O'Reilly v. O'Reilly ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as O'Reilly v. O'Reilly, 
    2019-Ohio-269
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
    JILLIAN O’REILLY,                                :     OPINION
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            :
    CASE NO. 2018-G-0158
    - vs -                                   :
    DANIEL O’REILLY,                                 :
    Defendant-Appellee.             :
    Appeal from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2013 DC 000485.
    Judgment: Affirmed.
    Leslie A. Weiss, Halberg & Associates Company, L.P.A., 198 East Aurora Road,
    Northfield, OH 44067 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
    A. Pearce Leary, 100 Park Place, Chagrin Falls, OH 44022 (For Defendant-Appellee).
    Ann M. D’Amico, 6579 Wilson Mills Road, Macy House, Mayfield Village, OH 44143
    (Guardian ad litem).
    CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Jillian O’Reilly, appeals from the judgment of the Geauga
    County Court of Common Pleas, adopting the magistrate’s decision ordering the parties’
    minor daughter, R.O., to attend kindergarten and ordering her to pay costs of the
    proceedings. Appellant takes issue with the trial court’s judgment ordering her to pay
    costs. We affirm.
    {¶2}   Appellant and appellee, Daniel O’Reilly, have two daughters, R.O. and
    E.O. The parties disputed whether R.O. should be held back for an additional year of
    pre-school. The matter proceeded to hearing before the magistrate in the summer of
    2017.    After hearing evidence, the magistrate determined R.O. should be sent to
    kindergarten. Appellant filed timely objections, which were overruled. Appellant filed a
    notice of appeal. Appellee subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal as moot because
    R.O. had completed kindergarten. Appellant responded and appellee replied.
    {¶3}   Appellant had originally assigned seven errors, principally challenging
    evidentiary rulings made by the magistrate. On July 13, 2018, however, this court
    entered a judgment finding six assignments of error moot.              This court retained
    jurisdiction over the remaining assignment of error:
    {¶4}   “The trial court abused its discretion by appropriating the costs of the
    action to the plaintiff, exclusive of the appellee whereby both parties filed a motion to be
    heard by the trial court, neither dealing with any wrong doing by either party.”
    {¶5}   The assessment of costs is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be
    reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. McCullough Hyde Memorial Hospital,
    
    116 Ohio App.3d 595
     (12th Dist.1996); Civ.R. 54(D); see also State ex rel. Reyna v.
    Natalucci-Persichetti, 
    83 Ohio St.3d 194
    , 198 (1998). The phrase “abuse of discretion”
    is one of art, connoting a judgment which neither comports with reason, nor the record.
    State v. Ferranto, 
    112 Ohio St. 667
    , 676-678 (1925).
    {¶6}   Appellant asserts the trial court unfairly apportioned the court costs to her
    with no basis for doing so. We disagree.
    2
    {¶7}   Civ.R. 54(D) governs costs, and provides: “Except when express provision
    therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the
    prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.”          Appellee prevailed on the
    underlying motion. As appellant does not identify a statute or rule to the contrary and
    the court did not “otherwise direct,” appellee is allowed costs. We discern nothing
    unreasonable in the trial court’s decision.
    {¶8}   Appellant’s assignment of error lacks merit.
    {¶9}   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Geauga County Court of
    Common Pleas is affirmed.
    TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J., concurs,
    COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
    _____________________
    COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
    {¶10} Finding merit in Ms. O’Reilly’s assignment of error, I would reverse and
    remand. I agree that generally, Civ.R. 54(D) directs that costs should be awarded to the
    prevailing party. Daniel prevailed on the merits in the trial court. However, it is also true
    that costs are usually split in domestic relations proceedings. In this case, both parties
    presented legitimate arguments and evidence to the trial court.            Consequently, I
    conclude that justice dictates that costs be split.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018-G-0158

Judges: Rice

Filed Date: 1/28/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/28/2019