In re D.L. , 2016 Ohio 5834 ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as In re D.L., 
    2016-Ohio-5834
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 103553
    IN RE: D.L.
    A Minor Child
    JUDGMENT:
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Juvenile Division
    Case No. DL15103037
    BEFORE: Kilbane, J., E.A. Gallagher, P.J., and Stewart, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                 September 15, 2016
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Dale M. Hartman
    2195 South Green Road
    Cleveland, Ohio 44121
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    Vencot Brown
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    The Justice Center - 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:
    {¶1} Appellant, D.L., appeals from an order of the Cuyahoga County Court of
    Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, adjudicating him delinquent by reason of rape. D.L.
    raises a single assignment of error, contending that his delinquency adjudication was
    against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse
    the decision of the juvenile court and remand for further proceedings.
    {¶2} In April 2015, the state of Ohio filed a delinquency complaint against D.L.,
    age 17, charging him with one count of rape and three counts of gross sexual imposition
    (“GSI”). The complaint lists K.M., also age 17, as the victim. The matter proceeded to
    an adjudicatory hearing in July 2015, at which the following evidence was adduced.
    {¶3} D.L. and K.M. met each other through social media around August 2014.
    They attended different schools. Both K.M. and D.L. were involved in their respective
    schools and good students. D.L. had a four-year scholarship to college. Sometime after
    August 2014, K.M. met D.L. for the first time in person at a basketball game. Then in
    early October 2014, D.L. visited K.M. at her home. While D.L. was there, he met
    K.M.’s parents, who were both home during the visit.
    {¶4} D.L. was K.M.’s first boyfriend. K.M. told D.L. that her father does not like
    boys talking to her.    In D.L.’s video-recorded statement to the police, which was
    admitted into evidence, D.L. told the detective that he felt “weird” and “scared” at K.M.’s
    house because her father was pacing back and forth and was following them while they
    were talking outside by the lake behind her house. D.L. wanted to stay outside because
    K.M.’s parents were acting “fishy.” Subsequently, he called his grandmother to pick him
    up from K.M.’s house.
    {¶5} D.L. and K.M. then had a second date on October 14, 2014. On this date,
    K.M. visited D.L. at his home after dinner. K.M.’s mother dropped her off at D.L.’s
    home and asked to speak with D.L.’s father. D.L.’s father came outside and personally
    spoke with K.M.’s mother. The father told the mother that he would be home while K.M
    was there. D.L.’s father went into a room upstairs, and D.L. and K.M. went in D.L.’s
    bedroom, which was also upstairs and down the hall. They both sat on D.L.’s bed and
    watched a movie.1 D.L.’s bedroom door was open. K.M. testified that at some point,
    D.L. left his bedroom, and when he returned, he shut his bedroom door. D.L. testified
    that his bedroom door was “cracked open” the entire time.
    {¶6} While the two of them were talking, D.L. confirmed with K.M. that they were
    dating. K.M. testified that she wanted to be in a relationship with D.L. They stood up
    and started kissing. K.M. had her arms wrapped around D.L. K.M. testified that she
    was “okay” with the kissing, describing it as “what boys and girls do.” They moved back
    onto D.L.’s bed. D.L. was touching K.M.’s, breasts, buttock, and thighs. K.M. testified
    that she began to feel “uncomfortable when it led to the bed.” K.M. next testified that
    D.L. pulled down her pants and underwear. She was lying on her back, and D.L. was on
    1In  his statement to the police, D.L. stated that he has a “couch bed” and had
    it as a couch when K.M. was visiting.
    top of her. She testified that D.L. kept saying “I’m not going to do anything.” She then
    felt his penis enter her vagina. At that point in time, K.M. thought “okay, I need to stop
    this.” She stated her thoughts:
    I had all these thoughts running through my head. I’m like okay, I don’t —
    I’m like — I was like I couldn’t really say anything. Like I tried to push
    him, but it’s like, you know, he wasn’t really moving. He was like, I’m not
    going to do anything. So I’m like okay, my mom is coming.
    {¶7} K.M. testified that D.L. stopped when she told him that her mother was
    coming. After that, K.M. pulled up her underwear and pants, and both of them went
    downstairs to play video games.
    {¶8} In her video-recorded statement to the police, which was admitted into
    evidence, K.M. told the detective D.L. stopped after she told him that he had to stop. At
    which point, she indicated that D.L. stopped and got off of her.
    {¶9} D.L. testified that while they were in his bedroom, they started kissing and
    touching each other. K.M. was touching his back and kissing his neck. They went onto
    the bed and K.M. started to unbuckle her belt. She then pulled down her pants. D.L.
    testified that at this point in time, K.M. gave him no indication that she wanted to stop.
    He then put the tip of his penis by K.M.’s vagina and K.M. said, “stop.” At that point,
    D.L. respected K.M.’s decision and got off of the bed. D.L. testified that the only time
    K.M. said “stop” was when the tip of his penis was by her vagina. After that, they went
    downstairs and played a video game. He testified:
    [K.M.] wasn’t telling me no or none of that. She was just going with the
    flow. And, you know, I’m just like, okay. But, you know this is the same
    girl telling me that she was a virgin. While we was doing all that, that was
    shocking to me, like. So I’m just thinking, okay, you know, maybe she lied
    to me or something, I don’t know. I’m just continuing doing, you know,
    boom. Then I had — I took out my penis. And as soon as I put it right
    there, like on the tip, she like nah. She like nah, I ain’t ready yet. Nah, I
    ain’t ready yet. I looked at her. I said, okay, I respect your decision. I
    got up. And she like — she got up. She put her pants on.
    And then I was like, let’s go downstairs because ain’t no point of just
    staying up her and teasing each other[.]
    {¶10} In his statement to the police, D.L. said that while he and K.M. were kissing,
    she pulled down her pants. He then got on top of her. K.M. said she was not ready, so
    he respected her decision and got off of her. He told the detective that he did not pull
    down his pants and his penis never touched K.M.’s vagina. At trial, he testified that he
    was dishonest when he spoke with the detective because his was scared and nervous. He
    told the detective that they did not have sex because it was just getting to that point.
    Then, K.M. said “stop,” so he stopped and they went downstairs.
    {¶11} While they were playing the video game, K.M.’s mother arrived. D.L.
    walked her to the door, where they talked and D.L. gave K.M. a hug. While in the car
    together, K.M. told her mother that her time at D.L.’s house was fun. She did not tell her
    mother any details about her visit with D.L.
    {¶12} The next morning, K.M. woke up because she had to vomit. K.M. texted
    D.L. later that day, letting him know that she had a stomach virus. D.L. never responded
    to her text. She initially thought she was sick from food she ate the night before. She
    later found out that she was vomiting from being nervous about her visit with D.L. She
    continued to vomit for three days. At which point, her mother decided to take her to the
    doctor. K.M. then told her mother about what transpired while she was at D.L.’s house.
    She testified that she told her mother because she thought she might be pregnant and did
    not want her parents to find out at the hospital. Her mother told her father, who was
    furious with K.M. Her father called D.L. about the incident. D.L. testified that K.M.’s
    father was yelling at him, telling him that his daughter did not want to sleep with him. In
    his statement to the police, D.L. stated that K.M.’s father told him “I’m on my way to
    your house.” He also said that his daughter is a virgin. To which D.L. replied, “exactly,
    * * * you’re right, she’s a virgin, * * * we didn’t do [any]thing.” D.L. explained to the
    detective that he felt as though K.M.’s father was forcing her to accuse him of rape.
    {¶13} At the hospital, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (“SANE”) nurse
    completed an exam. K.M. told the SANE nurse that she did not want to press charges
    against D.L.   The Cuyahoga County Regional Forensic Laboratory completed DNA
    testing on the samples from the rape kit. Two types of DNA testing had to be completed
    in order to extrapolate a minute amount of DNA. Through the DNA test focusing solely
    on male DNA, the forensic scientist found a small amount of male DNA (seminal
    material) on K.M’s underwear consistent with D.L.’s DNA profile.
    {¶14} On August 19, 2015, the juvenile court adjudicated D.L. delinquent by
    reason of rape and dismissed the GSI counts. The court referred the matter to the
    probation department for a sex offender assessment. At the dispositional hearing on
    September 21, 2015, the court committed D.L. to the legal custody of the Department of
    Youth Services for an indefinite term of a minimum of 12 months and a maximum not to
    exceed D.L.’s attainment of 21 years of age. The next day, D.L. filed his notice of
    appeal. The day after, on September 23, D.L. moved for a bond hearing pending appeal
    and requested a stay of his sentence pending appeal. That same day, the court held a
    hearing on D.L.’s motion. The trial court granted his bond request and issued a stay of
    his sentence pending his appeal.
    {¶15} D.L. raises the following single assignment of error for review.
    Assignment of Error
    The verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶16} D.L. maintains that the incident involves two juveniles, both 17, who were
    sexually inexperienced. He argues that there is a conflict in the evidence as to when
    K.M. said “stop” and when D.L. stopped. As a result, he contends that the delinquency
    adjudication was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶17} We recognize that “[w]here a trial is not to a jury, a majority of the Court of
    Appeals may reverse a judgment on the weight of the evidence.” State v. Gilkerson, 
    1 Ohio St.2d 103
    , 104, 
    205 N.E.2d 13
     (1965), citing Hnizdil v. White Motor Co., 
    152 Ohio St. 1
    , 
    87 N.E.2d 94
     (1949), and construing former Section 6, Article IV, of the Ohio
    Constitution, which is similar to the current version of Section 3(B)(3), Article IV.
    {¶18} A manifest weight challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence
    presented and questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion. State v. Whitsett,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101182, 
    2014-Ohio-4933
    , ¶ 26, citing State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 
    1997-Ohio-52
    , 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    ; State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    92266, 
    2009-Ohio-3598
    , ¶ 13, citing Thompkins. Because the standard of review is
    broader, a reviewing court may determine that a judgment of a trial court is sustained by
    sufficient evidence, but nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the weight of
    the evidence.
    {¶19} In discussing the manifest weight standard as explained in Thompkins, the
    Ohio Supreme Court stated:
    [T]he reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive — the
    state’s or the defendants? * * * “When a court of appeals reverses a
    judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of
    the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees
    with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” [Thompkins
    at 387], citing Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 
    457 U.S. 31
    , 42, 
    102 S.Ct. 2211
    , 
    72 L.Ed.2d 652
    .
    State v. Wilson, 
    113 Ohio St.3d 382
    , 
    2007-Ohio-2202
    , 
    865 N.E.2d 1264
    , ¶ 25.
    {¶20} An appellate court may not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but
    must find that “‘in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and
    created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a
    new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    ,
    175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st Dist.1983). Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved
    for “‘the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”
    Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin at 175. We believe that this is such a case.
    {¶21} The trial court adjudicated D.L. delinquent by reason of rape in violation of
    2907.02(A)(2), which provides that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with
    another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or
    threat of force.”
    {¶22} In the instant case, there is nothing in the record that would enable a trier of
    fact to reasonably conclude that D.L. engaged in sexual conduct with K.M. without her
    consent, while compelling her to submit to force or threat of force. Rather, the record
    reveals that K.M. and D.L. were inexperienced juveniles who engaged in consensual
    sexual activity. D.L. was K.M.’s first boyfriend. They were on their second date when
    the two of them began experimenting sexually in D.L.’s bedroom. The sexual activity
    began with kissing. K.M. was “okay” with this. It then progressed onto the bed. As it
    progressed, K.M. testified about the thoughts in her head. She stated, “I had all these
    thoughts running through [her] head. I’m like okay, I don’t — I’m like — I was like I
    couldn’t really say anything.” Then she decided to say “my mom is coming.” After she
    said that, D.L. stopped within a couple of seconds.        K.M. further testified that the
    encounter did not last for very long — for “two minutes or so.”
    {¶23} D.L.’s testimony essentially corroborates K.M.’s testimony as to how the
    consensual sexual conduct progressed between the two of them and how D.L. stopped
    when K.M. said “stop.” He testified that:
    [K.M.] wasn’t telling me no or none of that. She was just going with the
    flow. And, you know, I’m just like, okay. But, you know this is the same
    girl telling me that she was a virgin. While we was doing all that, that was
    shocking to me, like. So I’m just thinking, okay, you know, maybe she lied
    to me or something, I don’t know. I’m just continuing doing, you know,
    boom. Then I had — I took out my penis. And as soon as I put it right
    there, like on the tip, she like nah. She like nah, I ain’t ready yet. Nah, I
    ain’t ready yet. I looked at her. I said, okay, I respect your decision. I
    got up. And she like — she got up. She put her pants on.
    {¶24} While K.M. may have intended to stop prior to the point where D.L. took
    out his penis, and she felt that she expressed her desire to stop, we cannot conclude from
    the record that D.L. continued with sexual conduct knowing that K.M. wanted him to
    stop. According to K.M., the whole interaction transpired over two minutes. K.M. had
    second thoughts about progressing sexually with D.L. There was a delay in time from
    the moment she began to contemplate whether she should continue and when she verbally
    expressed her desire to stop. The testimony demonstrates that D.L. did in fact stop when
    K.M. expressed her desire for him to do so.
    {¶25} Moreover, this case is not the situation where either K.M. or D.L. were
    under the influence of alcohol, substantially impaired, or impaired at all. Rather, K.M.
    and D.L. were two 17-year-old teenagers who were engaging in consensual sexual
    activity. They were boyfriend and girlfriend on a second date, which was after school at
    D.L.’s house. K.M.’s mother dropped her off at D.L.’s house and personally spoke with
    D.L.’s father, who was in the house and on the same floor as D.L. and K.M. When
    picked up by her mother, less than an hour and a half later, K.M. indicated that her time at
    D.L.’s house was fun, and did not tell her mother about what happened with D.L. K.M.
    only discussed the date with her mother three days later when she thought she might be
    pregnant and was nervous about how her parents would react. K.M.’s father was furious
    with her. He called D.L. about the incident, yelling at him. He told D.L., “I’m on my
    way to your house.” He also said that his daughter is a virgin, to which D.L. replied,
    “you’re right, we didn’t do [any]thing.” D.L. felt as though K.M.’s father was forcing
    her to accuse him of rape. K.M.’s testimony as well as the SANE’s testimony revealed
    that K.M. did not want to press charges against D.L.
    {¶26} As the court stated in In re Z.B., 9th Dist. Medina No. 09CA0039-M
    
    2010-Ohio-1345
    :
    This Court acknowledges that a manifest weight challenge presents an
    appellate court with a narrow window of review, given the fact that the trier
    of fact is in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
    Yet, when faced with a case such as this, where the only witnesses to an
    alleged sexual attack were the victim and the accused, and the victim’s
    credibility stands alone as the linchpin of the State’s case, this Court cannot
    ignore its duty to sit as the “thirteenth juror” and review the evidence with a
    critical eye. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. When viewed in its
    entirety, we cannot agree that the State presented the greater amount of
    credible evidence in this case. In weighing the evidence and all reasonable
    inferences, we conclude that, “in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
    trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
    justice that the [adjudication of delinquency] must be reversed and a new
    trial ordered.” [State v. Otten, 
    33 Ohio App.3d 339
    , 340, 
    515 N.E.2d 1009
    (9th Dist.1986)].
    Id. at ¶ 24, discretionary appeal not allowed, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 1547
    , 
    2010-Ohio-3855
    , 
    932 N.E.2d 340
     (where the court found defendant’s delinquency adjudication against the
    manifest weight of the evidence because the victim’s testimony contained numerous
    discrepancies and was, at times, not believable. In addition, the victim’s testimony was
    consistently impeached with evidence other than the juvenile’s own testimony, including
    records of cell phone calls between the victim and the juvenile, the victim’s statements to
    the police, and the testimony of the victim’s friend.)
    {¶27} We are aware that the facts of this case are sensitive. We are bound,
    however, to follow the law objectively and apply it justly. Here, we have a consensual
    encounter between two 17-year-old juveniles that ended after one of the participants
    communicated a desire to stop. “It is contrary to this court’s basic understanding of the
    offense of rape to extend the definition of the offense to situations where two children so
    close in age engage in consensual intercourse.” In re Frederick, 
    63 Ohio Misc.2d 229
    ,
    
    622 N.E.2d 762
     (C.P. 1993). In In re Frederick, the defendant, a juvenile aged 14 years,
    was charged with rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) for engaging in sexual intercourse
    with the victim, aged 12.              The trial court concluded that the application
    R.C. 2907(A)(1)(b) to the case as written would produce an unjust and absurd result. Id.
    at 234.
    {¶28} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s adjudication of
    delinquency is against the manifest weight of the evidence. After reviewing the entire
    record, weighing all of the evidence and considering the credibility of witnesses, we find
    that this is the exceptional case where the trial court “‘clearly lost its way and created
    such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [delinquency adjudication] must be
    reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20
    Ohio App.3d at 175.
    {¶29} Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is sustained.
    {¶30} Judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial.
    It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
    County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
    MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 103553

Citation Numbers: 2016 Ohio 5834

Judges: Kilbane

Filed Date: 9/15/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021