Ruple v. Ruple ( 2021 )

[Cite as Ruple v. Ruple, 2021-Ohio-2884.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
VICTORIA RUPLE, CASE NO. 2021-L-027
Petitioner-Appellee,
Civil Appeal from the
- and - Court of Common Pleas,
Domestic Relations Division
JOHN RUPLE,
Petitioner-Appellant. Trial Court No. 2019 DI 000191
OPINION
Decided: August 23, 2021
Judgment: Affirmed
James W. Reardon, Carrabine & Reardon Co., LPA, 7445 Center Street, Mentor, OH
44060 (For Petitioner-Appellee).
Kenneth J. Cahill, Dworken & Bernstein Co., LPA, 60 South Park Place, Painesville, OH
44077 (For Petitioner-Appellant).
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.
{¶1} Appellant, John Ruple (“Husband”), appeals the judgment overruling his
objections, denying his motion for relief from judgment, and finding him in contempt. We
affirm.
{¶2} In June 2019, the parties obtained a dissolution that incorporated their
separation agreement. In relevant provisions, the separation agreement provided (1) the
parties would be liable for the debts in their personal names, (2) Husband would retain
ownership of several business entities, including Chagrin Valley Steel Erectors, as well
as rental properties, (3) Husband would be solely responsible for any debts associated
with the properties, and (4) the parties would retain the assistance of an accountant to
ascertain the most advantageous method of filing their 2018 taxes and equally divide any
refund.
{¶3} After the dissolution decree was entered, the parties’ accountant prepared
the parties’ personal joint income tax return, and the refunds totaled nearly $33,000. The
accountant opted for the refunds to be issued on paper checks in both parties’ names. In
October 2019, Wife moved the court to find Husband in contempt for his failure to comply
with the decree by refusing to sign the tax refund checks and by failing to pay two credit
cards that were used for the businesses. In December 2019, Husband filed a motion for
relief from the dissolution decree pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), arguing that the parties were
mutually mistaken as to the amount of the 2018 tax refund.
{¶4} The matter proceeded to hearing before the magistrate. With respect to the
credit card issue, during opening statements, Wife’s counsel withdrew the portion of her
motion pertaining to one of the cards because it was not included in her credit report, and
nonpayment was not adversely affecting her.
{¶5} Thereafter, the magistrate issued a decision denying Husband’s motion and
finding him in contempt. Husband filed objections, which the trial court overruled. The
trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and entered judgment.
{¶6} In his first assigned error, Husband maintains:
{¶7} “As a matter of law the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for relief
from judgment pursuant to Civil Rule 60(B).”
{¶8} Civ.R. 60(B) provides, in relevant part:
2
Case No. 2021-L-027
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied,
released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year
after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
{¶9} To prevail on a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), the moving party must
demonstrate that “(1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is
granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)
through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds
of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order
or proceeding was entered or taken.” GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc.,
47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶10} “In addition to the Civ.R. 60(B) requirements for modification, the divorce
and dissolution statutes contain certain statutory restrictions that limit the authority of a
trial court to modify a final decree.” Walsh v. Walsh, 157 Ohio St.3d 322, 2019-Ohio-
3723, 136 N.E.3d 460, ¶ 19, citing R.C. 3105.171(I); 3105.18(E); 3105.63(A) and (C). In
Walsh, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “Civ.R. 60(B) cannot be used to alter the statutory
requirements for the modification of a decree. Because R.C. 3105.171(I) does not permit
modification absent the consent of both parties, Civ.R. 60(B) cannot provide a
workaround.” Walsh at ¶ 23; see R.C. 3105.171(I) (In divorce and legal separation
3
Case No. 2021-L-027
proceedings, “[a] division or disbursement of property * * * is not subject to future
modification by the court except upon the express written consent or agreement to the
modification by both spouses.”). Likewise, in dissolution proceedings, “the court may
modify the division of property provided in the separation agreement only upon the
express written consent or agreement of both spouses.” R.C. 3105.65(B). R.C.
3105.63(C)(2) provides, “[i]f a petition for dissolution of marriage contains an authorization
for the court to modify the division of property provided in the separation agreement, the
modification shall be made with the express written consent or agreement of both
spouses.”
{¶11} Here, in the parties’ separation agreement, they agreed to division of their
2018 tax refunds as follows:
The parties agree that they will consult with accountant,
Michael Stefanek and shall file their State and Federal returns
for tax year 2018 in the manner most advantageous to them.
Any net tax refunds shall be divided equally between the
parties after the payment of tax preparation.
Any outstanding State or Federal tax liability shall be paid
utilizing the parties joint Third Federal savings account as
enunciated in paragraph 7(A) of this Agreement.
Moreover, the parties’ separation agreement provides that “[t]he agreement shall not be
altered, changed or modified, unless done so in writing, and signed by both parties.”
{¶12} Husband attempted to utilize Civ.R. 60(B) to modify the decree, arguing that
his business losses primarily generated the large tax refund, and the parties were
unaware of the amount of the refund at the time of signing the separation agreement.
Neither the parties nor the trial court explicitly addressed whether Civ.R. 60(B) was an
available procedural mechanism to employ in this case. However, this issue is dispositive
4
Case No. 2021-L-027
of Husband’s motion. Because the parties did not authorize the court to modify the
separation agreement, the modification is precluded by statute, and Civ.R. 60(B) cannot
be used as “a workaround.” R.C. 3105.63(C)(2); R.C. 3105.65(B); Walsh, 2019-Ohio-
3723, at ¶ 23. For this reason, we conclude that Husband’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion was
properly denied. See Geneva v. Fende, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2009-A-0023, 2009-
Ohio-6380, ¶ 33 (“[R]eviewing courts affirm and reverse judgments, not the reasons for
the judgments.”).
{¶13} Accordingly, Husband’s first assigned error lacks merit.
{¶14} In his second assigned error, Husband maintains:
{¶15} “The trial court inconsistently applied the law in this matter, and thus, erred
as a matter of law.”
{¶16} In his second assigned error, Husband argues that the trial court erred in
relying on extrinsic evidence relative to the Capital One debt, when it did not rely on
extrinsic evidence with respect to the tax refund, when resolving the disputes as to the
separation agreement.
{¶17} However, unlike Husband, Wife did not seek to modify the terms of the
agreement. See Ross v. Ross, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2019-G-0237, 2020-Ohio-5237, ¶
17, quoting Nash v. Nash, 11th Dist. Lake No. 93-L-184, 1994 WL 721849, *2 (Dec. 9,
1994) (“‘[W]here there is good faith confusion over the requirements of a dissolution
decree, the court has the power to enforce its decree, to hear the matter, to clarify the
confusion, and resolve the dispute.’”). Instead, she requested the trial court to enforce
the agreement by holding Husband in contempt for failing to pay a Capital One credit card
debt, which Wife maintained was a business debt for which Husband is responsible under
5
Case No. 2021-L-027
the agreement. In response, Husband argued that the card constituted Wife’s personal
debt, for which she is solely responsible because she signed for the card.
{¶18} The parties’ arguments regarding the Capital One debt implicate two
provisions of the separation agreement. First, with respect to personal debts, the parties
agreed as follows:
Each of the parties shall be solely responsible for any debts
incurred in their own names as of December 31, 2018, and
specifically Wife shall be responsible for and shall indemnify
and hold Husband harmless from her Key Bank credit card,
BJ's credit card and the debt to Lincoln Auto for her 2016
Lincoln. Husband shall be solely responsible for and shall
indemnify and hold Wife harmless from the Fifth Third credit
card debt.
The parties agree to close and destroy any joint marital credit
cards and shall not encumber said credit cards further.
{¶19} With respect to the businesses and rental properties, the parties agreed that
Husband would retain these properties, and the agreement provided:
Husband shall be solely responsible for and shall indemnify
and hold Wife harmless of any debts, taxes, insurance,
claims, mortgages, equity lines of credit or encumbrances and
forbearances of any nature associated with the above
properties.
The parties acknowledge that Wife previously resigned all
positions held within the above cited companies; that she
relinquished any and all rights, title and interest to any
common stock and value of said companies and real
properties together with, but not limited to any vehicles,
equipment, inventory, etc.
{¶20} As the separation agreement did not specifically list the Capital One card
as a debt allocated to Wife, and the agreement did not specifically identify the business
debts, all of which were allocated to Husband, evidence was required, not to interpret the
agreement, but to determine which provision of the separation agreement applied to the
6
Case No. 2021-L-027
Capital One debt. With respect to the Capital One debt, the evidence presented at the
magistrate’s hearing established: the application for the card lists “Chagrin Valley Steel
Erectors Inc.” as the business name, lists Wife as the “Authorizing Signatory Name,” and
was signed by Wife when she served as president of Chagrin Valley Steel Erectors; the
credit card statements were addressed to “Victoria S. Ruple” followed on the next line by
“Chagrin Valley Steel Erectors Inc”; the card was used only for business purposes;
business employees continued to use the credit card after the dissolution; and the
business continued to pay the credit card bill until it could no longer afford payments. It
was not inconsistent for the trial court to both (1) reject Husband’s attempt to use extrinsic
evidence to modify the unambiguous tax provision, and (2) consider extrinsic evidence
regarding the Capital One debt to determine the allocation of the debt in accordance with
the separation agreement. Husband’s second assigned error lacks merit.
{¶21} In his third assigned error, Husband argues:
{¶22} “As a matter of law the trial court erred by improperly finding Husband in
contempt of court.”
{¶23} In his final assigned error, Husband contends that the trial court erred in
finding him in contempt for failing to cooperate in equal division of the tax refund because
the agreement contained no date by which he was required to comply.
{¶24} Husband did not raise this argument in his objections to the magistrate’s
decision finding him in contempt. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) states, “Except for a claim of plain
error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding
or legal conclusion [in a magistrate’s decision], whether or not specifically designated as
7
Case No. 2021-L-027
a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has
objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).”
In applying the doctrine of plain error in a civil case, reviewing
courts must proceed with the utmost caution, limiting the
doctrine strictly to those extremely rare cases where
exceptional circumstances require its application to prevent a
manifest miscarriage of justice, and where the error
complained of, if left uncorrected, would have a material
adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in,
judicial proceedings.
(Citations omitted.) Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099(1997).
{¶25} Husband has not advanced a plain error argument on appeal. Further, we
cannot say this is one of the “extremely rare cases where exceptional circumstances”
require application of the plain error doctrine “to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
See id. Accordingly, Husband’s third assigned error lacks merit.
{¶26} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
8
Case No. 2021-L-027