In re M.B. , 2015 Ohio 5329 ( 2015 )

[Cite as In re M.B., 2015-Ohio-5329.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PICKAWAY COUNTY
In the Matter of: : Case Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7,
: 15CA8, 15CA9, 15CA10 & 15CA11
M.B., C.B.-1, C.B.-2, H.B., C.B.-3, :
T.B. and C.B.-4 : DECISION AND
: JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
: Released: 12/10/15
__________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Jesse A. Atkins, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Jason W. Tonn, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
McFarland, A.J.
{¶1} This is an appeal of the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court’s
decision awarding permanent custody of Appellant M.B.’s seven children to
Pickaway County Job and Family Services. M.B. argues that the trial court’s
findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. He asserts that the
Appellee agency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would be
in the children’s best interest to destroy the parent-child bond he shared with his
children. M.B. also contends that the trial court erred in finding that he could not
provide a legally secure permanent placement when it failed to consider his overall
progress on his case plan and instead focused on his difficulty establishing
permanent housing. However, the evidence shows that M.B. had little, if any,
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 2
interaction with his children and made little progress on his case plan due to
significant cognitive deficiencies. Thus, the trial court’s findings are not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s
assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTS
{¶2} In July 2013 officers with the Circleville Police Department
responded to a report of a van trespassing in the parking lot of a local business.
Officers approached and made contact with Appellant M.B. and the children’s
mother, L.B. A seven-month-old infant wearing only a soiled diaper was in a car
seat in the back of the van crying and coughing. The van was very dirty with trash
and dirty clothing lying about and smelled very badly of urine and feces.
{¶3} The infant was very skinny with visible tendons and ribs. He had dirt
caked under his neck and covering his legs and feet. His diaper was very full and
did not appear to have been changed in quite some time. Despite the heat, the
infant was not sweating. When an officer asked what they were feeding the infant,
L.B. stated that they were feeding him a mixture of soda pop and dehydrated milk.
The officers took a small bottle from the van, rinsed it, and filled it with bottled
water from their cruiser. The infant drank eagerly from the bottle.
{¶4} Due to the infant’s malnourished state and the fact that he was not
sweating despite the hot weather, the officers contacted Circleville EMS. The
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 3
infant was initially transported to Berger Hospital and then transferred to
Children’s Hospital. M.B. was convicted of child endangering in violation of R.C.
2919.22. The infant was placed in Appellee’s temporary custody.
{¶5} Appellee learned that the couple had five other children who were
living with M.B.’s parents. These children were also transported to Berger
Hospital for medical evaluations. The children were extremely disheveled, dirty,
and had severe head lice infestations. They arrived at the hospital barefooted. The
children had unattended medical needs and serious dental problems.
{¶6} Appellee filed complaints in July 2013 alleging that the children were
dependent and/or neglected. Initially the remaining five children were placed in
the temporary custody of M.B.’s parents, the children’s paternal grandparents.
However, that placement was later determined inappropriate due to the conditions
of the home and the emotional instability of a resident and Appellee was awarded
temporary custody of all of the children. A seventh child was born to L.B. and
M.B. in April 2014 and the newborn was immediately placed in the temporary
custody of Appellee. All seven children were placed in foster care and
experienced significant improvement in their health and well-being.
{¶7} Appellee developed case plans for M.B. and L.B. with the goal of
reunification of the children with their parents. Both parents were to have mental
health assessments and parenting classes. From the assessment, L.B. was found to
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 4
have significant cognitive delays and was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with
depressed mood and mild mental retardation. Although she had a strong desire to
parent her children, it was determined that cognitively she lacks the ability to use
effective decision-making skills on a consistent basis and is unable to internalize or
generalize information gained through previous parent training interventions.
Because her parenting difficulties stem from her cognitive deficits, which change
little in adulthood, it was determined that it was unlikely that therapeutic
interventions would significantly improve her parenting abilities. Thus, the
prognosis for her ability to assume primary care of her seven children was viewed
as very poor. Counseling services and assistance through the Board of
Developmental Disabilities were provided to L.B. but this intervention did not
result in any improvement in L.B.’s ability to attain the case plan goals.
{¶8} M.B. was also required to have a mental health assessment, including
a full psychological evaluation. Results from M.B.’s assessments indicated that he
was also functioning in the mild mental retardation range of intelligence. While
M.B. could benefit from individual counseling to help him use positive coping
skills and develop basic independence skills, the assessment concluded that his
limited cognitive abilities made it unlikely that he would be able to independently
and safely parent his children without significant, long-term supervision and
support from others. A review of M.B.’s history showed that he has held multiple
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 5
odd jobs, but struggles to maintain long-term employment and has been unable to
meet the financial needs of his children or provide them with independent housing
or other adequate permanent housing. Appellee determined that M.B. had failed to
make any meaningful progress on his case plan.
{¶9} Witnesses for Appellee testified that they observed the supervised
visitation M.B. and L.B. had with their children. During these scheduled
visitations, M.B. and L.B. exhibited little or no interaction with their children.
L.B. limited her interaction to her youngest child and did not acknowledge the
other children when they arrived. M.B. limited his interaction to the two youngest
children. M.B. started visits well but would soon begin to pace, check his phone,
and leave the room to talk on his phone. Neither parent responded well to
parenting coaching from Appellee or the guardian ad litem during the visits. The
visits never progressed to a level where unsupervised visits could be considered
due to M.B.’s erratic behavior and L.B.’s inability to interact adequately with the
children.
{¶10} Appellee considered the possibility of relative placement for the
children rather than foster care, but found no viable options. The paternal
grandparents had inadequate, overcrowded living space, poor health conditions,
additional relatives living with them who expressed hostility towards the children,
a lock on the refrigerator door to prevent the children from accessing food, and
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 6
were unwilling to following court orders. The maternal grandparents had health
issues that prevented them from adequately caring for the children and the
maternal grandmother had a history of neglect allegations concerning her own
children. None of the aunts or uncles was appropriate or willing to care for the
children.
{¶11} Because of the children’s ages and cognitive abilities, they were
unable to express their wishes concerning their care and custody.
{¶12} Appellee filed a motion for permanent custody in October 2014. The
trial court held a hearing in January 2015 and granted Appellee permanent custody.
M.B. appealed.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶13} Appellant raises one assignment of error for our review:
“The lower court erred in granting permanent custody to the Pickaway
County Department of Jobs and Family Services because the agency
failed to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence as required
by R.C. Section 2151.414(B)(1) and the holding was not supported by
the manifest weight of the evidence.”
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶14} A reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial court's permanent
custody decision unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 7
In re M.H., 4th Dist. Vinton No. 11CA683, 2011–Ohio–5140, ¶ 29; In re A.S., 4th
Dist. Athens Nos. 10CA16, 10CA17, 10CA18, 2010–Ohio–4873, ¶ 7.
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater
amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of
the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the
party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on
weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater
amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be
established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but
depends on its effect in inducing belief.’ ” Eastley v. Volkman, 132
Ohio St.3d 328, 2012–Ohio–2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 12, quoting
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997),
quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).
{¶15} When an appellate court reviews whether a trial court's permanent
custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court “weighs
the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses
and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact]
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
[judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 20. Accord In re
Pittman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20894, 2002–Ohio–2208, ¶¶ 23–24.
{¶16} In a permanent custody case, the ultimate question for a reviewing
court is “whether the juvenile court's findings * * * were supported by clear and
convincing evidence.” In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008–Ohio–4825, 895
N.E.2d 809, ¶ 43. “Clear and convincing evidence” is:
[T]he measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the
trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 8
be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere
preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as required
beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean
clear and unequivocal. In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101,
104, 495 N.E.2d 23 (1986).
{¶17} In determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear and
convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the record to determine
whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite
degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990).
Accord In re Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985), citing
Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954) (“Once the clear and
convincing standard has been met to the satisfaction of the [trial] court, the
reviewing court must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact had
sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of proof.”). “Thus, if the
children services agency presented competent and credible evidence upon which
the trier of fact reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent custody
is warranted, then the court's decision is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.” (Citations omitted.) In re R.M., 2013–Ohio–3588, 997 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 55
(4th Dist.).
{¶18} After the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may
reverse the judgment only if it appears that the fact-finder, when resolving the
conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 9
miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.’ ” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Martin at
175. A reviewing court should find a trial court's permanent custody decision
against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against the [decision].’ ” Id., quoting Martin at
175; accord State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483, 721 N.E.2d 995 (2000).
{¶19} Furthermore, when reviewing evidence under the manifest weight of
the evidence standard, an appellate court generally must defer to the fact-finder's
credibility determinations. As the Eastley court explained:
“[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against
the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every
reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and
the finding of facts. * * *
If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is
consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining
the verdict and judgment.” Eastley, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012–Ohio–
2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, at ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn.3,
quoting 5 Ohio Jur.3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192
(1978).
B. PERMANENT CUSTODY PRINCIPLES
{¶20} A parent has a “fundamental liberty interest” in the care, custody, and
management of his or her child and an “essential” and “basic civil right” to raise
his or her children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 10
L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169(1990); accord In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007–Ohio–1105, 862 N.E.2d 829.
A parent's rights, however, are not absolute. In re D.A. at ¶ 11. Rather, “ ‘it is
plain that the natural rights of a parent * * * are always subject to the ultimate
welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be
observed.’ ” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979),
quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla.App.1974). Thus, the state may
terminate parental rights when a child's best interest demands such termination. In
re D.A. at ¶ 11.
{¶21} Before a court may award a children services agency permanent
custody of a child, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) requires the court to hold a hearing. The
primary purpose of the hearing is to allow the court to determine whether the
child's best interests would be served by permanently terminating the parental
relationship and by awarding permanent custody to the agency. Id. Additionally,
when considering whether to grant a children services agency permanent custody,
a trial court should consider the underlying purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151, as set
forth in R.C. 2151.01:
(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical
development of children * * * whenever possible, in a family
environment, separating the child from the child's parents only
when necessary for the child's welfare or in the interests of public
safety;
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 11
(B) To provide judicial procedures through which Chapters 2151 and
2152 of the Revised Code are executed and enforced, and in
which the parties are assured of a fair hearing, and their
constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and enforced.
C. PERMANENT CUSTODY FRAMEWORK
{¶22} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) permits a trial court to grant permanent custody
of a child to a children services agency if the court determines, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the child's best interest would be served by the award of
permanent custody and that any of the following apply:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division
(D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in
another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's
parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the
child's parents.
(b) The child is abandoned.
(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who
are able to take permanent custody.
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve
or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the
child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve
or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as
described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code,
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 12
the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent
agency in another state.
(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents
from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated
an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions
by any court in this state or another state.
{¶23} Thus, before a trial court may award a children services agency
permanent custody, it must find (1) that one of the circumstances described in R.C.
2151.414(B)(1) applies, and (2) that awarding the children services agency
permanent custody would further the child's best interests.
{¶24} In the case at bar, M.B. does not challenge the trial court’s R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d) finding. Therefore, we do not address it. Instead, M.B. focuses
his argument on the trial court’s best interest determination.
D. BEST INTEREST
{¶25} R.C. 2151.414(D) requires a trial court to consider specific factors to
determine whether a child's best interest will be served by granting a children
services agency permanent custody. The factors include: (1) the child's interaction
and interrelationship with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and
out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child; (2) the child's wishes, as expressed directly by the child or through the
child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child's maturity; (3) the child's
custodial history; (4) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 13
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent
custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R.C.
2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply. “In a best-interest analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D),
a court must consider ‘all relevant factors,’ including five enumerated statutory
factors * * *. No one element is given greater weight or heightened significance.”
In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007–Ohio–1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 57, citing In re
Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006–Ohio–5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.
E. M.B.'S APPEAL
{¶26} In the case at bar, the only aspect of the trial court's decision M.B.
challenges is whether the trial court properly evaluated the relevant factors in
determining the best interests of the children. Specifically, he argues that the trial
court failed to properly consider his interaction and interrelationship with the
children, a factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), and it erred in its evaluation
of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) concerning whether a legally secure permanent
placement for the children could be achieved without a grant of permanent custody
to the agency.
{¶27} As to the level of interaction he had with his children, he claims that
evidence of the supervised visitation sessions shows that the children recognized
him as their father and sought his attention. He refers to his testimony at the
permanent custody hearing where he stated that he completed parenting classes and
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 14
attended visitation sessions. However, he also testified that he heard the other
witnesses’ testimony about the visitation sessions and their testimony was “all
pretty accurate” as well.
{¶28} With respect to the children’s interaction and interrelationship with
M.B., the court evaluated this factor and found that the testimony presented by
Appellee and the guardian ad litem about the overall interaction between the
children and the parent was minimal:
“That evidence indicated that mother did not engage with any of the
children, except the newborn child * * *. Father had little engagement and
became distracted by outside influences during the visits. Father also was
not receptive to parental coaching and instruction but was resistant to such.
Visitations were described by all witnesses as chaotic in nature.”
The court’s evaluation of this evidence is accurate and its findings are not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. The record shows that several witnesses
testified about M.B.’s behavior and lack of interest at the visitations. Moreover, as
previously discussed, M.B. conceded that the testimony of the other witnesses was
“all pretty accurate.” Consequently, we do not agree with M.B.’s claim that the
trial court failed to consider his interaction and interrelationship with his children
in its best interest analysis.
{¶29} As to M.B.’s second contention concerning the permanent placement
factor listed in subsection (D)(1)(d), he claims to have made noticeable progress in
achieving his case plan. He argues that the trial court focused too much of its
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 15
attention on his lack of permanent housing. However, the evidence M.B. refers to
in the record shows only that he continued to work towards his case plan goals, not
that he has made any meaningful progress. He testified that he plans to get a job
and has been actively searching for employment. However, he stated that his
search efforts have been frustrated because he allowed his driver’s license to expire
and must rely on his father for transportation. He testified that he wants to get his
life back on track, get a permanent full-time job, and eventually save money for a
house, but he had not yet achieved those goals. Because he has employment goals
and plans to eventually obtain housing, M.B. claims that the trial court erred in
finding that he could not achieve stable housing that would be adequate for his
children.
{¶30} In addressing the children’s need for a legally secure permanent
placement, the trial court noted that Appellee had filed a motion for permanent
custody because the children had been in the custody of the agency for more than
twelve months over a consecutive twenty-two month period and it would be in the
best interest of the children to grant permanent custody to the agency. See R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a). The trial court found that the goal of the Appellee was to
reunify the children with their parents and that the case plan to achieve this goal
was clear and understandable. However, the trial court found that the clear and
convincing evidence presented in the case showed that the parents’ significant
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 16
cognitive limitations and their inability to process and implement appropriate
parenting skills taught to them meant that the children would not be in a secure
placement if permanently returned to them. Evidence presented at the hearing
showed that the children “would be at risk of harm if left to be raised by the
parents.” M.B. presented no psychological report to contradict Appellee’s
evidence concerning M.B.’s cognitive deficiencies.
{¶31} Additionally, the court found that there was clear and convincing
evidence that “both parents would need significant, intensive ongoing support of
others to be able to provide for the appropriate supervision and care of [their
children] to assure [their] safety and well-being” and there was no evidence that
either L.B.’s or M.B.’s extended family was capable or willing to adequately
support them in their parenting efforts. Moreover, the trial court found that there
was no evidence that a social service agency could provide this type of intensive
supportive services.
{¶32} Based upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court’s
determination that the children’s need for a legally secure permanent placement
could not be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the Appellee was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court was not required to
deny the children the permanency they need, especially given their young ages and
needs, in order to provide M.B. additional chances to achieve the employment and
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 17
housing goals in his case plan. This is particularly true here where the cognitive
deficiencies that he experiences are not known to improve or change over time
with intervention. To deny Appellee permanent custody would only prolong these
children’s uncertainty. “We do not believe that the trial court was required to
experiment with the [children’s] best interest in order to permit appellant to prove
that [he] will be able to regain custody * * *” In the Matter of C.T.L.A., 4th Dist.
Hocking No. 13CA24, 2014 Ohio 1550, ¶ 51 citing In re Bishop, 36 Ohio App.3d
123, 126, 521 N.E.2d 838 (1987)(“The law does not require the court to
experiment with the child’s welfare to see if he will suffer great detriment or
harm.”). Thus, we reject M.B.’s assertion that the trial court erred in analyzing the
permanent placement factor of the best interest analysis.
{¶33} Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we overrule M.B.’s sole
assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pickaway App. Nos. 15CA5, 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9,
15CA10, & 15CA11 18
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that costs be
assessed to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this
judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date
of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hoover, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ______________________________
Matthew W. McFarland,
Administrative Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.