In re Adoption of M.F. , 2014 Ohio 3801 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as In re Adoption of M.F., 2014-Ohio-3801.]
    STATE OF OHIO                    )                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    )ss:                    NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF SUMMIT                 )
    IN RE: M.F.                                              C.A. No.    27166
    APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
    ENTERED IN THE
    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
    CASE No.   2013 AD 16
    DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
    Dated: September 3, 2014
    CARR, Judge.
    {¶1}    Appellant, David O., appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of
    Common Pleas, Probate Division. This court affirms.
    I.
    {¶2}    M.F. was born on December 9, 2002.            Richard F. (“Father”) and Linda H.
    (“Mother”) were listed as the biological father and mother, respectively, on the child’s birth
    certificate. The parents were married at the time of birth, but divorced in 2006 in Mahoning
    County, Ohio. Father was ordered to pay $476.38 per month in child support. Later, M.F.’s
    mother married David O. (“Stepfather”).
    {¶3}    Father has been unemployed since 2006. Initially, he supported himself by living
    on proceeds from the sale of a home. After the proceeds of the home sale were exhausted, Father
    relied on unemployment and retirement funds to support himself.         Eventually, his retirement
    savings were exhausted as well. Father now survives by living with his brother free of charge
    2
    and receiving money from family members to help pay his bills. Father’s child support order
    requires him to pay $476.38 per month. He made no child support payments after August 19,
    2011.
    {¶4}   On May 12, 2010, the Municipal Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
    issued an order preventing Father from having any contact with M.F. The order stemmed from
    allegations that Father sexually abused M.F. A criminal investigation of Father began on May
    13, 2010. Father was ultimately charged with indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of
    age and endangering the welfare of children.
    {¶5}   On January 9, 2013, the criminal case against Father went to trial. He was
    acquitted on January 13, 2013. After the case was resolved, the order of the Allegheny County
    Municipal Court, which prevented Father from having any contact with his child, terminated.
    {¶6}   Three days after his acquittal, on January 16, 2013, Father attempted to contact
    Mother and Stepfather via a court-approved email to continue with the previous court-approved
    visitation schedule. Father did not receive a response. On January 18, 2013, Father attempted to
    contact Mother through her work email. Father received no response to this attempted contact.
    {¶7}   While Father’s criminal case was pending, Mother and Stepfather relocated to
    Summit County. On February 14, 2013, Stepfather filed a petition for adoption with the Probate
    Division of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. Stepfather sent notice of the petition to
    Father; however, Father did not receive the notice because it was mailed to the wrong address.
    Father was subsequently successfully served by regular mail. In the petition, Stepfather asserted
    that consent of the biological father for adoption of M.F. was not required because Father had
    failed to provide more than de minimis contact with the child and had failed to provide
    3
    maintenance and support for the child during the one year period prior to the filing of the petition
    without justification, as required by R.C. 3107.07.
    {¶8}   Father filed an objection to the petition for adoption on March 26, 2013. After
    holding an evidentiary hearing, the probate magistrate denied Stepfather’s petition upon finding
    that Father was justified in failing to have contact with the child or pay support for the child
    during the requisite period. Stepfather filed timely objections to the magistrate’s decision.
    Father filed a response to Stepfather’s objections. After considering Stepfather’s objections, the
    probate court overruled them and adopted the magistrate’s decision.
    {¶9}   Stepfather filed an appeal that was dismissed by this Court for lack of a final,
    appealable order. The Probate Court subsequently issued an opinion independently entering
    judgment. Stepfather filed a timely appeal in which he raises two assignments of error for
    review.
    II.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE MAGISTRATE’S
    DECISION IN THAT THE MAGISTRATE RULED THAT THE CONSENT OF
    THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER WAS NECESSARY IN WHICH TO PROCEED
    WITH THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION BY THE STEP-PARENT, [DAVID
    O.], WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER WAS
    JUSTIFIED IN PAYING NO (0) FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE BENEFIT
    OF THE MINOR CHILD.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE MAGISTRATE’S
    DECISION IN THAT THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION INDICATED THAT
    THE CONSENT OF THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER WAS REQUIRED IN
    WHICH TO PROCEED WITH THE PETITION FOR STEP-PARENT
    ADOPTION IN THAT THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER WAS JUSTIFIED IN
    NOT HAVING ANY CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH THE MINOR CHILD
    IN EXCESS OF ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
    ADOPTION.
    4
    {¶10} In his assignments of error, Stepfather argues that the trial court erred in adopting
    the magistrate’s decision that found that the consent of the biological father was necessary to
    proceed with the petition for adoption. Specifically, Stepfather argues that consent of the
    biological father was not necessary because Father was not justified in failing to provide more
    than de minimis contact with M.F. and failing to provide maintenance and support for M.F. in
    the year prior to Stepfather’s petition for adoption.
    {¶11} The right to parent one's children is a fundamental right. Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 66 (2000); In re C.F., 
    113 Ohio St. 3d 73
    , 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28. Parents have a
    “fundamental liberty interest” in the care, custody, and management of the child. Santosky v.
    Kramer, 
    455 U.S. 745
    , 753 (1982). In recognition of the significance of that fundamental
    interest, the Ohio Supreme Court has described the permanent termination of parental rights as
    “the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.” In re Hayes, 
    79 Ohio St. 3d 46
    , 48 (1997). Therefore, parents “must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection
    the law allows.” 
    Id. This includes
    notice and an opportunity to be heard when a parent faces the
    risk of termination of his or her parental rights. In re Z.H., 9th Dist. Summit No. 26844, 2013-
    Ohio-3904, ¶ 14, citing In re Thompkins, 
    115 Ohio St. 3d 409
    , 2007-Ohio-5238, ¶ 13. In regard
    to the permanent termination of parental rights specific to the context of adoptions, as a general
    rule, the biological parent must consent and may withhold consent to adoption. R.C. 3107.06;
    see also In re Adoption of G.V., 
    126 Ohio St. 3d 249
    , 2010-Ohio-3349, ¶ 6 (stating “Because
    adoption terminates fundamental rights of the natural parents, * * * [a]ny exception to the
    requirement of parental consent [to adoption] must be strictly construed so as to protect the right
    of natural parents to raise and nurture their children.”). The biological parent’s consent is not
    required, however, in certain limited circumstances.
    5
    {¶12} R.C. 3107.07(A) provides that a parent’s consent to adoption is not required if it
    is alleged in the adoption petition and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
    the parent has failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis
    contact with the minor or to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor
    as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately
    preceding either the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor
    in the home of the petitioner.
    {¶13} “Because R.C. 3107.07(A) is written in the disjunctive, either a failure to
    communicate or a failure to provide support for the one-year time period is sufficient to obviate
    the need for a parent's consent.” In re Adoption of A.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010312,
    2013-Ohio-1600, ¶ 9, citing In re Adoption of McDermitt, 
    63 Ohio St. 2d 301
    , 304 (1980). “The
    petitioner has the initial burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent
    has failed to support and/or have contact with the children for at least the requisite one-year
    period.” In re Adoption of A.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010312, 2013-Ohio-1600, ¶ 12,
    citing In re Adoption of Bovett, 
    33 Ohio St. 3d 102
    (1987), paragraph one of the syllabus. “Once
    the petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the natural parent has failed
    to support the child for at least the requisite one-year period, the burden of going forward with
    the evidence shifts to the natural parent to show some facially justifiable cause for such failure.
    The burden of proof, however, remains with the petitioner.” Bovett, 33 Ohio St.3d at paragraph
    two of the syllabus.
    A. Failure to provide maintenance and support
    {¶14} “[T]he question of whether justifiable cause for failure to pay child support has
    been proven by clear and convincing evidence in a particular case is a determination for the
    probate court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless such determination is against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.” In re Adoption of M.B., 
    131 Ohio St. 3d 186
    , 2012-Ohio-236, ¶
    6
    24, quoting In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d. 163 (1986), paragraph two of the syllabus. It
    is the parent's overall “ability to pay [that] is a key factor in determining whether there is
    justifiable cause for failure to support a child.” In re Adoption of Masa, 
    23 Ohio St. 3d 163
    , 167
    (1986). “To determine whether the parent is financially capable of paying support requires an
    examination of the amount of income from all sources, the amount of the support order, and the
    entire financial situation including the types and amounts of other financial obligations.” In re
    Adoption of A.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010312, 2013-Ohio-1600, ¶ 15.
    {¶15} In this case, Stepfather met the initial burden of proving that Father did not
    provide support payments in the one-year period prior to the petition for adoption. Mahoning
    County Child Support records presented in the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate showed
    that the last support payment was received on August 19, 2011. Father does not dispute that he
    did not make support payments after that date, including the one-year period prior to the petition
    for adoption. Given that Stepfather established Father’s failure to pay, Father was required to go
    forward with evidence showing “some facially justifiable cause for such failure.” 
    Bovett, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 104
    .
    {¶16} The probate court properly found that Father’s failure to provide support
    payments was justified because he was financially incapable of paying his support obligations.
    Father has been unemployed since 2006. Since losing his job, Father made attempts to secure
    employment in his profession. Despite efforts during and after his criminal investigation and
    trial, he has been unable to find employment. Thus, Father did not have employment income
    from which he could fulfill his support obligations.
    {¶17} After losing his job, Father had four other financial resources: (1) income
    property, (2) unemployment compensation, (3) retirement funds, (4) and generosity of his
    7
    siblings. In the 2006 divorce settlement between Father and Mother, Father received a home
    owned by the couple. To meet his needs and obligations, he sold the home. Father used the
    proceeds from the sale of the home to cover his expenses until 2008. After the proceeds from the
    sale of the home were exhausted, Father relied upon unemployment compensation to meet his
    needs and obligations. Additionally, Father moved into his brother’s home in 2008 to decrease
    his expenses. During this time, Father paid his child support obligations using proceeds of the
    sale of the home and his unemployment compensation.
    {¶18} Subsequently, Father relied on retirement funds to meet his needs and obligations.
    The retirement funds consisted of a 401(k) plan. Father withdrew six hundred dollars per month.
    He was able to stay current on his obligations, including his child support obligation, until the
    retirement funds were fully expended.
    {¶19} The investigation of Father and his criminal case took nearly two years and eight
    months to resolve. During this time, Father borrowed money from his siblings to pay his legal
    bills and continued to live with his brother. Father sought employment while the case was
    pending and after his case was resolved. However, he has been unable to secure employment.
    {¶20} Father’s overall ability to pay, viewed in light of each financial resource, shows
    that Father was unable to provide maintenance and support to his child. Father has had no
    employment income since 2006, despite attempts to secure employment in his field. During this
    period of unemployment, Father liquidated property, took steps to decrease his expenses,
    exhausted unemployment benefits, and cashed out his retirement savings. He relied on the
    generosity of his siblings to meet his needs and obligations. Despite his financial circumstances,
    Father made support payments until August 19, 2011, the point at which his financial resources
    were fully exhausted. Because Father’s resources were depleted, he was financially incapable of
    8
    paying his support obligations and his subsequent failure to provide maintenance and support
    was justifiable.
    B. Failure to provide de minimis contact
    {¶21} Some courts have held that a “no contact” court order constitutes justifiable cause
    for a parent's failure to communicate with his children. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Adoption of
    Bryan W., 6th Dist. Huron No. H–96–039, 
    1997 WL 224968
    (May 2, 1998). To determine
    whether the lack of communication was justified, the specific language and terms of the order
    must be examined to determine whether the court order prohibited all communication by the
    parent. See In re Adoption of K.K., 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 05CA008849 and 05CA008850, 2006-
    Ohio-1488, ¶12.
    {¶22} Stepfather met the initial burden of proving that Father did not provide more than
    de minimis contact in the one-year period prior to the petition for adoption. Father does not
    dispute that he did not communicate with the child in the year preceding the petition for
    adoption. Because Stepfather established a lack of communication, the burden of going forward
    with evidence shifted to Father to demonstrate some facially justifiable cause for his failure to
    communicate. 
    Bovett, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 104
    .
    {¶23} The Municipal Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, issued three bail release
    conditions to Father on May 12, 2010. The second condition stated in its entirety, “You are to
    have no contact with the victim.” In this case, the alleged victim was his daughter, M.F. The
    order contained no qualifying terms and made no provision for any sort of approved contact.
    This order remained in place until Father’s case was disposed on January 13, 2013.              By
    complying fully with the terms of this order, Father was legally prevented from having any
    contact with his child for eleven of the twelve months preceding the petition for adoption.
    9
    {¶24} After the order was lifted, Father attempted to contact the child. Three days after
    Father’s case was disposed, Father used a court-approved email to contact Mother and Stepfather
    to reestablish the previously approved visitation schedule. After he received no response, Father
    attempted to contact Mother via an alternate email address. Father did not receive a response to
    the second email. Twenty seven days after the second email was sent, Stepfather filed the
    petition for adoption. Thus, Father made two attempts to reestablish contact with the child, both
    of which occurred during the final month of the one-year look back period required by R.C.
    3107.07.
    {¶25} Because the no contact order prevented Father from having contact with his
    daughter during the first eleven months of the one-year look back period and Father made
    multiple attempts to contact his daughter through Mother during the remaining month of the one-
    year look back period, Father’s failure to provide more than de minimis contact was justified.
    C. Conclusion
    {¶26} The probate court did not err in finding that, although Father failed to provide
    maintenance and support and failed to provide more than de minimis contact during the requisite
    one-year look back period prior to Stepfather’s petition for adoption, he showed justifiable cause
    for his failures. Therefore, Father’s consent was necessary to proceed with the petition for
    adoption. Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled.
    II.
    {¶27} Stepfather’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
    County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    10
    There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
    Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
    of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
    Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
    judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
    period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
    instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
    mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
    Costs taxed to Appellant.
    DONNA J. CARR
    FOR THE COURT
    HENSAL, P. J.
    MOORE, J.
    CONCUR.
    APPEARANCES:
    JEFFREY V. HAWKINS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
    RICHARD FOLEY, pro so, Appellee.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 27166

Citation Numbers: 2014 Ohio 3801

Judges: Carr

Filed Date: 9/3/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021