State v. Sager ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Sager, 2017-Ohio-7217.]
    sCOURT OF APPEALS
    ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                :       JUDGES:
    :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    Plaintiff - Appellee                 :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-                                         :
    :
    ANDREW SAGER                                 :       Case No. 17-COA-006
    :
    Defendant - Appellant                :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Appeal from Ashland Municipal
    Court, Case No. 2017 TRD 368
    JUDGMENT:                                            Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                    August 11, 2017
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                               For Defendant-Appellant
    ANDREW N. BUSH                                       RHYS B. CARTWRIGHT-JONES
    Assistant Director of Law                            42 N. Phelps St.
    1213 E. Main Street                                  Youngstown, Ohio 44503
    Ashland, Ohio 44805
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-006                                                      2
    Baldwin, J.
    {¶1}   Appellant Andrew Sager appeals a judgment of the Ashland Municipal Court
    convicting him of speeding (R.C. 4511.21) and suspending his operator’s license
    pursuant to R.C. 4510.15 based upon a finding of recklessness. Appellee is the State of
    Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}   On January 15, 2017, Trooper Speicher of the Ohio State Highway Patrol
    stopped appellant for speeding on Interstate 71 in Ashland County. Trooper Speicher’s
    attention was drawn to appellant because he was traveling at a high rate of speed in the
    right lane, as he passed cars in a center lane near an exit. Appellant was traveling 93
    miles per hour in a 70 mile per hour speed limit zone.
    {¶3}   Appellant was charged with speeding in violation of R.C. 4511.21. He
    entered a plea of guilty on February 14, 2017. The court suspended his license pursuant
    to R.C. 4510.15 based on a finding that appellant’s conduct involved recklessness.
    {¶4}   Appellant assigns a single error to the license suspension:
    {¶5}   “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING A
    DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION ON MR. SAGER RELATIVE TO HIS TRAFFIC
    CHARGE.”
    {¶6}   The trial court imposed a license suspension based on R.C. 4510.15, which
    provides in pertinent part:
    Whenever a person is found guilty under the laws of this state, or
    under any ordinance of any political subdivision of this state, of operating a
    motor vehicle in violation of any such law or ordinance relating to reckless
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-006                                                     3
    operation, the trial court of any court of record, in addition to or independent
    of all other penalties provided by law, may impose a class five suspension
    of the offender's driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or
    nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(5) of
    section 4510.02 of the Revised Code.
    {¶7}   We review the trial court's decision to suspend a defendant's driver's license
    under R.C. 4510.15 (formerly R.C. 4507.34) for an abuse of discretion. State v.
    Castagnola, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 15-COA-026, 2015-Ohio-4752, ¶19, citing State v.
    Tamburin, 
    145 Ohio App. 3d 774
    , 780, 
    764 N.E.2d 503
    (9th Dist. Medina 2001).
    {¶8}   A court's authority to suspend a driver's license under R.C. 4510.15 may
    arise when a person has been charged with and convicted of speeding under R.C.
    4511.21, without any charge of reckless operation being made under R.C. 4511.20,
    inasmuch as a law or ordinance prohibiting speeding is a prohibition “relating to reckless
    operation” of a motor vehicle within the meaning of R.C. 4507.34, now 4510.15. 
    Id. at ¶20,
    citing State v. Newkirk, 
    21 Ohio App. 2d 160
    , 
    255 N.E.2d 851
    (5th Dist.1968).
    {¶9}   “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
    consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause
    a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to
    circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely
    disregards a known risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.” R.C. 2901.22(C).
    {¶10} In 
    Castagnola, supra
    , the defendant was driving 97 miles per hour in a dark
    area, with other traffic in the area and a pass being made. We found that the trial court
    did not abuse its discretion in finding his driving to be reckless. 2015-Ohio-4752, ¶21-22.
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-006                                                 4
    {¶11} In the instant case, the trial court made the following finding to support his
    conclusion that appellant’s operation of his motor vehicle was reckless:
    THE COURT: Okay. Well the problem that I have, Mr. Sager, and
    the ongoing (inaudible) where Trooper Spiker [sic] observed you, he says
    you were passing cars on the right. There were cars in the center lane, and
    you’re going past them in the right-hand lane.          That’s an extremely
    dangerous thing do to [sic] at that kind of speed, especially in the area of an
    exit, because those cars might also be intending to exit, and they’re not
    expecting you to be going past them on the right at 93, and someone could
    pull over in front of you, and those are – those are very, very bad accidents
    when they happen because people pass on the right at high speeds.
    So I do think it’s pretty clear you’re endangering other people, and I
    will make that finding under 4510.15 under the Ohio Revised Code that your
    driving shows a reckless indifference to the safety of others and that you
    were endangering other people.
    {¶12} Tr. 5.
    {¶13} As in Castagnola, appellant was driving at a high rate of speed with other
    traffic present on the roadway. As noted by the trial court, passing other vehicles at a
    high rate of speed in the right hand lane is particularly dangerous near an exit. Based on
    the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    finding appellant’s conduct to be reckless.
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-006                                          5
    {¶14} The assignment of error is overruled.       The judgment of the Ashland
    Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs are assessed to appellant.
    By: Baldwin, J.
    Gwin, P.J. and
    John Wise, J. concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-COA-006

Judges: Baldwin

Filed Date: 8/11/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/14/2017