State v. Blevins , 2017 Ohio 8225 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Blevins, 
    2017-Ohio-8225
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 104704
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    KARLOS BLEVINS
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-14-586423-A
    BEFORE: Laster Mays, J., McCormack, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                      October 19, 2017
    -i-
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Russell S. Bensing
    600 IMG Building
    1360 East Ninth Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44114
    FOR APPELLANT
    Karlos Blevins, pro se
    Inmate No. 680296
    Trumbull Correctional Institution
    P.O. Box 901
    Leavittsburg, Ohio 44430
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michael C. O’Malley
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Mahmoud S. Awadallah
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    Justice Center, 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Karlos Blevins (“appellant”)1 appeals the trial court’s
    mandatory transfer of appellant’s case from the Juvenile Division to the General Division
    of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to be tried as an adult. Based on the
    Ohio Supreme Court’s recent ruling in State v. Aalim, Slip Opinion No. 
    2017-Ohio-2956
    (“Aalim II”), we find appellant’s error to be without merit.
    I.     Background
    {¶2} On March 15, 2014, appellant attended a dance held at the Garfield Heights
    Community Center where a shooting occurred involving two gang factions. A firearm
    wielded by appellant was tied to the shooting death of 15-year-old Davone Wright.
    Appellant was 17 years old at the time of the incident.
    {¶3} Pursuant to the mandatory bindover provisions of R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b)
    and 2152.12(A)(1)(b), appellant’s case was transferred from the Juvenile Division to the
    General Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. On July 1, 2014,
    1  On November 20, 2016, Blevins’s assigned counsel filed a brief under
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S.Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L.Ed.2d 493
     (1967), seeking
    approval to withdraw on the ground that there were no nonfrivolous issues
    available for appeal. On November 21, 2016, we held the motion in abeyance
    pending the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in Aalim II. On January 26, 2017,
    appellant filed a merit brief pro se. On February 21, 2017, after the release of the
    opinion in Aalim, this court sua sponte denied the Anders motion and returned the
    case to the regular docket. Briefing was completed, and Blevins was represented
    by counsel at oral argument.
    appellant was indicted by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated
    murder with firearm and criminal gang activity specifications; two counts of murder with
    firearm and criminal gang activity specifications; two counts of felonious assault with
    firearm and criminal gang activity specifications; one count of grand theft with a firearm
    specification; one count of tampering with evidence; and two counts of aggravated rioting
    with firearm and criminal gang activity specifications.
    {¶4}   On September 14, 2015, appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder
    (R.C. 2903.01) with one- and three-year firearm specifications (R.C. 2941.141 and
    2941.145), and to tampering with evidence (R.C. 2921.12(A)(1)).                The gang
    specification was deleted, and the remaining charges were nolled.          Appellant was
    sentenced to a term of 23 years to life on the aggravated murder charge with the one- and
    three-year firearm specifications to be served prior to and consecutive to the 23-year
    term. Appellant was also sentenced to three years for tampering with evidence to be
    served concurrently with the aggravated murder sentence. This appeal ensued.2
    II.    Analysis
    {¶5}   The sole assigned error in this case is whether appellant’s federal and state
    due process rights were violated by the mandatory bindover statutes. At the time of the
    filing of the instant appeal, the governing case law in State v. Aalim, Slip Opinion No.
    
    2016-Ohio-8278
     (“Aalim I”), was favorable to appellant’s case:
    2  A guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt but it does not preclude a
    claim on appeal that challenges the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. State v.
    Fitzpatrick, 
    102 Ohio St.3d 321
    , 
    2004-Ohio-3167
    , 
    810 N.E.2d 927
    , ¶ 78-79.
    1.      The mandatory transfer of juveniles to the general division of
    common pleas court violates juveniles’ right to due process as
    guaranteed by Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
    2.      The discretionary transfer of juveniles 14 years old or older to the
    general division of common pleas court pursuant to the process set
    forth in R.C. 2152.10(B) and 2152.12(B) through (E) satisfies due
    process as guaranteed by Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio
    Constitution.
    
    Id.
     at syllabus.
    {¶6} Upon motion by the state, the Ohio Supreme Court granted reconsideration
    of its decision in Aalim I, and issued Aalim II. The court expressed concern that its
    decision in Aalim I effectively:
    [U]surped the General Assembly’s exclusive constitutional authority to
    define the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas by impermissibly
    allowing a juvenile-division judge discretion to veto the legislature’s grant
    of jurisdiction to the general division of a court of common pleas over this
    limited class of juvenile offenders.
    Id. at ¶ 3.
    {¶7} The court vacated its decision in Aalim I and affirmed the appellate court’s
    decision.      “[T]he mandatory bindover of certain juvenile offenders under R.C.
    2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) complies with due process and equal protection
    as guaranteed by the Ohio and United States Constitutions.” Id. at ¶ 38.
    {¶8}    Pertinent here to appellant’s request that the case be remanded for an
    amenability hearing,3 the court determined that substantive due process does not require
    3  An amenability hearing allows the juvenile court to consider whether a
    juvenile is amenable to treatment and rehabilitation in the juvenile system.
    that a juvenile defendant be granted an amenability hearing to determine whether the
    defendant should be bound over as an adult because juvenile courts were not established
    statewide by the General Assembly until 1937, and “the amenability hearing was not
    added to the juvenile court system until 1969.” Aalim II at ¶ 17.
    Because Ohio’s Due Course of Law Clause and the federal Due Process
    Clause both predate the creation of juvenile courts in Ohio and throughout
    the United States, these provisions cannot have created a substantive right
    to a specific juvenile-court proceeding. Therefore, an amenability hearing
    cannot be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and
    “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”
    Id., quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 
    431 U.S. 494
    , 551, 
    97 S.Ct. 1932
    , 
    52 L.Ed.2d 531
    (1977), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 
    302 U.S. 319
    , 325, 
    58 S.Ct. 149
    , 
    82 L.Ed. 288
    (1977).
    {¶9} Finally, Aalim II considered the policy underlying the General Assembly’s
    determination that the mandatory bindover provision was necessary “to provide special
    measures for extraordinary cases, involving older or violent offenders.” Id. at ¶ 36.
    Prosecuting older juveniles who commit serious crimes in the general
    division of a common pleas court is rationally related to the legitimate state
    interest of fighting rising juvenile crime because it allows the most serious
    juvenile offenders to be prosecuted in the general division, where harsher
    punishments are available.
    Id. at ¶ 36.
    {¶10} Based on the court’s holding in Aalim II, appellant is not entitled to the
    requested relief. The assignment of error lacks merit.
    {¶11}    The trial court’s order is affirmed.
    It is ordered that the appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
    been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    __________________________________________
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
    TIM McCORMACK, P.J., and
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 104704

Citation Numbers: 2017 Ohio 8225

Judges: Laster Mays

Filed Date: 10/19/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2017