State v. Seymour , 2014 Ohio 72 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Seymour, 2014-Ohio-72.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
CASE NO. CA2013-03-038
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
OPINION
: 1/13/2014
- vs -
:
ROBERT M. SEYMOUR a.k.a. SEYMORE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2011-03-0432
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Lina N. Alkamhawi, Government
Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee
Scott N. Blauvelt, 246 High Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendant-appellant
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Robert Seymour, appeals from a decision of the Butler
County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to a term of seven years in prison. For the
reasons detailed below, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further
proceedings.
{¶ 2} On April 13, 2011, appellant was indicted on seven counts in the Butler County
Court of Common Pleas. The indictment included one count of domestic violence, one count
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of aggravated burglary, two counts of assault, one count of grand theft, one count of failure to
comply with an order or signal of a police officer, and one count of violating a protection
order.
{¶ 3} On July 5, 2011, appellant entered guilty pleas to all charges and was
sentenced to a total prison term of 13 years and six months for those convictions.
Appellant's aggravated burglary conviction accounted for six years of that prison term.
Appellant appealed his conviction.
{¶ 4} On July 9, 2012, we remanded this matter to the trial court because "under the
facts and circumstances of [the] case, domestic violence, aggravated burglary, and violating
a protection order are allied offenses of similar import that should have been merged under
R.C. 2941.25." State v. Seymour, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2011-07-131, CA2011-07-143,
2012-Ohio-3125, ¶ 1. As such, we found the trial court committed plain error by not merging
those offenses based on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio
St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314. Id. at ¶ 27. We therefore reversed the decision of the trial court
and held that on remand the trial court must accept the state's decision on which allied
offense to pursue, and then merge the other counts for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 31.
{¶ 5} At appellant's resentencing hearing, the state chose to pursue the aggravated
burglary charge, while the charges for violating a protective order and domestic violence were
merged. The trial court then sentenced appellant to a seven-year prison term for the
aggravated burglary offense, a sentence greater than the six-year prison term that was
originally imposed on appellant for that conviction. Appellant now appeals the decision of the
trial court, raising the following assignment of error:
{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN
RESENTENCING APPELLANT TO INCREASED PUNISHMENT UPON REMAND, IN
VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION
{¶ 7} In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969), the United
States Supreme Court held that a trial court violates due process of law when, motivated by
retaliation or vindictiveness for a defendant's successful appeal, the court resentences a
defendant to a harsher sentence. Id. at 725. Subsequent decisions have limited the
presumption in Pearce to situations where there is a "reasonable likelihood" that an enlarged
sentence was the product of vindictiveness by the trial court. State v. Craycraft, 12th Dist.
Clermont Nos. CA2011-04-029, CA2011-04-030, 2012-Ohio-884, ¶ 11, citing Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201 (1989).
{¶ 8} Although a court may still impose an enhanced sentence on remand, it must
demonstrate that the enhanced sentence was not motivated by vindictiveness toward the
defendant for exercising his rights. State v. Collins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98575, 98595,
2013-Ohio-938, ¶ 8, citing Pearce at 723. Thus, in order to ensure that a nonvindictive
rationale supports the enhanced sentence, the Pearce court held that "whenever a judge
imposes an increased sentence after a successful appeal, there is a presumption of
vindictiveness that can be rebutted only by objective information in the record justifying the
increased sentence." Id; Craycraft at ¶ 11.
{¶ 9} Appellant alleges the increase of his prison term from six years to seven years
on his aggravated burglary conviction was a product of vindictiveness. In support, he argues
the sentence is subject to a presumption of vindictiveness because the enhanced sentence
was imposed following his successful appeal. Because the same trial judge presided over
both sentencing hearings, but failed to explain the rationale for the enhanced sentence, he
contends that due process requires his sentence be reversed and remanded.
{¶ 10} In response, the state argues that a resentencing upon remand for an allied
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offenses error under Johnson is not subject to the presumption of vindictiveness. The state
analogizes the case at bar to those appeals following the announcement of the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856.
{¶ 11} We have previously questioned whether the application of the Pearce
presumption of vindictiveness automatically applies to cases remanded following the Ohio
Supreme Court's decisions in Foster and Johnson. Craycraft, 2012-Ohio-884, at ¶ 12; State
v. Andrews, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2006-06-142, 2007-Ohio-223, ¶ 23; State v. Fernbach,
12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2006-11-130, CA2006-11-131, 2008-Ohio-5670, ¶ 27. In those
cases, however, we questioned the application of the Pearce presumption because the
underlying reversals were "based on void sentences rather than sentences found to be in
error, and because the trial judge was originally constrained by sentencing factors which the
Ohio Supreme Court later found unconstitutional." Fernbach at ¶ 27; Andrews at ¶ 23
(acknowledging that such reversals are "different from cases in which a trial judge has been
reversed for erroneously applying the law").
{¶ 12} Although we have questioned the application of the Pearce presumption to
sentences following a trial court's reliance on factors later found unconstitutional, we have not
expressed such reservations following a trial court's erroneous application of the law. See
State v. Kortum, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2001-04-034, 2002-Ohio-613.
{¶ 13} Nevertheless, the state argues that pursuant to our decision in Craycraft, an
enhanced sentence following an allied offenses remand under Johnson is not entitled to the
Pearce presumption of vindictiveness.
{¶ 14} In Craycraft, this court originally affirmed a trial court's refusal to merge certain
offenses committed by the appellant. Craycraft at ¶ 3. Subsequently, the Ohio Supreme
Court issued its opinion in State v. Johnson, which announced a new test for determining
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whether offenses should merge for purposes of R.C. 2941.25. Id. That same day, the
Supreme Court reversed our affirmance in Craycraft and remanded the matter to this court
for application of the new Johnson test. Id. We in turn, found that the offenses for which
Craycraft was sentenced were allied offenses of similar import under Johnson. We therefore
reversed the trial court's sentencing of Craycraft and remanded the case to the trial court for
resentencing. Id.{¶ 15} On remand, the trial court sentenced Craycraft to a longer prison term on some
of the counts than had been imposed in the original sentence. Id. at ¶ 4. Craycraft then
appealed his resentencing on the basis of vindictiveness. Id. at ¶ 10. On appeal, we
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 18. In so doing, we acknowledged our
hesitation in automatically applying a presumption of vindictiveness because Craycraft was
not a case "in which a trial court judge has been reversed for erroneously applying the law."
Id. at ¶ 12. Since Craycraft was unable to show any evidence of actual vindictiveness, we
found that his sentence was appropriate. Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶ 16} We find the state's argument and reliance on Craycraft to be unpersuasive.
This Court's decision in Craycraft was not based on the trial court's erroneous application of
existing law. Rather, Craycraft involved an original sentence applying the allied offenses
standard set forth in State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632 (1999), which was overruled by
Johnson during the pendency of Craycraft's appeal. Accordingly, Craycraft is similar to our
prior decisions in which we questioned the application of the Pearce presumption in cases
where "the trial judge was originally constrained by sentencing factors which the Ohio
Supreme Court later found unconstitutional." See, e.g., Fernbach, 2008-Ohio-5670, at ¶ 27;
see also Andrews, 2007-Ohio-223, at ¶ 23. Since Craycraft did not involve an erroneous
application of the law by the trial court, it is therefore inapposite to the present case.
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Furthermore, other courts have held that Johnson remands can be subject to the Pearce
presumption of vindictiveness. See State v. Quinones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97054, 2012-
Ohio-1939.
{¶ 17} In the present case, Johnson was established law at the time of appellant's
original sentencing, and was erroneously applied by the trial court. See Seymour, 12th Dist.
Nos. CA2011-07-131, CA2011-07-143, 2012-Ohio-3125. Therefore, the circumstances in
which we previously questioned the application of the Pearce presumption are not present.
{¶ 18} Accordingly, because appellant was resentenced by the same trial judge
following his successful appeal of an erroneous decision and no other exception is present,
the presumption set forth in Pearce applies to appellant's enhanced sentence. See Kortum,
12th Dist. Warren No. CA2001-04-034, 2002-Ohio-613, at *7. Since the presumption of
vindictiveness applies to the present case, the trial court was obligated to supply "objective
information justifying the increased sentence." Id. Where no explanation for an increased
sentence appears in the record, the increased sentence is constitutionally defective and the
matter must be remanded for resentencing. Id.{¶ 19} At appellant's resentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged the
circumstances of the offense, and stated for the record the seriousness of the offense.
As I look at this, I note that Mr. Seymour, you have 41 prior
convictions. You've been to prison six times in Ohio, one time in
Florida. You had your probation revoked in the State of Florida.
As I go back to the summary of types, you've had aggravated
robbery. And I'm not going to name them all. You've had domestic
violence. You've had thefts; had drug charges. You've had
assaults and there is an element, a flavor of assault in this case
because per the bill of particulars on this count, and this count
alone, you struck [the victim] in the face, causing her nose to bleed
and facial swelling; more drug charges. So you've had an
extremely extensive criminal history with elements of violence
contained in it.
I certainly believe in your right to go to trial. I believe in your right to
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exercise all your appellate rights. That's what makes this country
great.
It's going to be the sentence of this Court, and the range on this is
three to 11 years. I've taken all that into account. I've taken into
account the facts of this Count 2 in particular; that you broke
through the door and you caused physical harm to [the victim].
***
So, be order of this Court that this Defendant receive a prison term
of seven years[.]
Although the trial court cited appellant's extensive criminal history and tendency towards
violence, the court failed to provide any explanation for why appellant's prison sentence was
increased from six years to seven years following appellant's successful appeal. The trial
court's decision to sentence appellant to an enhanced prison term was based only on
information originally available to the court at the time of appellant's original sentencing. See,
e.g., State v. Thrasher, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2007CA91, 2008-Ohio-5182, ¶ 22 ("[i]nformation
regarding identifiable conduct on defendant's part that was known by the court at the original
sentencing proceeding does not rebut the presumption of vindictiveness"); see also State v.
Paynter, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2006-0034, 2006-Ohio-5542, ¶ 18 (finding that the trial
court failed to overcome the presumption because "the court did not identify any 'relevant
conduct or events' that came to its attention during the time that passed between appellant's
second and third sentencing"). An explanation for the increased sentence following the facts
in this case is particularly important because Ohio does not allow sentence packaging. State
v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245.
{¶ 20} Therefore, the increased sentence in this case is constitutionally defective and
the matter must be remanded for resentencing. If the trial court decides to impose a harsher
sentence than the sentence imposed originally, then the trial court must affirmatively state
upon the record the reasons for imposing the harsher sentence. Those reasons may come
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to the judge's attention from a variety of ways, including "from a new presentence
investigation, from the defendant's prison record, or possibly from other sources." Collins,
2013-Ohio-938, at ¶ 12, citing Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 104 S.Ct. 3217(1984). Accordingly, appellant's sentence is reversed and remanded to the trial court for
resentencing.
{¶ 21} Judgment reversed and remanded.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.
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