Esplandiu v. Esplandiu , 2017 Ohio 5744 ( 2017 )

[Cite as Esplandiu v. Esplandiu, 2017-Ohio-5744.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 104750
JENNIFER ESPLANDIU
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
GELSOMINO ESPLANDIU
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Division
Case No. DR-13-349143
BEFORE: Stewart, J., Kilbane, P.J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 6, 2017
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Joseph G. Stafford
Nicole A. Cruz
Hannah R. Pasku
Stafford & Stafford Co., L.P.A.
55 Erieview Plaza, 5th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44114
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Mark A. Ziccarelli
Zicarelli & Martello
8754 Mentor Avenue
Mentor, OH 44060
MELODY J. STEWART, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Gelsomino Esplandiu appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion for relief from judgment of a divorce decree and allocation of marital property. Finding
no merit to his two assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
{¶2} During Gelsomino and plaintiff-appellee Jennifer Esplandiu’s marriage, they came
to own multiple businesses. Pursuant to their divorce action, they negotiated a separation
agreement that was incorporated into the court’s judgment entry. As relevant to the case, the
agreement provided that each person would keep two of the four businesses that the couple
owned together.
{¶3} One day shy of one year after the final judgment entry of divorce, Gelsomino
disputed whether the marital property had been equitably distributed. Asserting that Jennifer
had made fraudulent misrepresentations during the settlement and divorce that caused an unfair
distribution of the property, Gelsomino moved the court to vacate the judgment pursuant to
Civ.R. 60(B) and to conduct a full evidentiary hearing. Jennifer did not file a brief in
opposition. The court, although initially setting a date for a hearing on the motion, nevertheless
denied the motion before the hearing.
{¶4} In order to succeed on a motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), the
moving party must demonstrate each of the following:
(1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2)
the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)
through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the
grounds for relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the
judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St. 2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976),
paragraph two of the syllabus. A trial court should overrule any Civ.R. 60(B) motion that fails
to establish all three of these requirements. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St. 3d 17,
20, 520 N.E.2d 564 (1988).
{¶5} When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from judgment under
Civ.R. 60(B), we recognize a trial court is vested with discretion to grant the motion. Settonni v.
Settonni, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97784, 2012-Ohio-3084, ¶ 9, citing Rose Chevrolet at 20. We
will not disturb a trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse of
discretion exists when a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. (Citations
omitted.) Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Gelsomino complains that the trial court erroneously
denied his Civ.R. 60(B) motion as untimely. He argues that he is entitled to relief from
judgment under three Civ.R. 60(B) subdivisions: (3) based on fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of the adverse party; (4) because it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; and (5) any other reason justifying relief from judgment. Those
subdivisions require that the motion be made within a reasonable time, although subdivision (3)
has as an additional requirement that the motion be made within one year. However, whether a
Civ.R. 60(B) motion is timely depends on case-specific facts and circumstances. Fed. Natl.
Mtge. Assoc. v. Goldstein, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87743, 2006-Ohio-6769, ¶ 13. What
constitutes a “reasonable time” is a determination within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Ohio Carpenters’ Fringe Benefit Fund v. Krulak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88872,
2008-Ohio-220, ¶ 27, quoting In re Dissolution of Marriage of Watson, 13 Ohio App. 3d 344,
469 N.E.2d 876 (9th Dist.1983).
{¶7} Filing a Civ.R. 60(B) motion within one year of the judgment entry does not
guarantee its timeliness. This court has repeatedly held as much where the movant failed to
explain the reason for delay. See, e.g., Kaczur v. Decara, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67546, 1995
Ohio App. LEXIS 3038, 11 (July 20, 1995) (motion untimely where movant failed to explain
reason for nine-month delay); Natl. City Bank v. Hostelley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 58554, 1991
Ohio App. LEXIS 3292, 5 (July 3, 1991) (motion filed less than ten weeks after learning of
judgment, “devoid” of explanation for delay, was untimely); Mt. Olive Baptist Church v. Pipkins
Paints & Home Improvement Ctr., Inc., 64 Ohio App. 2d 285, 289, 413 N.E.2d 850 (8th
Dist.1979) (motion filed more than four months after judgment entered was untimely absent
evidence explaining delay). The burden is on the movant to justify the delay. Brackins v.
Brackins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 75025, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6061, 8 (Dec. 16, 1999) (bare
assertion that appellant was “diligent,” in and of itself, failed to demonstrate delay was
reasonable).
{¶8} Although Gelsomino asserted that his Civ.R. 60(B) motion was “timely,” because it
was filed just shy of one year, the motion provided no basis for the trial court to find as much.
The court denied the motion as untimely, stating “[n]owhere in [Gelsomino’s] Motion or
Affidavit does he explain when he received the information that he is using as a basis for his
Motion to Vacate * * * [and] he never states what information he discovered to support this
allegation.”
{¶9} While a moving party is not required to submit evidentiary material in support of a
Civ.R. 60(B) motion, he must include more than “bare allegations” of entitlement to relief. Kay
v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 76 Ohio St. 3d 18, 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996). This court has
reiterated that the moving party bears the burden of proving timeliness and “[t]o sustain this
burden, ‘good legal practice dictates that the movant * * * present allegations of operative facts’”
demonstrating the motion is timely. Brackins at 8-9, quoting Fouts v. Weiss-Carson, 77 Ohio
App.3d 563, 566, 602 N.E.2d 1231 (11th Dist.1991).
{¶10} Gelsomino asserted that his motion was timely, because he had “only recently
discovered” the alleged fraud and misrepresentation, and that he had done so “shortly” before he
filed his motion. These assertions were apparently too vague for the court to find that the
motion was timely.
{¶11} Additionally, Gelsomino provided the court no operative facts to support his claim
that his motion was timely. In his affidavit, Gelsomino gave as a basis for his claims that at the
time of the settlement agreement Jennifer misrepresented that the two businesses she was to
retain were “not performing well.” He averred if her businesses were actually performing as
alleged, that she would not have been able to afford subsequent improvements she made to her
home. He also averred that “documentation and technology,” and specifically the point of sale
system used at one of the businesses demonstrated that Jennifer concealed income. Further, he
averred that the two businesses he retained have performed meagerly in comparison to hers and
that this demonstrated the purported fraud and misrepresentation. At best, these statements
establish that Jennifer made improvements to her home and that her businesses are
outperforming his. Gelsomino’s motion and affidavit do not contain any information that would
have allowed the court to find that his motion was timely made. We cannot say, therefore, that
the court abused its discretion in denying his motion. The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶12} In Gelsomino’s second assigned error, he complains that the trial court abused its
discretion when it set a date for an evidentiary hearing, but then denied his motion before the
hearing could take place.
{¶13} A party moving for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) is not automatically
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that motion. PNC Bank, N.A. v. DePalma, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 97566, 2012-Ohio-2774, ¶ 12, citing Gaines & Stern Co., L.P.A. v. Schwarzwald,
Robiner, Wolf & Rock, Co., L.P.A., 70 Ohio App. 3d 643, 591 N.E.2d 866 (8th Dist.1990). The
moving party bears the burden of proving entitlement to relief or a hearing on the motion. ABL
Wholesale Distribs. v. Clark Gas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100256, 2014-Ohio-2268, ¶ 13, citing
Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio App. 2d 97, 105, 316 N.E.2d 469 (8th Dist.1974). A party shows
entitlement to a hearing under Civ.R. 60(B) with allegations of operative facts that warrant relief
under the rule. Settonni, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97784, 2012-Ohio-3084, at ¶ 39, citing Kay, 76
Ohio St. 3d 18, 1996-Ohio-430, 665 N.E.2d 1102. Specifically, and as discussed above, the
party’s factual materials must, on the face, demonstrate timeliness, a reason why the motion
should be grated, and a meritorious defense. Danforth v. Danforth, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
86693, 2006-Ohio-2890, ¶ 14, citing Kay, id. If the party fails to demonstrate any one of those
elements the trial court need not hold an evidentiary hearing. Adomeit, id. “If the material
submitted by the movant in support of its motion contains no operative facts or meager and
limited facts and conclusions of law, it will not be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
refuse to grant a hearing and overrule the motion.” Id.
{¶14} As discussed in the previous assignment of error, the trial court found that
Gelsomino was not entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B) because his motion was untimely. The
court subsequently found that his motion did not contain “sufficient allegations of operative facts
to warrant a hearing * * *.”
{¶15} After a review of the record, we cannot find that the court abused its discretion by
denying Gelsomino’s motion without conducting a hearing. His second assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶16} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the domestic relations
division to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________________
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR