State v. Wood , 2013 Ohio 3446 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Wood, 
    2013-Ohio-3446
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PERRY COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                 :   JUDGES:
    :
    :   Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellant                    :   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    :   Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-                                          :
    :   Case No. 12-CA-00013
    :
    LONNIE WOOD                                   :
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellee                     :   OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                          Appeal from the Perry County Court of
    Common Pleas, Case No. CRB1200169
    JUDGMENT:                                         DISMISSED
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                           July 23, 2013
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellant:                          For Defendant-Appellee:
    MICHAEL DEWINE                                    ROBERT G. MCCLELLAND
    ATTORNEY GENERAL                                  P.O. Box 340
    Zanesville, OH 43702-0340
    MATTHEW J. DONAHUE
    SPECIAL PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
    150 E. Gay St., 16th Floor
    Columbus, OH 43215
    Perry County, Case No.12-CA-00013                                                         2
    Delaney, J.
    {¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant State of Ohio appeals the April 11, 2012 sentencing
    entry of the Perry County Court of Common Pleas.             Defendant-Appellee is Lonnie
    Wood.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶2} The underlying facts are unnecessary for disposition of this appeal.
    {¶3} On April 4, 2012, the trial court took a no contest plea from Defendant-
    Appellee Lonnie Wood for restraining and assaulting a female Perry County employee
    in a county office while Wood was a Perry County Commissioner. A visiting judge and
    special prosecutor were appointed to the matter. The trial court found Wood guilty of
    Assault, a first degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), and Unlawful
    Restraint, a third degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2905.03.
    {¶4} The State and Wood reached a plea agreement, but there was no agreed
    sentence recommendation by the parties as to confinement, fines, or community
    service. The trial court stated in open court:
    On the assault charge, the fine will be a thousand dollars and costs, sixty
    days in jail. On the unlawful restraint, the fine will be two hundred and fifty
    dollars and costs, and thirty days in jail. I am going to suspend fifty of the
    days on the assault and twenty of the days on the unlawful restraint and
    those two jail sentences will run concurrent with each other. I’m going to
    order that you served one hundred hours of community service within the
    next ninety days and I’m going to Order [sic] that you be placed on
    probation for a term of two years and as a part of that probation there will
    Perry County, Case No.12-CA-00013                                                        3
    be some sort of assessment done um, by an agency that will be
    determined, if they believe that further counseling is necessary, you are to
    undergo and complete that counseling successfully if after an assessment
    that is not determined necessary than obviously that won’t have to be
    followed. Also, obviously the portion of the agreement that you signed will
    all be in effect. You are not to hold public office for ten years, you are to
    resign and apparently have resigned your seat as County Commissioner.
    (Sentencing Hearing Transcript, p. 11).
    {¶5} The parties questioned at the sentencing hearing when Wood was to
    report to jail:
    MCCELLAND: Yes your honor. I would ask the Court to set a report to
    jail date, sometime in the future so Mr. Wood can get his affairs in line and
    um, report at a later date.
    DONAHUE: Your honor, I would leave that up to the Court. I have spoken
    to the Sheriff and he indicated that if the Court did impose a jail sentence
    that he did have immediate arrangements but certainly that is the power of
    the Court.
    JUDGE: Well, I don’ think that Mr. Wood poses any flight risk of any kind,
    uh, I have traditionally given defendant’s [sic] and opportunity to uh, when
    they come [sic] Court they don’t know if they’re going to jail and if so, they
    don’t know for how long. So sometimes, affairs do have to be arranged,
    so I’m willing to allow you to report to Court at some later date, in the near
    future. Do you have a proposed date?
    Perry County, Case No.12-CA-00013                                                        4
    ***
    JUDGE: * * * I am going to Order that you report on Monday April the
    23rd, at 2:00 pm.
    (Sentencing Hearing Transcript, p. 12-13).
    {¶6} The trial court issued its sentencing entry on April 11, 2012.            The
    sentencing entry contained the sentencing terms stated in open court on April 4, 2012.
    However, the trial court added the following term to the sentencing entry:
    Further, the incarceration time is to run concurrent, with the suspended
    incarceration time to run consecutive, the incarceration will be a total of
    ten (10) days, with the option of twenty (20) days home arrest in lieu of
    incarceration.
    (Sentencing Entry, April 11, 2012). The parties agree the trial court did not state in
    open court on April 4, 2012 that electronically monitored house arrest was a part of
    Wood’s sentence.
    {¶7} Wood was placed on house arrest on April 25, 2012. The State filed a
    Motion to Stay Imposition of Sentencing with the trial court on April 30, 2012. The trial
    court ordered on May 1, 2012 that Wood’s house arrest be temporarily halted until
    further order of the court.
    {¶8} On May 7, 2012, the State filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal pursuant to
    App.R. 5(C). Wood filed an opposing memorandum on June 6, 2012. We granted the
    motion for leave to appeal by judgment entry on June 21, 2012.
    {¶9} This Court dismissed the State’s appeal on September 21, 2012 for want
    of prosecution. The State failed to timely file its appellate brief. Based on the dismissal
    Perry County, Case No.12-CA-00013                                                          5
    of the appeal, Wood restarted his house arrest in October 1, 2012 and terminated on
    October 19, 2012. Wood completed his 100 hours of community service.
    {¶10} On December 20, 2012, the State filed a Motion for Leave to Reopen
    Appeal.   The State argued the Perry County Clerk of Courts failed to forward this
    Court’s orders to the special prosecutor and the State was unaware of this Court’s
    orders. We granted the motion to reopen on February 5, 2013.
    {¶11} We now consider the State’s appeal.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    {¶12} The State raises one Assignment of Error:
    {¶13} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE STATE,
    WHEN CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF CRIM.R. 43, ESTABLISHED CASE
    LAW AND THE OHIO AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL [SIC], IT PRONOUNCED
    ONE SENTENCE IN OPEN COURT, BUT IN THE SENTENCING ENTRY IMPOSED A
    DIFFERENT SENTENCE, WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE PARTIES AND WITHOUT AN
    ADDITIONAL HEARING.”
    ANALYSIS
    {¶14} Before this Court engages in an analysis of the merits of the State’s
    Assignment of Error, we first conduct an in-depth inquiry into the issue of whether we
    have jurisdiction to consider the State’s appeal of the April 11, 2012 sentencing entry.
    {¶15} The State may appeal a criminal matter under limited circumstances. It is
    well-established the State may appeal in a criminal case only when a statute gives it
    express authority to do so. See State v. Hensley, 2nd Dist. No. 18886, 2002-Ohio-
    1887, citing Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2); State ex rel. Leis v. Kraft, 10
    Perry County, Case No.12-CA-00013 
    6 Ohio St.3d 34
    , 
    460 N.E.2d 1372
     (1984); State v. Rogers, 
    110 Ohio App.3d 106
    , 
    673 N.E.2d 666
     (4th Dist.1996).
    {¶16} The general authority for the State to appeal is found in R.C. 2945.67(A).
    The statute reads:
    A prosecuting attorney, village solicitor, city director of law, or the attorney
    general may appeal as a matter of right any decision of a trial court in a
    criminal case, or any decision of a juvenile court in a delinquency case,
    which decision grants a motion to dismiss all or any part of an indictment,
    complaint, or information, a motion to suppress evidence, or a motion for
    the return of seized property or grants post conviction relief pursuant to
    sections 2953.21 to 2953.24 of the Revised Code, and may appeal by
    leave of the court to which the appeal is taken any other decision, except
    the final verdict, of the trial court in a criminal case or of the juvenile court
    in a delinquency case. In addition to any other right to appeal under this
    section or any other provision of law, a prosecuting attorney, city director
    of law, village solicitor, or similar chief legal officer of a municipal
    corporation, or the attorney general may appeal, in accordance with
    section 2953.08 of the Revised Code, a sentence imposed upon a person
    who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony.
    {¶17} The trial court’s sua sponte modification of Wood’s sentence to include the
    option to serve 20 days of house arrest with electronic monitoring in lieu of 10 days in
    jail does not fall under any of the “appeal as a matter of right” categories for the State in
    R.C. 2945.67(A), i.e., dismissal of an indictment/complaint, granting a suppression
    Perry County, Case No.12-CA-00013                                                        7
    motion, a return of seized property, or post conviction relief. The second clause of R.C.
    2945.67(A) provides the State has the right to appeal “any other decision” by leave of
    court. It is within the court’s discretion to grant or deny the State’s motion for leave to
    appeal under the second clause of R.C. 2945.67(A).
    {¶18} This Court granted the State leave to appeal the April 11, 2012 sentencing
    entry. Upon further analysis of the matters raised in the original motion for leave to
    appeal, response in opposition, and this appeal, we find the leave to appeal under R.C.
    2945.67(A) was improvidently allowed.
    {¶19} The overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing are to protect the
    public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender. R.C.
    2929.21(A). Woods was convicted of a first degree misdemeanor and a third degree
    misdemeanor.     A trial court may impose a definite jail term of not more than one
    hundred eighty days (six months) for a misdemeanor of the first degree.               R.C.
    2929.24(A)(1). A trial court may impose a definite jail term of not more than sixty days
    for a misdemeanor of the third degree. R.C. 2929.24(A)(3). In this case, the trial court
    sentenced Wood to 60 days in jail, with 50 days suspended, on the first degree
    misdemeanor conviction. The trial court sentenced Wood to 30 days in jail, with 20
    days suspended, on the third degree misdemeanor conviction.
    {¶20} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.24(H), the trial court retains jurisdiction over the
    offender and the jail term under the following terms:
    If a court sentences an offender to a jail term under this section, the
    sentencing court retains jurisdiction over the offender and the jail term.
    Upon motion of either party or upon the court's own motion, the court, in
    Perry County, Case No.12-CA-00013                                                       8
    the court's sole discretion and as the circumstances warrant, may
    substitute one or more community control sanctions under section
    2929.26 or 2929.27 of the Revised Code for any jail days that are not
    mandatory jail days.
    {¶21} R.C. 2929.27(A)(2) states:
    (A) Except when a mandatory jail term is required by law, the court
    imposing a     sentence for a misdemeanor,           other than     a minor
    misdemeanor, may impose upon the offender any nonresidential sanction
    or combination of nonresidential sanctions authorized under this division.
    Nonresidential sanctions include, but are not limited to, the following: * * *
    (2) A term of house arrest with electronic monitoring or continuous alcohol
    monitoring or both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol
    monitoring, a term of electronic monitoring or continuous alcohol
    monitoring without house arrest, or a term of house arrest without
    electronic monitoring or continuous alcohol monitoring[.]
    {¶22} The trial court sentenced Wood to 60 days in jail, with 50 days suspended,
    on the first degree misdemeanor conviction. The trial court sentenced Wood to 30 days
    in jail, with 20 days suspended, on the third degree misdemeanor conviction. The trial
    court ordered the incarceration to be served concurrently, resulting in 10 days in jail.
    The trial court gave Wood the option of serving 10 days in jail or 20 days on house
    arrest with electronic monitoring.
    {¶23}    We find the sentence pronounced in the April 11, 2012 sentencing entry
    was not contrary to law. These facts and law were presented in the State’s motion for
    Perry County, Case No.12-CA-00013                                                  9
    leave to appeal and Wood’s response in opposition. Upon our further consideration of
    the circumstances of this case and the discretionary nature of the State’s ability to
    appeal “any other decision” in a criminal matter under R.C. 2945.67(A), we find the
    State’s motion for leave to appeal was improvidently allowed.
    {¶24} The appeal of Plaintiff-Appellant State of Ohio is dismissed.
    By: Delaney, J., and
    Baldwin, J. concur,
    Hoffman, J., concurs separately
    HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN
    PAD:kgb
    Perry County, Case No.12-CA-00013                                                    10
    Hoffman, P.J., concurring
    {¶25} I concur in the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal as being
    improvidently granted.    However, I do so primarily because Appellant has already
    served the sentence as set forth in the trial court’s sentencing entry.1
    ________________________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    1
    I would have found R.C. 2929.24(H) authorizes the trial court to sua sponte substitute
    house arrest for the non-mandatory jail days in the case sub judice had this Court
    reached the merits of the appeal.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-CA-00013

Citation Numbers: 2013 Ohio 3446

Judges: Delaney

Filed Date: 7/23/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014