Start Skydiving, L.L.C. v. Wiese ( 2017 )

[Cite as Start Skydiving, L.L.C. v. Wiese, 2017-Ohio-7020.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
START SKYDIVING, LLC, :
CASE NO. CA2017-04-042
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
OPINION
: 7/31/2017
- vs -
:
ANDRI WIESE, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CV2016-11-2443
Rittgers & Rittgers, Konrad Kircher, 12 East Warren Street, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for
plaintiff-appellant
Konrad Kuczak, 130 West Second Street, Suite 1010, Dayton, Ohio 45402, for defendant-
appellee
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Start Skydiving, LLC ("Start Skydiving"), appeals from the
decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas dismissing its complaint against
defendant-appellee, Andri Wiese.1 For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we hereby sua sponte remove this case from the accelerated calendar for the
purposes of issuing this opinion.
Butler CA2017-04-042
{¶ 2} Start Skydiving is a Delaware limited liability company that operates a
recreational skydiving center in Middletown, Butler County, Ohio. Wiese is an Illinois resident
who is engaged in the skydiving industry as the president of Win Win Aviation, Inc. ("Win
Win"), an Illinois corporation.
{¶ 3} On November 14, 2016, Start Skydiving filed a complaint against Wiese
alleging claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and negligence. According to
the complaint, the allegations arose after Wiese, in his individual capacity, sold Start
Skydiving cargo doors to a Cessna Caravan aircraft that Start Skydiving had previously
leased to Chambersburg Skydiving Center ("Chambersburg"). This transaction occurred
after Start Skydiving "expressed interest throughout the skydiving community that it wished to
purchase replacement cargo doors for its Caravan aircraft," to which Wiese responded "by
stating he [Wiese] had doors for sale."
{¶ 4} Agreeing to purchase the cargo doors from Wiese, Start Skydiving paid Wiese
$10,000 and then "retrieved the doors" from him. After the purchase was complete, Start
Skydiving returned to Ohio and began to install the cargo doors on its Caravan aircraft when
it identified the doors as "the same ones which had been on the plane when it was delivered
to Chambersburg." The complaint concludes by stating that Wiese, knowing the cargo doors
were property of Start Skydiving at the time of the sale, refused to return the money Start
Skydiving paid Wiese for the cargo doors.
{¶ 5} On December 12, 2016, Wiese moved to dismiss Start Skydiving's complaint
alleging the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him resulting from "the single sale of
aircraft doors" to Start Skydiving. In response, on December 29, 2016, Start Skydiving filed a
memorandum in opposition to Wiese's motion to dismiss claiming Wiese's contacts with the
state of Ohio, particularly that of Butler County, were sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction
over him to the trial court since Wiese's contacts with Ohio and Butler County were more
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than just a single transaction for the sale of cargo doors. An affidavit attached to Start
Skydiving's memorandum, however, indicated that Start Skydiving "had never before done
business with Wiese in his personal capacity" in Ohio or otherwise.
{¶ 6} On January 6, 2016, Wiese filed a reply to Start Skydiving's memorandum,
wherein Wiese averred that he never conducted any business activities of Win Win as a sole
proprietor, and that any contacts with Ohio and Butler County had been strictly in his capacity
as president of Win Win. Wiese also noted the fact that Win Win was then currently pursuing
a collection claim in the Circuit Court for the 23rd Judicial Circuit, DeKalb County, Illinois
against Start Skydiving. It is undisputed that Start Skydiving attempted to transfer venue of
the DeKalb County case to Butler County, a motion that the Illinois Circuit Court denied.
{¶ 7} On March 16, 2017, after taking the matter under advisement, the trial court
granted Wiese's motion to dismiss. In so holding, the trial court stated, in pertinent part, the
following:
[Start Skydiving] lists a number of activities Wiese is tangentially
related to or involved in, but ultimately, that conduct is on behalf
of Win Win and not as an individual. In those contacts, Win Win
reaps the benefits and potential liabilities of his actions, while in
this matter, [Start Skydiving] is pursuing [Wiese] as an individual.
***
Viewing the allegations of [Start Skydiving's] complaint in a light
most favorable to it, this court finds that Wiese's personal
conduct does not confer jurisdiction to this court. Wiese, based
upon the pleadings, sold the doors as an individual, and that
represented a one-time personal transaction with an Ohio
business. As such, the court finds that there is insufficient
support to establish Wiese individually maintained minimum
contacts with Ohio * * *
The trial court also determined that "any rulings from this court might alter the Illinois case or
lead to opposing outcomes in each jurisdiction," and therefore, found "it should step aside
and allow the Illinois court to proceed on the original filings and any cross claims that may be
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presented."
{¶ 8} Start Skydiving now appeals from the trial court's decision to grant Wiese's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, raising a single assignment of error for
review.
{¶ 9} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED WIESE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
{¶ 10} In its single assignment of error, Start Skydiving argues the trial court erred by
granting Weise's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We review a trial court's
judgment granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. Dahlhausen
v. Aldred, 187 Ohio App.3d 536, 2010-Ohio-2172, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). De novo review means
that this court uses the same standard the trial court should have used. Carter v. Reese,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-04-095, 2014-Ohio-5395, ¶ 11.
The Parties' Arguments on Appeal
{¶ 11} In the briefs submitted to this court, as well as during oral argument, the parties
limited their arguments to issues involving the trial court's application of Ohio's long-arm
statute, R.C. 2307.382, and the principles of due process. The parties did not address the
trial court's additional holding, albeit in the alternative, that this case could also be dismissed
because Win Win and Start Skydiving were involved in litigation in DeKalb County, Illinois.
Given the fact that neither party contested that holding on appeal, this court would be well
within its power to affirm the trial court's decision on that basis alone.
{¶ 12} However, after a thorough review of the record, and based on the
representations of both parties during oral argument, we are not convinced the trial court's
decision was entirely correct given the named parties involved in the DeKalb County case
included only Win Win and Start Skydiving, not Wiese. Moreover, again based on the
representations from both parties during oral argument, the DeKalb County case does not in
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Butler CA2017-04-042
any way involve "issues surrounding payment for the doors" as the trial court stated in its
decision. Regardless, while we may disagree with the trial court as it relates to this issue, we
nevertheless find no error in the trial court's decision to grant Wiese's motion to dismiss since
Wiese, in his individual capacity, had not maintained sufficient minimum contacts with Ohio,
particularly Butler County, to vest personal jurisdiction over him with the trial court.
Principles of Personal Jurisdiction
{¶ 13} Before a trial court may exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, such as Wiese, it must complete a two-step analysis. Booth v. Watershed
Wellness Ctr., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-04-065, 2013-Ohio-5272, ¶ 8, citing Kentucky
Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 75 (1990). "First, the
defendant must satisfy the provisions of Ohio's long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, and second,
exercising jurisdiction over the defendant must comply with due process requirements
inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment." Dobos v. Dobos, 179 Ohio App.3d 173, 2008-Ohio-
5665, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 14} While the trial court addressed both Ohio's long-arm statute and considerations
of due process, as we have done before, we will focus our analysis on the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment for purposes of this opinion. See, e.g., Booth,
2013-Ohio-5272 at ¶ 10 (focusing analysis on lack of minimum contacts rather than on
whether transaction at issue triggered Ohio's long-arm statute).
{¶ 15} "The due process clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being
subject to binding judgments of a forum with which that individual has established no
meaningful contacts, ties, or relations." Multiform Plastics, Inc. v. Thermo Plastics Display,
Inc., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA93-01-004, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3495, *3 (July 12, 1993),
citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985). An Ohio
court can assert jurisdiction if the nonresident defendant has certain minimum contacts with
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Ohio so that having him defend in Ohio does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).
"The constitutional touchstone is whether the nonresident defendant purposely established
contacts in Ohio so that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there." VanCamp v. VanCamp, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2001-03-058 thru CA2001-03-060,
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 6000, *11 (Dec. 31, 2001).
Wiese's Contacts with Ohio
{¶ 16} Taking the facts alleged in Start Skydiving's complaint as true, Wiese's contacts
with Ohio in his individual capacity, not as the president of Win Win, consisted of a one-time
sale of cargo doors to Start Skydiving, a Delaware limited liability company that operates a
recreational skydiving center in Middletown, Butler County, Ohio. Start Skydiving "expressed
interest throughout the skydiving community that it wished to purchase replacement cargo
doors for its Caravan aircraft," to which Wiese, who resides in Illinois, responded "by stating
he [Wiese] had doors for sale." Wiese did not solicit Start Skydiving's business, nor did
Wiese advertise the sale of the cargo doors in Ohio. This is confirmed by the affidavit
submitted by Start Skydiving, which indicated Start Skydiving "had never before done
business with Wiese in his personal capacity" in Ohio or otherwise. The complaint further
indicates that Start Skydiving "retrieved" the cargo doors from Wiese, thereby indicating the
sale took place in Illinois, not Ohio.
{¶ 17} In light of the foregoing, we find that even if this single sale of cargo doors from
Wiese to Start Skydiving would have triggered Ohio's long-arm statute, Wiese, in his
individual capacity, did not have a substantial connection with Ohio and did not purposely
establish contacts in Ohio, particularly in Butler County, so that Wiese should reasonably
anticipate being haled into an Ohio court. Again, as the trial court stated:
Wiese, based upon the pleadings, sold the doors as an
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individual, and that represented a one-time personal transaction
with an Ohio business. As such, the court finds that there is
insufficient support to establish Wiese individually maintained
minimum contacts with Ohio * * *
{¶ 18} We agree with the trial court's decision. As this court has stated previously,
"single" or "occasional" acts are insufficient to establish jurisdiction "if 'their nature and quality
and the circumstances of their commission' create only an 'attenuated' affiliation with the
forum." Buflod v. Von Wilhendorf, LLC, 12th Dist. Warren No CA2016-02-022, 2007-Ohio-
347, ¶ 15, citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475-476, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Such is the case
here. Therefore, finding no error in the trial court's decision to grant Wiese's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Start Skydiving's single assignment of error lacks
merit and is overruled.
{¶ 19} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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