State v. Oakley , 2019 Ohio 2487 ( 2019 )

[Cite as State v. Oakley, 2019-Ohio-2487.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
LOGAN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-19-06
v.
TYLER L. OAKLEY, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 18 09 0267
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 24, 2019
APPEARANCES:
Eric J. Allen for Appellant
David A. Walsh, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 8-19-06
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tyler L. Oakley (“Oakley”), brings this appeal
from the January 23, 2019, judgment of the Logan County Common Pleas Court
sentencing Oakley to a six-year prison term after he pled guilty to, and was
convicted of, Complicity to Robbery in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(1) and R.C.
2911.02(A)(2), a felony of the second degree. On appeal Oakley argues that the
trial court erred by sentencing him to a greater prison term than the prison term that
had been jointly recommended by the parties.
Procedural History
{¶2} On September 11, 2018, Oakley was indicted for Aggravated Robbery
in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree. It was alleged that
on June 27, 2018, an individual was leaving Woody’s Diner at Indian Lake with the
proceeds of the day’s sales. The individual was approached by a man wearing a
mask, wielding a baseball bat. A confrontation ensued and money was taken from
the diner employee. A subsequent investigation determined that three individuals
were involved, Oakley being one of them. Oakley was a “getaway driver” for the
operation, and may have participated in the planning. Oakley originally pled not
guilty to the charge against him.
{¶3} On December 7, 2018, Oakley entered into a written negotiated plea
agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the amended charge of Complicity
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to Robbery in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(1) and R.C. 2911.02(A)(2), a felony of
the second degree. In exchange for his plea the State agreed to dismiss the more
serious charge, and the parties agreed to jointly recommend a four-year prison term.
Notably, the written plea agreement contained a provision that stated as follows.
13. I know that the sentence I will receive is solely a matter
within the control of the Judge. I understand that if the State has
agreed to a sentencing recommendation, the Court is not bound
to accept the recommendation. I understand that if there is a
jointly recommended (agreed) sentence, I may not appeal a jointly
recommend sentence that is authorized by law.
{¶4} On December 7, 2018, the trial court held a change-of-plea hearing. At
the plea hearing, the agreement between the parties was recited to the trial court,
and the trial court engaged in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Oakley. As part of the
colloquy, the trial court specifically stated that “Even if there is an agreed sentence,
it doesn’t mean the Court is bound to follow it.” (Dec. 7, 2018, Tr. at 9). The
defendant indicated he understood. The trial court continued by stating, “I
frequently do not follow them. In fact, it’s rare I follow them. I usually make my
own determination * * * Understanding that the Court is not bound by that agreed
sentence, are you still willing to go forward?” (Id. at 9-10). Oakley responded
affirmatively.
{¶5} The trial court continued to inform Oakley of all the rights Oakley was
waiving by entering his guilty plea, and Oakley then elected to enter a guilty plea
pursuant to the agreement that had been made. The trial court accepted Oakley’s
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plea, finding that it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Oakley was found
guilty, and the trial court set the matter for sentencing at a later date.
{¶6} On January 22, 2019, the matter proceeded to sentencing. Oakley gave
a statement expressing remorse for his actions, and the State indicated that it was
standing by the four-year prison term from the joint sentencing recommendation.
The trial court then reviewed Oakley’s history of involvement with the legal system
both as a juvenile and as an adult, concluding that for Oakley’s age—23—his record
was “epic.” (Jan. 22, 2019, Tr. at 14). After reviewing the principles and purposes
of sentencing, and being particularly concerned with the protection of the public,
the trial court determined that a six-year prison term was appropriate in this matter.
{¶7} A judgment entry memorializing Oakley’s sentence was filed January
23, 2019. It is from this judgment that Oakley appeals asserting the following
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The record in this matter does not support more than the joint
sentencing recommendation presented to the court.
{¶8} In his assignment of error, Oakley argues that the trial court erred by
deviating from the joint sentencing recommendation that the parties presented.
Specifically, he contends that the record in this matter does not support more than
the jointly recommended sentence.
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Standard of Review
{¶9} Appellate review of felony sentencing is governed by R.C.
2953.08(G)(2), which reads as follows:
The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this
section shall review the record, including the findings underlying
the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a
sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the
sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for
resentencing. The appellate court’s standard for review is not
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate
court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly
and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s
findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Thus, “an appellate court will reverse a sentence ‘only if it
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the
trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise
contrary to law.’ ” State v. Nienberg, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-16-15 and 12-16-16,
2017-Ohio-2920, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St. 3d 516, 2016-Ohio-
1002, ¶ 1.
Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof
which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but
not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a
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reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts
sought to be established.
State v. Sullivan, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-17-09, 2017-Ohio-8937, ¶ 12, quoting
Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, at paragraph three of the syllabus (1954).
Relevant Authority
{¶10} “This [C]ourt has previously held that trial courts have full discretion
to impose any prison sentence within the statutory range as long as they consider
the purposes and principles of felony sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism
factors.” State v. Close, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-45, 2018-Ohio-2244, ¶ 5, citing
State v. Alselami, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5–11–31, 2012–Ohio–987, ¶ 21. The trial
court is not required to make any specific findings to demonstrate the consideration
of those statutory sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Id.
{¶11} Revised Code 2929.11 provides that sentences for a felony shall be
guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing: “to protect the public from
future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.” R.C.
2929.11(A). In order to comply with those purposes and principles, R.C. 2929.12
instructs a trial court to consider various factors set forth in the statute relating to
the seriousness of the conduct and to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.
R.C. 2929.12(A) through (D). In addition, a trial court may consider any other
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factors that are relevant to achieving the purposes and principles of sentencing. R.C.
2929.12(E).
{¶12} Moreover, trial courts are not bound by a jointly recommended
sentence. State v. Lyttle, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-12-22, 2013-Ohio-2608, ¶ 24,
citing State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 28. In fact, “ ‘[a]
trial court does not err by imposing a sentence greater than that forming the
inducement for the defendant to plead guilty when the trial court forewarns the
defendant of the applicable penalties, including the possibility of imposing a greater
sentence than that recommended by the prosecutor.’ ” Lyttle at ¶ 24, quoting State
ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St. 3d 58, 2005-Ohio-3674, ¶ 6; State v. Spencer,
3d Dist. No. 6-12-15, 6-12-16, 2013-Ohio-137, ¶ 10.
Argument and Analysis
{¶13} In this case, Oakley entered into a plea agreement wherein he pled
guilty to a second degree felony and the parties would jointly recommended a four-
year prison term. Oakley was notified at his plea hearing that the penalty for a
second degree felony was two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years in prison,
with a presumption in favor of a prison term. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(b). At the
plea hearing, Oakley was also specifically notified by the trial court that it was not
bound to follow the recommendation of the parties. In fact, the trial court went so
far as to state that it “frequently” did not follow the recommendation of the parties,
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making its own determination regarding sentencing. Oakley still elected to enter
his plea even with this knowledge, and the trial court sentenced him to a six-year
prison term, which was within the appropriate statutory range for a second degree
felony. R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(b).
{¶14} Case authority makes it clear that a trial court is not bound by a joint
sentencing recommendation, particularly where the trial court informs a defendant
as much. This was explicitly done here, thus we can find no error with the trial
court’s deviation from the jointly recommended sentence. Nevertheless, Oakley
still maintains that the record does not support his six-year prison term.
{¶15} In fashioning its sentence in this matter, the trial court noted Oakley’s
prior juvenile and adult record. After going through Oakley’s extensive
involvement with the legal system as a juvenile, the trial court indicated that “four
months into adulthood” Oakley was found guilty of unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle in municipal court, and that within three months of that incident Oakley had
three counts of complicity to grand theft of a motor vehicle, all felonies of the fourth
degree, and two counts of grand theft, both felonies of the third degree. For
Oakley’s felony crimes he was sentenced to fifty-four months in prison. He was
subsequently granted judicial release from that prison term, but he violated his
judicial release by committing another theft offense. Oakley’s remaining prison
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term was imposed, and shortly after he was released, he was charged with the
offense in this case.
{¶16} The trial court reviewed the principles and purposes of sentencing,
finding that rehabilitation had not been effective in the past for Oakley, and that a
fifty-four month prison term had not been a deterrent to Oakley. The trial court
stated it was chiefly concerned with protecting the community, stating,
I was not unmindful of the State’s recommendation of four years,
but I would point out to the State that Mr. Oakley has already
been sentenced to 54 months in the past for crimes that are less
violent that this. It didn’t work and it didn’t protect the public.
It didn’t deter him. It didn’t alter the course of his behavior, so I
believe that this sentence is appropriate. I am not willing to go
along with the State’s recommendation. I believe it to be
insufficient to protect the public.
(Jan. 22, 2019, Tr. at 17).
{¶17} Based on the trial court’s careful consideration of the sentencing
factors, we cannot find that the trial court’s sentence in this matter, which was less
than a maximum prison term, was clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
Therefore, Oakley’s assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶18} For the foregoing reasons Oakley’s assignment of error is overruled
and the judgment of the Logan County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
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