Ohio-2792, ¶ 14. This protection includes unreasonable automobile stops. Bowling
Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, ¶ 11.
{¶16} Ohio recognizes two types of lawful traffic stops, each requiring a different
constitutional standard. State v. Ratliff, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-09-163, 2020-Ohio-
3315, ¶ 6-7. One is a typical non-investigatory stop where an officer directly observes a
Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00076 6
traffic violation, giving rise to probable cause to stop the vehicle. Whren v. United States
(1996), 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89. The second type of stop is
an investigative stop, or Terry stop, which occurs where an officer has a reasonable
suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts criminal behavior has occurred or is
imminent. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.
{¶17} While the concept of reasonable and articulable suspicion has not been
precisely defined, it has been described as something more than an undeveloped
suspicion or hunch, but less than probable cause. State v. Moore, 12th Dist. Fayette No.
CA2010-12-037, 2011-Ohio-4908, 2011 WL 4436647, ¶ 31-33. To determine whether an
officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, the “totality of circumstances”
must be considered and “viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police
officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.” State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio
St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). “This process allows officers to draw on their
own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’
” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, (2002),
quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981);
State v. Hawkins, 158 Ohio St.3d 94, 2019-Ohio-4210, 140 N.E.3d 577, ¶ 19-22.
{¶18} In the instant case, the trial court found Trooper Maust “lacked a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient to justify stopping [Appellee].”
Dec. 9, 2020 Judgment Entry at 5.
Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00076 7
Here, the trooper testified that he personally observed [Appellee] go
over the center line on two occasions. Unfortunately, the video does not
show this. Maust explained that, due to the location inside the cruiser where
the camera is mounted – to the windshield toward the passenger side – the
camera is not able to show the same thing that he can see with his eyes.
The whole point of having video cameras in cruisers is to record
events, including violations of law. It is frustrating, to say the least, to see
video after video that does not capture the infraction claimed by the officer
and this case is no exception.
The trooper claims to have personally observed a traffic violation.
This would render the stop a non-investigatory stop granting him probable
cause to stop the vehicle. The objective video evidence does not
corroborate the trooper’s testimony and the Court finds that he did not have
probable cause to stop the vehicle because a violation of the law did not
occur.
The traffic stop would still be permissible if the trooper possessed
reasonable, articulable suspicion that [Appellee] had committed or was
committing an offense. Here, the trooper claimed he saw – not suspected
– a traffic infraction. The Court has found that there is a lack of competent,
credible evidence to support that claim. Id. at 4.
{¶19} We have reviewed the video and, like the trial court, find such does not
demonstrate any traffic violation. As stated, supra, when ruling on a motion to suppress,
Licking County, Case No. 2020 CA 00076 8
the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve
questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Dunlap, supra.
Based upon the findings, it is clear the trial court did not find Trooper Maust’s testimony
to be credible as to either alleged left of center violation. Without objective video
evidence, the trial court concluded the trooper did not possess a reasonable, articulable
suspicion Appellee committed or was committing a traffic offense. We find the trial did
not err in granting Appellee’s motion to suppress.
{¶20} The state’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶21} The judgment of the Licking County Municipal Court is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, J.
Baldwin, P.J. and
Gwin, J. concur