Pearson v. Pearson , 2022 Ohio 642 ( 2022 )

[Cite as Pearson v. Pearson, 2022-Ohio-642.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
Tracey L. Pearson Court of Appeals No. WD-21-066
Appellee Trial Court No. 2019DR0155
v.
Mark T. Pearson DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: March 4, 2022
*****
Drew J. Mihalik, for appellee.
John C. Filkins, for appellant.
*****
DUHART, J.
{¶ 1} In this accelerated appeal, Appellant, Mark T. Pearson, appeals from the
September 7, 2021 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
Relations Division, which denied his objections to the magistrate’s decision awarding
appellee, Tracey L. Pearson, spousal support. Because we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion, we affirm.
Statement of the Case
{¶ 2} Appellee filed a complaint for divorce on or about November 12, 2019. The
matter proceeded to a final hearing on or about November 30, 2020, during which both
parties provided testimony. In a decision issued on or about December 2, 2020, the
magistrate recommended that appellant pay appellee spousal support in the amount of
$600 per month for a period of 60 months and, thereafter, in the amount of $500 per
month for a period of 60 months. Appellant timely filed objections to the magistrate’s
decision. In a judgment entry journalized on September 7, 2021, the trial court affirmed
the magistrate’s decision as to the matters of spousal support, stating that “[i]n light of the
parties’ respective incomes, the duration of the marriage, and the standard of living
established during the marriage, the Court finds the award of spousal support to be
appropriate and reasonable.” It is from this judgment that appellant his filed his appeal.
Statement of the Facts
{¶ 3} The parties were married on or about October 25, 1991, and two children
were born as issue of the marriage. At the time of the proceedings, appellant was 57-
years-old, appellee was 49-years-old, and both of the children were emancipated adults.
{¶ 4} It is undisputed that over the course of the couple’s 29-year marriage,
appellant was the primary breadwinner, with his income generally substantially higher
than that earned by appellee. For example, as of the November 30, 2020 hearing,
appellee’s year-to-date income was approximately $14,859. Together with
approximately six weeks of unemployment that she received, her projected income for
2020 was about $16,251. By contrast, appellant’s year-to-date income, as of the
2.
November 30, 2020 hearing was approximately $44,105.19. His total projected income
for 2020, from working two jobs, was about $54,009.32.
{¶ 5} As for other years, the evidence showed that appellee had previously earned
approximately: $13,455 in 2015; $21,921.76 in 2016; $19,202 in 2017; $16,912 in 2018;
and $25,302.65 in 2019. Appellant, over these same time periods, had previously earned
about: $43,710 in 2015; $38,415.73 in 2016; $43,033.67 in 2017; $42,578.97 in 2018;
and $25,615 in 2019.
{¶ 6} The parties do not dispute the trial court’s finding that following the divorce,
neither party will have sufficient income to enjoy the same standard of living that they
had while they were together.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 7} In his appeal, appellant sets forth the following assignment of error:
I. The trial court erred in calculating the amount and duration of
spousal support awarded.
Analysis
{¶ 8} Regarding review of spousal support determinations, this court has
recognized:
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s judgment awarding spousal
support under an abuse of discretion standard. Kunkle v. Kunkle, 51 Ohio
St.3d 64, 67, 554 N.E.2d 83 (1990); Bowen v. Bowen, 132 Ohio App.3d
616, 626, 725 N.E.2d 1165 (9th Dist. 1999). ‘Even though a trial court has
broad discretion in awarding spousal support, its determination of whether
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spousal support is “appropriate and reasonable” the nature, amount,
duration and terms of payment of spousal support is controlled by the
factors in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1).’ Crites v. Crites, 6th Dist. Wood Nos. WD-
04-034, WD-04-042, 2004-Ohio-6162, ¶ 26-27, citing Schultz v. Schultz,
110 Ohio App.3d 715, 724, 675 N.E.2d 55 (10th Dist. 1996). Although a
trial court need not enumerate each R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) factor, it must
demonstrate that it considered all the ‘relevant factors.’ Stockman v.
Stockman, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-00-1053, 2000 WL 1838937, *9 (Dec. 15,
2000).
{¶ 9} Additionally, when awarding spousal support, ‘“the trial court’s judgment
must contain sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that the spousal
support award is ‘fair, equitable and in accordance with the law.’”’ Crites, supra, at ¶ 27,
quoting Kaechele v. Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 518 N.E.2d 1197 (1988). King v.
King, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-17-072, 2019-Ohio-1561, ¶ 8-9.
{¶ 10} R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) sets forth the following factors for a court to consider
for purposes of awarding spousal support:
(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not
limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed
under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code;
(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of
the parties;
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(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(e) The duration of the marriage;
(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because
that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek
employment outside the home;
(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage;
(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties;
(j) The contributions of each party to the education, training, or
earning ability of the other party, including but not limited to, any party’s
contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;
(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking
spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the
spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the
education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;
(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal
support;
(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted
from that party’s marital responsibilities;
(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and
equitable.
5.
Here, the trial court properly considered all of the requisite factors in order to achieve a
fair and equitable result. See King at ¶ 9. In addition, the trial court reserved jurisdiction
over the spousal support, “thereby allowing for a change in the status of either appellant
or appellee.” Cooper v. Cooper, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1163, 2002-Ohio-7105, ¶ 11.
Under such circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. See id.(Appellate court found no abuse of discretion where trial court both considered the
requisite factors in order to achieve a fair and equitable result and, further, reserved
jurisdiction over the spousal support).
{¶ 11} Arguing against this conclusion, appellant asserts that the trial court erred
in “presum[ing] that appellant can maintain yearly income at the rate of $54,000.” He
further asserts that “[i]f the Trial Court had used the average of Appellant’s income over
the years 2015-2019, or $38,672.93 [after taxes], Appellant’s yearly income would be
reduced to approximately $27,832, or $2,319 per month,” “which is not enough to cover
his stated expenses of $2,636 per month plus a spousal support award of $500 or $600
per month.” Based on the foregoing, appellant concludes that the trial court’s award of
spousal support is “arbitrary, inappropriate, inequitable, and unreasonable.” Appellant
additionally complains that the trial court gave “no explanation or reasoning for either the
amount or the duration of the spousal support award, including why the support would
reduce after five years.”
{¶ 12} As indicated above, all of the statutory factors must be considered, with the
goal of reaching an equitable result. See King at ¶ 8-9. This is because, “[t]he method by
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which the goal is achieved cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula.” Kaechele v.
Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 518 N.E.2d 1197 (1988).
{¶ 13} Although appellant disputes the manner in which the trial court considered
the evidence of the parties’ income and/or projected incomes, stating that a better result
would have been derived had the trial court used an average income over several years,
the decision whether to apply “income averaging” a matter that is within the trial court’s
discretion. See Coors v. MacEachen, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100013, 2010-Ohio-4470(finding that although there are cases where appellate courts have affirmed a trial court’s
decision when it used income averaging to determine spousal support, “simply because
some courts have not reversed judgments involving income averaging does not mean that
a court abuses its discretion by not using income averaging in every similar situation.”)
Here, we find that the trial court acted within its broad discretion when it chose to
analyze the parties’ incomes without employing income averaging.
{¶ 14} As indicated above, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the spousal
support, which would allow for the modification of spousal support in the event of a
significant change of circumstances for the parties. If there should be such a change of
circumstances, appellant has the option of requesting a modification. Regarding
appellant’s disagreement with the duration of the spousal support, we note that a marriage
of long duration, such as the one at issue, “in and of itself would permit a trial court to
award spousal support of indefinite duration.” Muckensturm v. Muckensturm, 3d Dist.
Hancock No. 5-11-38, 2012-Ohio-3062, ¶ 32. Nevertheless, the trial court saw fit to
establish a date certain for the spousal support to end.
7.
{¶ 15} While it may have been preferable for the court to have provided more
information concerning how it specifically determined the amount of spousal support it
awarded, we find that it explained in adequate detail its rationale for awarding spousal
support based upon the factors enumerated in the statute. In reaching this conclusion, we
note that appellant at no point seeks to challenge the trial court’s determination as to any
specific statutory factor.
{¶ 16} In light of all of the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s decision to
order appellant to pay appellee spousal support was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. The trial court carefully considered all of the statutory factors and found
numerous reasons, expressly based upon R.C. 3105.18 and supported by evidence in the
record, why the award of spousal support in this case was reasonable and appropriate.
Accordingly, we find appellant’s sole assignment of error not well-taken, and the
judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is
affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
_______________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
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This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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