Gen. Elec. Credit Union v. Meadows ( 2015 )


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  •        [Cite as Gen. Elec. Credit Union v. Meadows, 
    2015-Ohio-5480
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    GENERAL          ELECTRIC CREDIT :                        APPEAL NO. C-150230
    UNION, f.k.a. GENERAL ELECTRIC                            TRIAL NO. A-1308506
    EVENDALE EMPLOYEES FEDERAL :
    CREDIT UNION,
    :                             O P I N I O N.
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    :
    vs.
    :
    SHARON K. MEADOWS,
    :
    Defendant-Appellant.
    :
    and,
    :
    ESTATE OF MIRIAM MEDOW, et al.,
    Defendants.                 :
    Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Appeal Dismissed
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 30, 2015
    Statman, Harris, & Eyrich, LLC, and William B. Fecher, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Montgomery, Rennie & Johnson, LPA, Elaine M. Stoll and Ralph E. Burnham, for
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    S TAUTBERG , Judge.
    {¶1}   This appeal arises from a summary-judgment order issued in a foreclosure
    action. Defendant-appellant Sharon K. Meadows and plaintiff-appellee General Electric
    Credit Union (“G.E.”) moved the trial court for summary judgment on the issue of
    whether Meadows’s dower interest in the subject property or G.E.’s mortgage lien had
    priority in the underlying foreclosure action. The trial court determined that G.E.’s
    mortgage lien had priority. It therefore overruled Meadows’s motion and granted G.E.’s.
    Meadows now appeals that order. At the time of Meadows’s appeal, the foreclosure
    action was still pending in the trial court. Before reaching the merits of Meadows’s
    appeal, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction in this matter.
    {¶2}   This court has “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and
    affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the
    court of appeals within the district * * * .” Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), Ohio Constitution.
    Where, as here, we are faced with an appeal from an order that does not dispose of all
    claims against all of the parties, we must (1) determine whether the order is “final”
    within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02, and, if it is, we must (2) determine whether the
    requirements of Civ.R. 54(B) have been met. Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 
    122 Ohio St.3d 83
    , 
    2009-Ohio-1971
    , 
    909 N.E.2d 88
    , ¶ 10; Walburn v. Dunlap, 
    121 Ohio St.3d 373
    ,
    
    2009-Ohio-1221
    , 
    904 N.E.2d 863
    , ¶ 13; Denham v. New Carlisle, 
    86 Ohio St.3d 594
    ,
    596, 
    716 N.E.2d 184
     (1999); Noble v. Colwell, 
    44 Ohio St.3d 92
    , 97, 
    540 N.E.2d 1381
    (1989); compare Welsh Dev. Co. v. Warren Cty. Regional Planning Comm., 
    128 Ohio St.3d 471
    , 
    2011-Ohio-1604
    , 
    946 N.E.2d 215
    , ¶ 14 (holding that when the right to appeal
    is conferred by statute, an appeal can be perfected only in the manner prescribed by the
    applicable statute.)
    2
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Finality Under R.C. 2505.02
    {¶3}   In Queen City S. & L. Co. v. Foley, 
    170 Ohio St. 383
    , 
    165 N.E.2d 633
    (1960), the Supreme Court held that “[i]n a mortgage foreclosure action, a journalized
    order determining that the mortgage constitutes the first and best lien upon the subject
    real estate is a judgment or final order from which an appeal may be perfected.” 
    Id.
     at
    syllabus (emphasis added). While at first glance this holding appears to control the
    jurisdictional issue in this case, Queen City addressed only the matter of finality under
    R.C. 2505.02. Civ.R. 54(B) certification was not at issue in that case. Further, Queen
    City was decided prior to the series of cases, cited above, that require us to consider
    whether the requirements of both R.C. 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B) have been met to
    properly perfect an appeal. We therefore find that Queen City disposes only of the issue
    that the order before us is “final” under R.C. 2505.02. See id. at 385-387. We must also
    analyze whether the court’s order met the requirements of Civ.R. 54(B). See Sullivan;
    Walburn; Denham; Nobel.
    Civ.R. 54(B)
    {¶4}   The general purpose of Civ.R. 54(B) is to balance the policy against
    piecemeal appeals with the possible injustice sometimes created by the delay of appeals.
    Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 
    49 Ohio St.2d 158
    , 160, 
    359 N.E.2d 702
     (1977).
    Civ.R. 54(B) provides:
    When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action * * *, the
    court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of
    the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no
    just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no
    just reason for delay, any order * * * which adjudicates fewer than all the
    claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not
    3
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or
    other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
    of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
    all the parties.
    {¶5}    Thus, the appealability of a final order disposing of fewer than all of the
    claims in an action is a determination that must be made by the trial court. See IBEW
    Local Union No. 8 v. Vaugh Industries, LLC, 
    116 Ohio St.3d 335
    , 
    2007-Ohio-6439
    , 
    879 N.E.2d 187
    , ¶ 8 (holding that a trial court may not bypass the requirement to include the
    express language of Civ.R. 54(B) simply by designating an order as final). In deciding
    that there is “no just reason for delay,” the trial court makes the determination that an
    interlocutory appeal is consistent with the interests of sound judicial administration, i.e.,
    that an immediate appeal will lead to judicial economy. Wisintainer v. Elcen Power
    Strut Co., 
    67 Ohio St.3d 352
    , 
    617 N.E.2d 1136
     (1993), syllabus.             A Civ.R. 54(B)
    certification that “there is no just reason for delay” therefore can “transform a final order
    into a final appealable order.” Id. at 355.
    No Certification, No Jurisdiction
    {¶6}    Here, the trial court did not certify its order under Civ.R. 54(B). And all of
    the claims as to all of the parties in this case have not yet been determined. We therefore
    hold that this appeal has not been perfected, and that we are without jurisdiction in this
    matter. In so holding, we overrule Bank of Am., N.A. v. Omega Design/Build Group,
    LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100018, 
    2011-Ohio-1650
     to the extent that it conflicts
    with this opinion.
    Appeal dismissed.
    CUNNINGHAM, P.J., and FISCHER, J. ., concur.
    4
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its own entry this date.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C-150230

Judges: Stautberg

Filed Date: 12/30/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/30/2015