State v. Burns , 2017 Ohio 8248 ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Burns, 
    2017-Ohio-8248
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO                                    :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                       :   Appellate Case No. 27386
    :
    v.                                               :   Trial Court Case No. 2016-CR-484
    :
    LASTARZA A. BURNS                                :   (Criminal Appeal from
    :   Common Pleas Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                      :
    :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the 20th day of October, 2017.
    ...........
    MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ALICE B. PETERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0093945, Assistant
    Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division,
    Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
    HILARY LERMAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0029975, 249 Wyoming Street, Dayton, Ohio 45409
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    .............
    TUCKER, J.
    -2-
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Lastarza Burns appeals from his conviction and
    sentence for aggravated robbery, kidnapping and two counts of abduction. He contends
    that the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence of a pre-trial identification. He
    further contends that the trial court erred in sentencing.
    {¶ 2} We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Burns’ motion to
    suppress or by denying his request for merger at sentencing. Accordingly, the judgment
    of the trial court is affirmed.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    {¶ 3} Hope Doss was employed at Moraine Auto Sales located on North Dixie
    Drive in Montgomery County. As part of her duties, Doss was involved with car sales as
    well as taking in payments on cars. On February 1, 2016, Doss was the only employee
    working when a man entered the building and asked her about a car. As Doss was
    preparing to escort the man to the assembled cars, she observed him look out to the
    parking lot at another man. The first man pulled a gun and the second man, later
    identified as Burns, entered the building.
    {¶ 4} Burns asked where money could be found while his accomplice forced Doss
    into a car seat located in the corner of the business’s front room. While Doss was in the
    chair, the gunman used his knee to hit her several times in the chest resulting in a bruise
    to her chest. The gunman also hit Doss on her head with the gun several times causing
    a bruising and lump over her left eyebrow. After Burns found an envelope containing
    $400, the men took Doss down a hallway to the back room of the business. Once in the
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    back, they told her to sit down on the floor and to give them her purse. The men
    subsequently told her to lie on the floor on her stomach. While on her stomach, Doss
    heard the men rummaging around the room. They subsequently tied her up, and she
    heard them continue to rummage around. The men took her purse, told her to remain
    still and left the building. After the men left, Doss was able to remove her restraints, and,
    upon doing so, called 911. When the police arrived, she gave them a folder containing
    information on a Chevy Trailblazer she claimed was associated with Burns. Following
    an investigation, Burns was arrested.1
    {¶ 5} On March 8, 2016, Burns was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery
    (deadly weapon) with a firearm specification, one count of kidnapping (felony or flight),
    one count of abduction (restrain) and one count of abduction (remove). He filed a motion
    to suppress all pre-trial identification evidence.
    {¶ 6} At the suppression hearing, Montgomery County Sheriff’s Detective Kent
    Saunders testified that he has performed over three hundred photographic array lineups
    during his more than 20-year career. He testified that he used the JusticeWeb computer
    program to gather photographs for the purpose of creating a photographic lineup for Doss
    to view. Saunders testified that he prefers JusticeWeb over another available system
    because it uses similar backgrounds for the photographs and because it uses booking
    photographs with the individuals in street clothes rather than jail-issued clothing.
    {¶ 7} Saunders testified he used Burns’ physical characteristics, such as height,
    weight, eye color, race, sex, age and facial hair to generate photographs of men with
    1 The record is silent concerning whether Burns’ accomplice was arrested and
    prosecuted.
    -4-
    similar appearances. Saunders testified that it was difficult to create an array because
    Burns has a unique tattoo by his left eye. He testified that once pictures were generated
    and selected, the computer program randomly arranged five photos onto a page along
    with the photo of Burns. He arranged for another detective, Robert Schumacher, to
    administer the photo lineup.
    {¶ 8} Schumacher testified that he did not have any knowledge of the case or the
    suspect, and that Saunders did not inform him which photograph depicted Burns. He
    testified that he met with Doss outside of Saunders’ presence. Schumacher testified that
    he read, verbatim, the instructions concerning Doss’ review of the photographic lineup.
    According to Schumacher, Doss identified Burns within a matter of seconds.            Doss
    indicated that she was 80% certain that the person she identified was the perpetrator.
    {¶ 9} Following the hearing, the trial court found that the all of the men depicted in
    the array are African-American with medium to light complexions. Each man is wearing
    street clothes.   The trial court noted that they all are “broad-shouldered and thick
    chested,” and that each man has facial hair on the top lip and along the chin. The court
    also found that while none of the tattoos are exact matches, they are not so noticeably
    different as to be considered unduly suggestive. The trial court overruled the motion.
    {¶ 10} The case proceeded to trial in September 2016. However, the jury was
    unable to reach a verdict. The matter was re-tried in November 2016.
    {¶ 11} Doss testified that she recognized Burns as a customer who had been in
    the business approximately 15 to 18 times in the past to make payments on a maroon
    Chevrolet Trailblazer. She testified that the vehicle was repossessed by Moraine Auto
    Sales in September of 2015. At the time it was repossessed, Doss had observed Burns
    -5-
    in the parking lot of the business. She testified that he was “really angry” and yelling at
    the business manager, as well as at police who had been called to the scene. She
    testified that during the commission of the instant offenses Burns said, “I told you I’d be
    back.”
    {¶ 12} The manager of Moraine Auto Sales testified that he was involved in the
    repossession of the Chevy. He testified that Burns became irate and began to make
    threats. Specifically, Burns threatened to “burn the place down.” Burns also stated that
    he would be back, and that he would get his money back “one way or the other.”
    {¶ 13} Montgomery County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Kerschner was on the scene at
    the time of the repossession.        He verified that Burns was very angry about the
    repossession.
    {¶ 14} The jury returned a guilty verdict on all charges. A sentencing hearing was
    conducted on November 28, 2016. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery and
    kidnapping charges and the State elected to proceed on the aggravated robbery charge.
    The court sentenced Burns to a mandatory four year prison term for the aggravated
    robbery, and to twelve month prison sentences on each of the abduction convictions. All
    of these terms were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. The trial court
    further sentenced Burns to a mandatory three year prison term for the the firearm
    specification and ordered that it be served consecutively to the aggravated robbery
    offense for a total prison term of seven years. Burns appeals.
    II. Photographic Array Was Not Unduly Suggestive
    {¶ 15} The first assignment of error asserted by Burns states:
    -6-
    THE PHOTO LINEUP USED TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    WAS IMPERMISSIVELY [SIC] SUGGESTIVE
    {¶ 16} Burns claims that the photo array was unduly suggestive and thus the trial
    court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. Burns’ unduly suggestive argument is
    premised upon his contention that no other individual in the array had a facial tattoo similar
    to his, thereby causing his photograph to stand out.
    {¶ 17} A pre-trial identification derived from inappropriately suggestive procedures
    causing a likelihood of misidentification violates a defendant's right to due process. Neil
    v. Biggers, 
    409 U.S. 188
    , 
    93 S.Ct. 375
    , 
    34 L.Ed.2d 401
     (1972). Courts apply a two-step
    test in determining the admissibility of challenged identification testimony: (1) the
    defendant must demonstrate that the identification procedure was unnecessarily
    suggestive; and (2) if the defendant meets this burden, the court must consider whether
    the procedure, under the totality of the circumstances, was so unduly suggestive that it
    created a likelihood of irreparable mistaken identification.      State v. Wills, 
    120 Ohio App.3d 320
    , 324, 
    697 N.E.2d 1072
     (8th Dist.1997), citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 
    432 U.S. 98
    , 114, 
    97 S.Ct. 2243
    , 
    53 L.Ed.2d 140
     (1977), and State v. Garner, 
    74 Ohio St.3d 49
    ,
    61, 
    656 N.E.2d 623
     (1995).
    {¶ 18} R.C. 2933.83 governs the administration of photographic lineups and is
    aimed at preventing the use of unnecessarily suggestive procedures.              The statute
    requires specific procedures for conducting photographic array lineups. For example,
    the statute provides for the use of a person who does not know the suspect’s identity (a
    “blind administrator”) to present the photo array to a witness. R.C. 2933.83(A)(2). The
    administrator must inform the witness that the suspect may, or may not, be in the lineup.
    -7-
    R.C. 2933.83(B)(5). In this case, there is no evidence or claim that the police failed to
    comply with R.C. 2933.83. Instead, Burns’ argument hinges upon the fact that his facial
    tattoo is unique among the other photos presented in the array.
    {¶ 19} The photo array is before us and we have examined it. The array contains
    six color photographs of men who appear to be of approximately the same age with the
    same hair color and similar complexions.       They all have facial hair and some type of
    tattoo near the left eye. All of the individuals are wearing different casual attire.
    {¶ 20} Upon review of the record, we cannot conclude that the photo lineup is
    unduly suggestives.     This court has held that a “computerized method of creating
    photospreads avoids most potential unfairness and almost any claim that the lineup was
    suggestive.” State v. Beckham, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19544, 2003–Ohio–3837, ¶
    12, citing State v. Beddow, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 16197 & 16198, 
    1998 WL 126876
    (Mar. 20, 1998). Moreover, “[a] defendant in a lineup need not be surrounded by people
    nearly identical in appearance.” State v. Davis, 
    76 Ohio St.3d 107
    , 112, 
    666 N.E.2d 1099
    (1996). We agree with the trial court that the difference in the tattoos is not so striking
    as to be unduly suggestive. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in
    finding that the lineup was not suggestive.
    {¶ 21} Further, this court has followed the holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio
    that “although an identification procedure is suggestive, as long as the identification is
    reliable, it is admissible.” State v. Chaffin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24241, 2012–Ohio–
    634, ¶ 20, citing State v. Barker, 
    53 Ohio St.2d 135
    , 142, 
    372 N.E.2d 1324
     (1978). In
    State v. Lathan, 
    30 Ohio St.2d 92
    , 99, 
    282 N.E.2d 574
     (1972), the Supreme Court of Ohio
    held that when an identification procedure is unduly suggestive the State's burden of proof
    -8-
    is to establish the reliability of eyewitness testimony by clear and convincing evidence.
    Therefore, the question, assuming the identification procedure in this case was
    inappropriately suggestive, is whether the State met its burden of proving, by clear and
    convincing evidence, the reliability of the eyewitness identification under the totality of the
    circumstances.
    {¶ 22} It is beyond dispute that Doss knew Burns prior to the incident.            She
    informed the police that she had seen him on numerous occasions in the store, including
    during the incident when the Chevy was repossessed. She was able to observe him
    when he entered the car dealership, and she recognized him. Following the crime, Doss
    gave the police the folder with information on the Chevy associated with Burns. She
    immediately identified him in the array.
    {¶ 23} Therefore, even if the identification procedure utilized was overly
    suggestive, the identification made by Doss is sufficiently reliable to overcome any claim
    by Burns that his due process rights were denied.
    {¶ 24} Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
    III. Abduction Counts Not Allied Offenses of Similar Import
    {¶ 25} Burns’ second assignment of error is as follows:
    THE ABDUCTION RESTRAIN COUNT AND THE ABDUCTION REMOVAL
    COUNT WERE ALLIED OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT AND NEEDED
    TO BE MERGED
    {¶ 26} Burns contends that the two abduction convictions should have been
    merged for purposes of sentencing. He argues that both offenses were committed as
    -9-
    part of the same action to “place [Doss] in a position where she could not inform people
    of the robbery.”
    {¶ 27} R.C. 2941.25, Ohio's allied offense statute, provides that:
    (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute
    two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information
    may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be
    convicted of only one.
    (B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
    dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of
    the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as
    to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such
    offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
    {¶ 28} In State v. Ruff, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 114
    , 2015–Ohio–995, 
    34 N.E.3d 892
    , the
    Ohio Supreme Court clarified the applicable standard when determining whether offenses
    merge as allied offenses of similar import:
    Rather than compare the elements of two offenses to determine
    whether they are allied offenses of similar import, the analysis must focus
    on the defendant's conduct to determine whether one or more convictions
    may result, because an offense may be committed in a variety of ways and
    the offenses committed may have different import. No bright-line rule can
    govern every situation.
    As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses are allied
    offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must
    -10-
    ask three questions when the defendant's conduct supports multiple
    offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2)
    Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with
    separate animus or motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above
    will permit separate convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the import
    must all be considered.
    Ruff at ¶ 30–31.
    {¶ 29} Burns was convicted of abduction (remove) in violaton of R.C.
    2905.02(A)(1) which states in pertinent part:
    (A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly do any of the
    following:
    (1) By force or threat, remove another from the place where the other
    person is found[.]
    Burns was also convicted of an abduction (restrain) count in violation of R.C.
    2905.02(A)(2) which states in pertinent part:
    (A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly do any of the
    following:
    (2) By force or threat, restrain the liberty of another person under
    circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the victim or place the
    other person in fear[.]
    {¶ 30} A defendant, under R.C. 2941.25, has the burden of establishing his
    entitlement to merger. State v. Sullivan, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23948, 2012-Ohio-
    4317, ¶ 13; State v. Mughni, 
    33 Ohio St.3d 65
    , 67, 
    514 N.E.2d 870
     (1987). Under the
    -11-
    facts of this case, we conclude that Burns did not meet this burden. He merely argues
    that the two acts of abduction were one offense designed to prevent Doss from notifying
    anyone of the offenses. It could just as easily be argued that Doss was removed to the
    back room in order to search for more money, and that after the search was complete,
    she was tied up in order to allow the men time to get away from the scene.
    {¶ 31} We conclude that the record supports a finding, as argued by the State, that
    the abduction (remove) offense was committed when Burns and his accomplice forced
    Doss into the back room of the dealership. Once in the back room, the offense was
    completed. The men then made Doss sit on the floor, they took her purse and then they
    made her lie on her stomach while they rummaged around the room. The men finally
    tied up Doss. We further conclude that the record before us supports a finding, again as
    argued by the State, that the abduction (restrain) offense occurred when Burns and his
    accomplice forced Doss to the floor culminating in Doss being tied up. The offenses
    were committed separately, and, as such, the offenses are not allied offenses of similar
    import requiring merger.
    {¶ 32} The second assignment of error is overruled.
    IV. Conclusion
    {¶ 33} Both of Burns’ assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of the
    trial court is affirmed.
    .............
    -12-
    HALL, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur.
    Copies mailed to:
    Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
    Alice B. Peters
    Hilary Lerman
    Hon. Timothy N. O’Connell
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 27386

Citation Numbers: 2017 Ohio 8248

Judges: Tucker

Filed Date: 10/20/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/20/2017