State v. Highsmith , 2017 Ohio 7101 ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Highsmith, 2017-Ohio-7101.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LUCAS COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                       Court of Appeals No. L-16-1185
    Appellee                                    Trial Court No. CR0201601240
    v.
    Darian Highsmith                                    DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                   Decided: August 4, 2017
    *****
    Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brenda J. Majdalani,
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant.
    *****
    OSOWIK, J.
    {¶ 1} This is an appeal from an August 1, 2016 judgment of the Lucas County
    Court of Common Pleas, sentencing appellant to a total term of incarceration of 15 years
    following appellant’s convictions pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to two
    amended counts of robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2)(b), both felonies of the
    second degree, in addition to a mandatory one-year firearm specification, in violation of
    R.C. 2941.141(A). For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment, in
    part, and reverses it, in part.
    {¶ 2} Appellant, Darian Highsmith, sets forth the following two assignments of
    error:
    THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMPLY WITH R.C. 2929.11 IN
    SENTENCING APPELLANT TO 15 YEARS IN THE OHIO
    DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTIONS
    THEREFORE APPELLANT’S SENTENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
    THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR TO THE
    PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY IMPOSING THE COST OF
    PROSECUTION WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF APPELLANT’S
    PRESENT OR FUTURE ABILITY TO PAY.
    {¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On November 8,
    2015, appellant robbed the Vito’s Pizza located on Detroit Ave. in Toledo utilizing a
    black 9 mm weapon. On January 15, 2016, appellant robbed the In and Out Mart located
    on Berdan Ave. in Toledo utilizing a baseball bat.
    {¶ 4} The record reflects appellant possesses an extensive and serious criminal
    history spanning several decades. The record further reflects that appellant received
    2.
    multiple generous plea agreements, multiple court provided services, and multiple
    opportunities to change the course of his life over the years but did not do so.
    {¶ 5} On February 9, 2016, appellant was indicted on two counts of aggravated
    robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), felonies of the first degree, with one count
    accompanied by a mandatory firearm specification.
    {¶ 6} On February 25, 2016, appellant failed to appear for arraignment. A capias
    with bond set at $250,000, no 10 percent, was issued. Appellant was subsequently taken
    into custody and appointed legal counsel.
    {¶ 7} On June 6, 2016, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant pled
    guilty to two lesser, amended offenses of robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2),
    with one count including a mandatory firearm specification. Appellant was referred for a
    presentence investigation and report.
    {¶ 8} On August 1, 2016, appellant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of
    incarceration of seven years on the robbery convictions, along with the one-year
    mandatory term on the firearm specification, for a total term of incarceration of 15 years.
    On August 17, 2016, a timely notice of appeal was filed.
    {¶ 9} In the first assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial court erred
    in sentencing appellant by failing to comply with the R.C. 2929.11 principles and
    purposes of sentencing. We do not concur.
    {¶ 10} As set forth by this court in State v. Tammerine, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-
    1081, 2014-Ohio-425, ¶ 11, appellate court felony sentencing review in the state of Ohio
    3.
    is governed by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). As such, an appellate court may increase, reduce,
    modify, or vacate and remand, a disputed felony sentence if it clearly and convincingly
    finds that either the sentence is based upon relevant statutory findings not supported by
    the record or is otherwise contrary to law.
    {¶ 11} Notably, as applied to the instant case, appellant concedes that the terms of
    incarceration of the disputed sentence are lawfully within the permissible statutory
    ranges. Further, appellant makes no claim, nor does the record reflect, that the disputed
    sentence included relevant statutory findings not supported by the record.
    {¶ 12} Appellant’s first assignment of error alleges that appellant’s sentence was
    unlawful based upon a claimed breach of the R.C. 2929.11 purposes and principles of
    sentencing.
    {¶ 13} Specifically, appellant claims that this court should construe the underlying
    felony sentence as unlawfully disproportionate because appellant received lesser terms of
    incarceration in appellant’s own separate second-degree felony robbery convictions and
    sentences in separate cases that were heard by a separate trial court.
    {¶ 14} Significantly, appellant simultaneously concedes, “[C]ourts are not
    required to sentence uniformly with one another in similarly charged cases.” Appellant
    nevertheless suggests, without persuasive or controlling legal authority, that because
    appellant himself was the defendant in these separate cases, all other trial courts are
    constrained as a matter of law in sentencing appellant on separate second degree robbery
    convictions arising from separate offenses of the same type and degree such that a
    4.
    sentence of the same term of incarceration is the only permissible sentence that can be
    imposed. Appellant presents no persuasive or controlling legal authority in support of
    this position.
    {¶ 15} Stated differently, appellant maintains that because he was sentenced to
    four-year terms of incarceration in separate second degree felony robbery convictions, the
    imposition of the seven-year terms of incarceration in the instant case is thereby rendered
    unlawful. We do not concur.
    {¶ 16} Appellant’s position is counter to the governing principle, as conceded by
    appellant, that there is no mandate that trial courts uniformly sentence with one another in
    similarly charged separate cases.
    {¶ 17} We find that appellant has failed to clearly and convincingly demonstrate
    that the disputed felony sentence in the instant case is either based upon relevant statutory
    findings unsupported by the record or otherwise contrary to law. We further find that
    appellant has failed to demonstrate that the disputed felony sentence is contrary to R.C.
    2929.11. We find appellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
    {¶ 18} In appellant’s second assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial
    court erred in sentencing in connection to the imposition of attorney’s fees, costs of
    confinement, and the cost of supervision without notifying appellant. We concur.
    {¶ 19} In State v. Joseph, 
    125 Ohio St. 3d 76
    , 2010-Ohio-954, 
    926 N.E.2d 278
    , ¶
    22-24, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the failure to orally notify the defendant that it
    was imposing costs denied the defendant the ability to seek a waiver. The court further
    5.
    held that the remedy required in such cases is a limited remand to the trial court for
    purposes of enabling the defendant to motion the court for a waiver of the payment of
    costs.
    {¶ 20} We have carefully reviewed the sentencing transcript in this matter. It
    reflects that appellant engaged, at times, in a highly disruptive and insolent manner
    during the proceedings. For example, at one point, appellant exclaimed, “I got like
    something 20 something years for this shit. What, man? Grab me and I’m going to have
    a problem with you. I’m telling you. So don’t grab me * * * [I]t’s going to be a mother
    fucking problem.”
    {¶ 21} The record further reflects that during the course of the commotion, the
    trial court failed to orally notify the defendant regarding the imposition of costs.
    Therefore, appellant was unable to seek a cost waiver. As such, this case must be
    remanded to the trial court. Wherefore, we find appellant’s second assignment of error to
    be well-taken.
    {¶ 22} Based upon the foregoing, we hereby affirm the sentencing judgment of the
    trial court, in part, and reverse it, in part. This matter is hereby remanded to the trial
    court solely for purposes of appellant being orally notified by the trial court of the matter
    of costs and permitting appellant the opportunity to move the court for a waiver of costs.
    Appellant and appellee and each ordered to pay one-half of the costs of this appeal
    pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed, in part
    and reversed, in part.
    6.
    L-16-1185
    State v. Highsmith
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           _______________________________
    JUDGE
    James D. Jensen, P.J.
    _______________________________
    Christine E. Mayle, J.                                     JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    7.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: L-16-1185

Citation Numbers: 2017 Ohio 7101

Judges: Osowik

Filed Date: 8/4/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/7/2017