State v. McCrary , 2017 Ohio 8701 ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. McCrary, 2017-Ohio-8701.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 16CA3568
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
vs. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
JASON A. MCCRARY, :
:
Defendant-Appellant. : Released: 11/27/17
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Robert Alan Brenner, Robert Alan Brenner, LLC, Dayton, Ohio, for
Appellant.
Matthew S. Schmidt, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C.
Wells, Ross County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for
Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Jason A. McCrary appeals from his convictions in the Ross
County Court of Common Pleas after he was found guilty, by a jury of his
peers, of the murder of Timberly Claytor. On appeal, Appellant contends
that 1) the trial judge abused his discretion when he replaced Juror 23 with
an alternate pursuant to R.C. 2945.45; and 2) his conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Because we conclude that replacing a juror
who is unable to perform his/her duties, even during deliberations, is within
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 2
the sound discretion of the trial court, and because the trial court did not
abuse its discretion, Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
Similarly, because we conclude Appellant's conviction for murder was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the jury did not lose its
way in finding Appellant guilty, Appellant's second assignment of error is
overruled. Accordingly, having found no merit in either of the assignments
of error raised by Appellant, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
FACTS
{¶ 2} Jason McCrary was indicted for murder, a special felony in
violation of R.C. 2903.02, on July 24, 2015. The indictment also contained
firearm and repeat violent offender specifications. The charge stemmed
from an investigation related to the death of Timberly Claytor, whose body
was found in the gravel lot of an abandoned dairy bar located on Trego
Creek Road in Massieville, Ohio, on May 29, 2015. It was ultimately
determined that the cause of Claytor's death was the sustainment of three
gunshot wounds to the head, one of which severed her brain stem. The
record indicates that Appellant was a suspect in the case from the beginning
of the investigation due to the fact that law enforcement's interviews of Ms.
Claytor's friends led them to view surveillance tapes from two area gas
stations, which included video footage of Appellant, as well as his vehicle, at
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 3
the same location where Claytor was last seen.1 Appellant, however, was
not initially charged with Claytor's murder, but instead was arrested for
failure to register in connection with a prior conviction. It appears Appellant
was not formally charged with the murder of Claytor until a woman by the
name of Jessica Lowry came forward as an eye witness to the murder.
{¶ 3} Appellant denied the charge contained in the indictment and the
matter proceeded to a five-day jury trial beginning on July 11, 2016. The
State presented several witnesses at trial, including Jillian Adkins and Maria
Catron, who were with Ms. Claytor just before her disappearance in the
early morning hours of May 29, 2015, as well as Jessica Lowry, who
claimed to be an eye witness to the murder. The State also presented the
testimony of Appellant's girlfriend, Nicole Perkins, her son, Myray Perkins,
and her sister, Ebony Perkins. Additionally, the State presented testimony
by John Winfield, a detective with the Ross County Sheriff's Office, Dr.
Bryan Casto, a forensic pathologist and Deputy Coroner with the
Montgomery County Coroner's Office, Nicole Law and Hallie Garofalo,
both forensic scientists with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation and
Identification (hereinafter "BCI"), Todd Fortner, a special agent in BCI's
Crime Scene Unit, and finally, Matthew White, a firearm examiner in BCI's
1
As will be discussed in more detail below, the vehicle Appellant was driving was a white, four-door
Chevrolet Impala, which was owned by his girlfriend, Nicole Perkins.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 4
Forensic Laboratory. Appellant presented four witnesses, including Robert
Moledor, a detective with the Columbus Division of Police who is also
assigned to the Cellular Analysis Survey Team Unit, which is part of an FBI
task force/Columbus Violent Crime Squad. Appellant's other witnesses
included his friends, Carol Jordan and Seth Cottrill, as well as himself.
{¶ 4} Jillian Adkins testified Timberly Claytor was at her house the
night before she disappeared and that Claytor and Maria Catron left around
2:00 or 2:30 a.m. to get jugs of water and cigarettes at a nearby store, either
Valero or Speedway, and that she never saw her again. She said she
reported Claytor missing the next day at about 5:00 p.m. after she heard a
body had been found. Maria Catron testified that she was at the Valero
station with Claytor when a man in a white car pulled up and started talking
to Claytor. She testified he told them his name was Curtis Woodfork. She
testified that Claytor got in the car with him and although Catron initially
started walking, she then got into the car with them and they all drove to
Speedway. She testified that they then took her to her house to get water
and that while she was inside Claytor came to the door and told her she
would be back in a few minutes, but that she never came back. She testified
on cross examination that it was her understanding that Claytor and
Appellant were going to go have sex and do drugs together.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 5
{¶ 5} Jessica Lowry testified that she was at a party at her friend Carol
Jordan's house, which is located in Massieville, on the night in question.
She testified that prior to that time Appellant was an acquaintance of hers
who lived across the street from Jordan. She testified that Appellant stopped
by that night and had Claytor in the car, who Lowry testified she had never
met. Lowry testified that she had been drinking and was drunk that night,
and that she left the party with Appellant, Claytor, Cottrill and Jordan to go
to a park in Massieville. She testified that Appellant was driving a white,
four-door car and that Claytor was in the front seat while the rest were in the
back seat. She testified that when they got to the park and got out Jordan
informed her of a plan to "jump" Claytor to take her money and that
although she attempted to assist Jordan in this plan she was too drunk to do
so, and Cottrill pulled them apart. She said Appellant and Claytor then went
to the car and that she saw Claytor hand Appellant money out of her pocket.
She testified that Appellant and Claytor then got into the car and had sex,
while the others went and climbed on a "tower thing" located at the park,
which the record reveals was Scioto Trails Park. Lowry testified that after
Appellant and Claytor got out of the car, they all talked and made up and
then Claytor and Appellant began smoking crack while the others, including
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 6
Lowry, were drinking. She testified they all got back into the car in the
same seating arrangement and headed back towards Massieville.
{¶ 6} Lowry testified that as they were driving, Appellant got mad at
Claytor because she smoked the last bit of crack and he began cussing at her.
She testified that Appellant and Claytor began arguing and that Appellant
pulled out a gun while he was still driving. She testified that as they
approached an old building, which was an old dairy bar in Massieville,
Claytor tried to open the car door and get out and Appellant shot her. She
testified that Appellant actually shot her as she was halfway out of the
vehicle, that she fell, got back up and he shot her again. She testified that
after four or five shots Claytor didn't move anymore. She testified that
Appellant then pointed the gun at them and told them to move the body. She
testified they moved Claytor's body into the grass and they all got back into
the car and went to Lowry's house, where Appellant threw the gun into
water, which the record indicates was Paint Creek. She testified Appellant
then drove them back to Jordan's house and threatened them not to say
anything. She testified that she later came forward because it was the right
thing to do.
{¶ 7} On cross-examination, the defense questioned Lowry
extensively about inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her prior
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 7
statements given to Deputy Winfield. However, those statements were
never actually introduced into evidence. Lowry tried to explain that when
she was initially interviewed by Winfield, her sister was with her and she
was scared she was disappointing her sister. She conceded on cross that she
had been drinking and doing drugs on the night in question, but she testified
she didn't do any drugs from the time she got into the car with Appellant and
that she stopped drinking when Claytor was shot. She also testified on cross
that she had been "drinking hard" and had been taking pills when she talked
to Deputy Winfield. With regard to the actual shooting, Lowry testified on
cross that Claytor had her foot out while the car was still moving and that
Appellant shot her. She testified Claytor fell, was "leaning out," that she
tried to pull herself back up on the car door, but that Appellant moved, got
out of the car and shot her again over the top of the car from the driver's
side. She said Claytor then stopped, went down, and that Appellant walked
around the front of the car and shot her again because she moved.2 She
testified that Appellant made them move her body, but clarified that Jordan
did not help.
2
Lowry broke down on the stand while testifying upon cross-examination and the trial was actually
recessed for the night so she could review her several-hours-long interview with Deputy Winfield in order
to refresh her recollection. There was detailed questioning on cross as to the time of day of the shooting, as
reported by Lowry to Winfield, and also as to whether Claytor was shot in the side or the back of the head.
Lowry's testimony is, at times, hard to follow, which may be explained by multiple references throughout
the transcript during side bar discussions between the court and counsel that Lowry is low-functioning,
inarticulate and has deficits, possibly from her extensive drug use.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 8
{¶ 8} Myray Perkins, Appellant's girlfriend's son, testified that he
lives in Massieville with his mother, grandfather and Appellant. He testified
that Appellant goes by Curtis Woodfork on Facebook and that he saw
Appellant with what he thinks was a .380 caliber gun with a silencer on it a
week prior to the shooting. As to the events of the night in question, he
testified that Appellant left in his mom's car that night and did not come
back until between 4:00 or 4:30 a.m., at which time he came in, took a
shower and went to sleep. He also testified he saw Appellant cleaning out
the car the next morning and that Appellant told him he had spilled coffee in
it. Nicole Perkins testified that when Appellant picked her up at her
mother's in the car the day after the murder, there was a rug over the front
passenger seat and two odd holes by the seatbelt. She testified Appellant
told her he dumped coffee in the seat and that he did not know anything
about the holes. She also testified Appellant used the name Curtis Woodfork
on Facebook.
{¶ 9} Deputy John Winfield testified regarding his investigation of
Timberly Claytor's death. He testified that he responded to the scene where
Claytor's body was found, where he observed flip-flops in a gravel lot,
blood, and a blood trail leading to the east side of the building where the
victim was located in a tall, weeded area with her head underneath a
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 9
guardrail. He, along with the Ross County Coroner's Office and BCI,
processed the crime scene, and he also attended the autopsy of Claytor,
which revealed Claytor had sustained three gunshot wounds to the head. He
testified he interviewed Adkins and Catron and obtained video surveillance
from Valero and Speedway. He testified that when he eventually located
Appellant and the vehicle, he noticed a blood smear on the bumper of the
car. He testified regarding the process used to obtain DNA samples from the
vehicle, the victim and Appellant, as well as the bullets that were eventually
recovered from the car, the scene and Claytor's body. He testified that
during the search of the vehicle, carpet saturated with blood was found
underneath the front passenger seat once the seat was removed. He also
testified that although Paint Creek was searched, the gun was never
recovered.
{¶ 10} Dr. Bryan Casto performed Claytor's autopsy. He testified that
Claytor had four gunshot injuries, three to her head and one to her hand. He
testified as to the trajectory or path of the bullets through her body and he
testified that there was one entrance wound in front of Claytor's left ear, one
behind her left ear and one below her left ear. He testified that one exit
wound was immediately beneath her right ear and one was on her right
upper cheek. One bullet was retained in Claytor's head and was found at the
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 10
base of her skull, where her internal ear bones would have been. Casto
testified that the trajectory of the path of the bullets through Claytor's body
collectively indicated a left to right, upward, and back to front trajectory.
Casto also testified that he observed very dense gunpowder stippling or
tatooing, which implies the weapon was discharged very close to Claytor.
He testified that although he determined the cause of death to be multiple
gunshot wounds to the head, he could not determine whether the shots were
fired in quick succession. Importantly, he testified that each shot was
"potentially lethal or life ending." He explained that two of the shots could
have caused death due to the blood loss they would create, albeit a slower
death than the shot that cut the brain stem in half, which he explained would
prohibit any voluntary movement thereafter. He testified that he could not,
however, determine the sequence of the shots, or which injuries they
inflicted in what order. He also importantly testified that the autopsy
revealed blood in Claytor's lungs, which would have been breathed in as
opposed to being drained from her injuries, which Casto explained is an
indicator of life after sustaining injury. He further testified that he collected
genital and anal swabs from Claytor, which he submitted to the Ross County
Sheriff's Office.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 11
{¶ 11} Forensic Scientist Nicole Law testified that she reviewed
swabs and a rape kit, which were submitted to BCI for testing, for the
presence of blood and semen. She testified that she confirmed the presence
of both and generated a report, which was admitted into evidence. Forensic
Scientist Hallie Garofalo examined items of evidence submitted to BCI in
order to generate DNA profiles and make comparisons. She testified that
she completed two rounds of testing in the case at issue. She testified that
the first round of testing confirmed the presence of Appellant's DNA on the
driver's side, interior, front door of the car, the gearshift, and the steering
wheel. She testified that her testing confirmed the presence of Claytor's
blood on the pillar of the vehicle and the steering wheel. She testified that
the rape kit and vaginal samples taken from Claytor contained Appellant's
DNA. She testified to another round of testing that she performed which
confirmed the presence of Claytor's blood on Appellant's shoes and the
passenger seat carpet of the car.
{¶ 12} BCI Special Agent Todd Fortner testified regarding his
involvement in the investigation and processing of the crime scene. He
testified that when searching the vehicle, he observed a blood stain, or more
specifically a drip stain that arrived through gravity, along the running board
of the passenger side that could have only been deposited with the door
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 12
open. He further testified to blood spatter stains on the B pillar on the
passenger side of the car where the seat belts are located. He explained that
the location and shape of the stains showed directionality, specifically a
front to rear direction. He explained that a spatter stain is a droplet of blood
that has been propelled through the air by an external force applied to a
source of liquid blood. He explained that as the droplet hits the surface, it
will disperse into an oval shape and a little of the blood will continue on and
make a little tail. He testified that here he observed an oval stain with a tail
on the right going up, which indicates the source was in the front and was
propelled up and backward. He also testified regarding the bullet holes in
the B pillar of the passenger side of the car. Importantly, he testified that his
inspection of the bullet entrance points reveals the bullets "went in pretty
much perpendicular to the passenger side of the vehicle."
{¶ 13} Finally, the State presented the testimony of BCI Firearms
Examiner Matthew White, who testified that his examination of the three
fired bullets submitted for testing were all .380 auto full metal jacketed fired
bullets, which were fired from a .380 caliber handgun. He testified he could
not determine whether, however, they were all fired from the same gun.
{¶ 14} Appellant presented the testimony of Robert Moledar
regarding cellular phone records that were obtained during the investigation.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 13
While Moledar's testimony was quite informative regarding how, generally,
cellular calls and activity can be tracked and analyzed, it was ultimately
inconclusive with regard to the calls placed on the night in question, who
placed them, and from where they were placed.
{¶ 15} Appellant also presented testimony from his friends Carol
Jordan and Seth Cottrill, both of whom Jessica Lowry alleged were present
and in the car the night Claytor was murdered. Both Jordan and Cottrill
denied being present that night. Jordan testified that Appellant was like
family to her. She also denied being part of a plan to rob Claytor on the
night in question. Cottrill testified he was friends with Appellant. He also
admitted that he had a substantial prior record, including aggravated
robbery, aggravated burglary, felonious assault, and was on post-release
control at the time of the murder, which prohibited him from doing drugs
and associating with known felons.
{¶ 16} Finally, Appellant testified in his own defense at trial. He
testified to a much different story that the one told by Jessica Lowry. He
admitted he sometimes goes by the name Curtis Woodfork and that he
picked up Timberly Claytor in Chillicothe in Nicole Perkins' car on the night
in question. He testified that he paid her $20.00 in exchange for sex. He
testified that while his purpose was to drive to his cousin's house to have sex
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 14
with Claytor and then go home, Claytor told him she needed to meet
someone at Poling Park. He testified that while driving there, she told him
to pull over into the Anderson Drug Store parking lot, where a "dude" came
out and walked up to the car window, leaned in and said "What's up Jay?"
Appellant testified he then realized the person's name was "Dollar Bill," aka
Ernest Moore. He testified that Moore persuaded him to give him a ride to
Massieville in exchange for sharing his $30.00 worth of marijuana.
Appellant testified they smoked marijuana while driving to Massieville, and
that he ended up pulling into the driveway of the home he shared with
Nicole Perkins, where her son Myray and father were inside asleep, and had
sex in the backseat of the car with Claytor while Moore essentially just hung
around outside, as his other ride never came. He testified that he then went
into the house to shower and then the three of them got back into the car.
{¶ 17} He admitted he was driving, Claytor was in the front, and
claimed that Moore was sitting in the back seat behind Appellant, with his
legs behind the front passenger seat.3 He testified that as he was heading
back to Chillicothe, he heard Moore tell Claytor that there was stuff missing
from his house after she had been there and that Claytor denied taking
anything. He testified that the two began bickering, that he saw Claytor
3
He explained that Moore was sitting this way as the front passenger seat was pushed back because Myray
had been riding in the front previously, and was very tall. There is no explanation as to why the seat
remained in that position while Appellant and Claytor were allegedly in the backseat having sex.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 15
raise her left hand, heard a "pop, pop, pop,” and saw a flash of light out of
the corner of his eye. He testified that he slammed on the breaks and that
Claytor was leaning against the side of the car and wasn't moving. He
testified that Moore then hit him on the shoulder with a pistol and told him
to keep going, and then told him to pull into a gravel lot by a dairy bar. He
testified Moore got out and opened Claytor's door and that Claytor fell out
into the gravel. He testified that Moore dragged her to the side of the
building and then got back into the back of the car. He testified that the two
of them just sat there for ten to fifteen minutes, at which point a truck pulled
up. He said Moore threatened him and then got out and left in the truck.
Appellant denied ever taking Claytor to a park and denied that anyone but
those three were in the car. Appellant also admitted that he had prior
convictions for unlawful conduct with a minor, aggravated robbery,
receiving stolen property, complicity to burglary and failure give notice for
change of address. He also admitted that he lied to Nicole Perkins about the
details of the night in question both verbally and in a letter written to her
from the jail, and that he previously lied as a sworn witness before a jury in
another case, because he was afraid that his family would be hurt if he
testified truthfully.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 16
{¶ 18} The case was submitted to the jury for deliberations. After
deliberations began, Juror 23 sent a message to the court asking to be
excused. Upon questioning by the court with counsel for both parties
present, it was determined the juror could not continue her service. As a
result, she was replaced with an alternate juror and the jury, as a whole, was
instructed to begin their deliberations anew. The jury ultimately determined
Appellant was guilty of the murder of Timberly Claytor. Appellant now
appeals his conviction to this Court, setting forth two assignments of error
for our review.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE
REPLACED JUROR 23 WITH AN ALTERNATE PURSUANT TO
R.C. 2945.45.
II. THE CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE.”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶ 19} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial
judge abused his discretion when he replaced Juror 23 with an alternate
pursuant to R.C. 2945.45. More specifically, Appellant contends that the
trial court's decision to remove the only African American on the jury panel,
who had disclosed during voir dire that she had previously held out against a
conviction in a felony criminal case, was an abuse of discretion. Appellant
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 17
also argues the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to discuss the
matter at sidebar, or to permit the juror to explain herself, before removing
the juror constituted a further abuse of discretion. The State responds by
arguing that because the record shows the juror was unable to perform her
duties, and because the trial court complied with the process set forth in R.C.
2945.29 and Crim.R. (G)(1), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
removing her and replacing her with an alternate juror. Based upon the
following, we agree with the State.
{¶ 20} As conceded by Appellant in his brief, the decision to remove a
juror lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In State v. Scarbrough,
4th Dist. Washington No. 97CA45, 1998 WL 823789, *4, this Court
explained as follows:
"After trial commences, the court may discharge a juror if he is
unable to perform his duty. R.C. 2945.29. Whether a juror can
perform his duty lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Hopkins (1985), 27 Ohio App. 3d 196, 197, 500
N.E.2d 323, citing United States v. Spiegel (C.A.5, 1979), 604
F.2d 961, 967."
“ ‘Although the abuse of discretion standard usually affords maximum
[deference] to the lower court, no court retains discretion to adopt an
incorrect legal rule or to apply an appropriate rule in an inappropriate
manner. Such a course of conduct would result in an abuse of discretion.’ ”
See 2-J Supply, Inc. v. Garrett & Parker, L.L.C., 4th Dist. Highland No.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 18
13CA29, 2015-Ohio-2757, ¶ 9. When applying the abuse-of-discretion
standard of review, appellate courts must not substitute their judgment for
that of the trial courts. See In re Jane Doe 1, 57 Ohio St. 3d 135, 138, 566
N.E.2d 1181 (1991). Furthermore, an appellate court must presume that the
findings of the trial court are correct because the finder of fact is best able to
observe the witnesses and to use those observations to weigh witness
credibility. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St. 3d 77, 81, 461
N.E.2d 1273 (1984); see also Mahlerwein v. Mahlerwein, 160 Ohio App. 3d
564, 2005-Ohio-1835, 828 N.E.2d 153, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.).
{¶ 21} R.C. 2945.29, entitled “Jurors becoming unable to perform
duties” provides as follows:
“If, before the conclusion of the trial, a juror becomes sick, or
for other reason is unable to perform his duty, the court may
order him to be discharged. In that case, if alternate jurors have
been selected, one of them shall be designated to take the place
of the juror so discharged. If, after all alternate jurors have been
made regular jurors, a juror becomes too incapacitated to
perform his duty, and has been discharged by the court, a new
juror may be sworn and the trial begin anew, or the jury may be
discharged and a new jury then or thereafter impaneled.”
Crim.R. 24 entitled “Trial jurors” is also pertinent and provides in section
(G)(1), which governs alternate jurors in non-capital cases, as follows:
“The court may direct that not more than six jurors in addition
to the regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate
jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called
shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 19
consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be
drawn in the same manner, have the same qualifications, be
subject to the same examination and challenges, take the same
oath, and have the same functions, powers, facilities, and
privileges as the regular jurors. The court may retain alternate
jurors after the jury retires to deliberate. The court must ensure
that a retained alternate does not discuss the case with anyone
until that alternate replaces a juror or is discharged. If an
alternate replaces a juror after deliberations have begun, the
court must instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew.
Each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition
to those otherwise allowed if one or two alternate jurors are to
be impaneled, two peremptory challenges if three or four
alternate jurors are to be impaneled, and three peremptory
challenges if five or six alternative jurors are to be impaneled.
The additional peremptory challenges may be used against an
alternate juror only, and the other peremptory challenges
allowed by this rule may not be used against an alternate juror.”
(Emphasis added).4
Thus, it is within a trial court's discretion to remove a juror unable to
perform his or her duties, even after deliberations have begun, provided the
court instructs the jury to begin its deliberations anew. R.C. 2945.29;
Crim.R. 24(G)(1); see also State v. Sallee, 8 Ohio App. 2d 9, 11, 220 N.E.2d
370 (1966) (holding that discharge of an individual juror for illness of an
immediate family member during any state of a criminal trial is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.).
4
Prior to the revision of this rule in 2008 there was no provision for removal and replacement of jurors
unable to perform their duties after deliberation had already begun; however, the current version of the rule
expressly allows such action, provided the trial court instructs the jury to begin its deliberations anew.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 20
{¶ 22} Here, a review of the record reflects that Juror 23 sent a note to
the trial court during the deliberations asking to be excused. The trial
transcript indicates the note stated as follows: "Please ask the judge to
excuse me, I can't do this, really, making me upset, and not feeling very
good." Upon receiving this message from the juror, the trial court went on
the record, with counsel for both parties present, shared the contents of the
message, and informed counsel of its intention to bring the juror out by
herself to "further explain" what she meant by stating she was not feeling
very good. Neither counsel objected to this plan, but defense counsel stated
the court should caution the juror not to disclose the status of deliberations.
{¶ 23} The juror was subsequently brought into the courtroom. The
trial court cautioned her not to disclose the status of deliberations and
inquired as to why she was upset and what "not feeling very good" meant.
The following exchange took place on the record:
“Juror 23: Your Honor, I can't go --
The Court: I can barely hear you.
Juror 23: I can't, I cannot . . . .
The Court: Are you physically unable to do it?
Juror 23: I can't handle it very well, just can't do this.
The Court: Are you physically ill, physically unable to do it,
that's my question.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 21
Juror 23: Very, very weak.
The Court: I understand you feel awful. There are a lot of
unpleasant things that we all do in our life. I'm
guessing, all I'm asking you are you telling me that
you are just not, you're physically not able to do
this, that's what I'm getting at.
Juror 23: Yes, I'm unable to do this.
The Court: So you're indicating that you are physically not
able to do it, okay? Okay. Well thank you, I very
much appreciate your honesty, your candor, and
talking with me about this. I'm going to --
Juror 23: Can I say something?
The Court: You may say something. Do not tell me, I don't
want to know what's going on in there though.
Juror 23: I can't take that.
The Court: What's that?
Juror 23: Can I say . . . .
The Court: You can say as long as you're not disclosing what's
going on in that room.
Juror 23: Can I say what I said? About me?
The Court: You said you wanted to tell me something.
Juror 23: Can I tell you what I . . . .
The Court: What you? I don't want to know --
Juror 23: What I came up with or what I decided within
myself?
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 22
The Court: No, I don't want to know your decision, I don't
want to know where you are or anything --
Juror 23: Okay, okay.
The Court: In fact I'm going to instruct you that you are not to
discuss anything that occurred in that room or
what's going on until this case is concluded.
Juror 23: Okay.
The Court: So I'm going to --
Juror 23: I get that.
The Court: I'm going to --
Myers: Your Honor, may we approach, maybe one time
before you make the final decision?
The Court: No. I don't need anyone to approach to make my
decision on this. I'm going to release you. Do not
discuss this case or anything about, kind of like
what I told the witnesses, or anything about this
case or your service as a juror until the jury
reaches a verdict and then if you wish to discuss
your jury experience you may do so.
Juror 23: Okay.”
{¶ 24} The trial court's questioning of Juror 23 concluded at that point
and she was removed from the jury. Immediately thereafter, the trial court
stated as follows on the record:
“I would note that Ohio Revised Code Section 2945.29
indicates what should happen when jurors unable [sic] to
perform their duties, as such I am substituting in an alternate, it
will be the first alternate. I'm going to bring in [sic] the entire
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 23
jury back out and instruct them that they must start their
deliberations anew as if this is the beginning of their
deliberations.”
The Court thereafter instructed the jury accordingly.
{¶ 25} At no point did defense counsel object to the removal of Juror
23 or the replacement by an alternate juror. Thus, although we generally
review a trial court's decision to remove a juror for an abuse of discretion,
because Appellant did not object the removal of Juror 23 at the trial court
level, we must analyze Appellant's assignment of error under a plain error
standard of review. Appellate courts take notice of plain error with the
utmost of caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a
manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St. 3d 420, 2008-
Ohio-2787, 889 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 78; State v. Patterson, 4th Dist. Washington
No. 05CA16, 2006-Ohio-1902, ¶ 13. Plain error should only be noticed if
the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. See State v. Bundy, 2012-Ohio-3934, 974 N.E.2d 139,
¶ 66. The Ohio Supreme Court recently stated that appellate courts should
be conservative in their application of plain-error review, reserving notice of
plain error for situations that involve more than merely theoretical prejudice
to substantial rights. State v. Steele, 138 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2013-Ohio-2470, 3
N.E.3d 135, ¶ 30.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 24
{¶ 26} Here, Appellant contends that the trial court erred and abused
its discretion when it replaced Juror 23, arguing that such removal is
improper in light of the fact that Juror 23 was the only African American
juror on the panel, and had also previously held out on a conviction in a
felony criminal trial. However, these facts do not factor into the analysis
when reviewing a trial court's removal of an individual juror who becomes
sick or otherwise unable to serve after already being seated on the jury, but
before the verdict is reached. Simply put, the trial court removed Juror 23
upon her request and in response to her statement, after direct questioning in
open court, revealed that she was physically unable to continue her service
on the jury.
{¶ 27} In making its decision, the trial court was not required to
inquire of the juror in person, nor was it required to permit counsel for either
party to question the juror, or make an argument to the court. State v. Owens,
112 Ohio App. 3d 334, 337, 678 N.E.2d 956 (11th Dist.1996) ("The fact that
the trial court did not make a more extensive inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the reportedly disabled juror's illness did not demonstrate an
abuse of discretion by the trial court."); State v. Shields, 15 Ohio App. 3d
112, 472 N.E.2d 1110, paragraph three of the syllabus (8th Dist.1984)
(Under Crim.R. 24(F) [now (G)] and R.C. 2945.29, the trial court is not
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 25
required to examine a reportedly disabled juror personally, nor is it required
to offer counsel an opportunity to do so, before replacing a seated juror with
an alternate."). Further, Appellant makes no argument as to how he might
have been prejudiced by removing the only African American, hold-out
juror on the panel, and we decline to speculate as to how her removal would
have prejudiced Appellant. See State v. Armstrong, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
81114, 2002-Ohio-6053, ¶ 27 (noting its prior reasoning that the
"substitution of an alternate for a regular juror after jury has retired to
consider its verdict is not per se plain error, rather, reversal is required only
where there is some showing of prejudice.")5; citing State v. Brown, 108
Ohio App. 3d 489, 671 N.E.2d 280 (1995); citing State v. Miley, 77 Ohio
App.3d 786, 603 N.E.2d 1070, headnote 3).
{¶ 28} As such, and light of the foregoing, we fail to find any error or
abuse of discretion, let alone plain error, in the trial court's handling of the
removal and replacement of Juror 23. Accordingly, Appellant's first
assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
5
The Armstrong decision was issued prior to the 2008 Amendments to Crim.R. 24 which created a process
for replacing a disabled juror with an alternate after deliberations had begun. Thus, prior to 2008, there was
no provision under the rules for removal and replacement of a juror once deliberations had begun. As such,
under the reasoning in Armstrong, even without an express provision for removal and replacement under
such circumstances, such action did not constitute per se plain error, bur rather, required a showing of
prejudice in order to justify reversal.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 26
{¶ 29} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends that his
conviction for murder is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Appellant argues that Jessica Lowry's story was "unsupportable and not
believable." He also argues that because Carol Jordan and Seth Cottrill
denied being present, and because the weapon at issue was never recovered
despite a search of Paint Creek, that the manifest weight of the evidence
supports his version of events, which claimed that a man nicknamed “Dollar
Bill” was the shooter and threatened Appellant to keep him quiet.
{¶ 30} When an appellate court considers a claim that a conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court must dutifully
examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
and consider the witness credibility. State v. Dean, 146 Ohio St. 3d 106,
2015–Ohio–4347, 54 N.E.3d 80, ¶ 151; citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A reviewing court must bear in
mind, however, that credibility generally is an issue for the trier of fact to
resolve. State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St. 3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v.
Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008–Ohio–1744, ¶ 31. “ ‘Because
the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent to
decide “whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular
witnesses,” we must afford substantial deference to its determinations of
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 27
credibility.’ ” Barberton v. Jenney, 126 Ohio St. 3d 5, 2010–Ohio–2420, 929
N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 20; quoting State v. Konya, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No.
21434, 2006–Ohio–6312, ¶ 6; quoting State v. Lawson, 2nd Dist.
Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684 (Aug. 22, 1997). As the court
explained in Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St. 3d 328, 2012–Ohio–2179, 972
N.E.2d 517, at ¶ 21:
“ ‘[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly
against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment
must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.
***
If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is
consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to
sustaining the verdict and judgment.’ ” Quoting Seasons Coal
Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St. 3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273,
fn.3 (1984), quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate
Review, Section 60, at 191–192 (1978).
Thus, an appellate court will leave the issues of weight and credibility of the
evidence to the fact-finder, as long as a rational basis exists in the record for
its decision. State v. Picklesimer, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA9, 2012–
Ohio–1282, ¶ 24; accord State v. Howard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2948,
2007–Ohio–6331, ¶ 6 (“We will not intercede as long as the trier of fact has
some factual and rational basis for its determination of credibility and
weight.”).
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 28
{¶ 31} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court
may reverse the judgment of conviction only if it appears that the fact-finder,
when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
and a new trial ordered.’ ” Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541; quoting State
v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). If the
prosecution presented substantial credible evidence upon which the trier of
fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential
elements of the offense had been established, the judgment of conviction is
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., State v. Eley, 56 Ohio
St.2d 169, 383 N.E.2d 132 (1978), syllabus, superseded by state
constitutional amendment on other grounds in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St. 3d
89, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). Accord Eastley at ¶ 12; quoting Thompkins at
387; quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990) (explaining that a
judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence when “ ‘ “the
greater amount of credible evidence” ’ ” supports it). Thus, “ ‘ “[w]hen
conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence simply because the jury believed the
prosecution testimony.” ’ ” State v. Cooper, 170 Ohio App. 3d 418, 2007–
Ohio–1186, 867 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 17; quoting State v. Mason, 9th Dist. Summit
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 29
No. 21397, 2003–Ohio–5785, 2003 WL 22439816, ¶ 17; quoting State v.
Gilliam, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 97CA006757, 1998 WL 487085 (Aug. 12,
1998). Instead, a reviewing court should find a conviction against the
manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Thompkins at 387;
quoting Martin at 175. Accord State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St. 3d 479, 483, 721
N.E.2d 995 (2000).
{¶ 32} R.C. 2903.02 defines the crime of murder and provides as
follows:
“(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or
the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy.
(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate
result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an
offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree
and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the
Revised Code.
(C) Division (B) of this section does not apply to an offense
that becomes a felony of the first or second degree only if the
offender previously has been convicted of that offense or
another specified offense.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder, and shall
be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised
Code.”
As indicated above, Appellant was also charged and convicted of a firearm
specification, as well as a repeat violent offender specification.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 30
{¶ 33} Here, Appellant does not argue or address whether the State
proved each and every element of the offense of murder and attendant
specifications. Instead, he argues that “Dollar Bill,” aka Ernest Moore, was
the person who shot and killed Timberly Claytor. His argument essentially
challenges the jury's ultimate reliance on the testimony of Jessica Lowry and
the rejection of his own testimony, and that of Jordan and Cottrill. Thus, his
arguments essentially amount to nothing more than a challenge to the jury's
credibility determinations. However, as set forth above, credibility is
generally an issue for the trier of fact. Additionally, just because the jury
apparently resolved the conflicting testimony of Lowry, Jordan, Cottrill and
Appellant in favor of the prosecution does not mean that Appellant's
conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, as set
forth above, an appellate court will leave the issues of weight and credibility
of the evidence to the fact-finder, as long as a rational basis exists in the
record for its decision. State v. Picklesimer, supra, at ¶ 24; accord State v.
Howard, supra, at ¶ 6.
{¶ 34} Here, aside from the testimony of Lowry, Jordan, Cottrill, and
Appellant, all of whom are, admittedly, less than ideal witnesses, taking into
consideration their various shortcomings, which include intellectual deficits,
impairment from drug use, prior criminal history, biases and motivations to
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 31
lie, there was voluminous expert and forensic testimony which supported
Lowry's version of events, or at least did not refute it. Appellant admitted
that he picked up Claytor on the night in question and paid her to have sex in
his girlfriend’s, Nicole Perkins’, car. As detailed at great length during the
fact portion of this opinion above, the State introduced expert and forensic
testimony indicating that Claytor was shot in that vehicle, at close range, and
died from multiple gunshot wounds.
{¶ 35} Importantly, the expert testimony could not determine the
rapidity in which the shots were fired, or the sequence in which the injuries
were inflicted. Thus, the scientific evidence in this case could not rule out
that Claytor may have still been trying to move and/or get out of the car after
the first shot was fired, nor could it determine the amount of time that blood
had time to pool and saturate the carpet before Claytor either got out of or
fell out of the vehicle. This is important to the extent that science does not
disprove Lowry's version of events, as argued throughout the trial by
Appellant.
{¶ 36} Further, expert testimony established the bullet trajectories
were from right to left, all entering Claytor's head near her left ear and
exiting near her right ear and cheek. As noted by the defense at trial, there is
no way to determine which way Claytor's head may have been turned when
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 32
she was shot, for purposes of determining whether she was shot from the
back by Moore, who was allegedly in the back seat, or by Appellant, who
conceded he was in the driver's seat. However, forensic testimony
introduced by the State at trial established that an examination of the blood
spatter stains on the B pillar of the passenger side of the car reveals
directionality and indicates that blood was propelled upward and backward,
from the front of the car. Further, and importantly, forensic review of the
bullet entrance points on the B pillar of the car indicates that the bullets
"went in pretty much perpendicular to the passenger side of the vehicle."
Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded, based upon the expert
testimony and forensic evidence presented by the State, that Claytor was
shot by an individual in the driver's seat, and Appellant, by his own
admission, was driving the car.
{¶ 37} As such, because there is both a factual and rational basis for
the jury's conclusion, and because there is no evidence that the jury, as fact-
finder, either lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice,
Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 16CA3568 33
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to
Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross
County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it
is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously
posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme
Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court.
If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the
sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of
the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court
of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of
the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Hoover, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion as to Assignment of Error II;
Concurs in Judgment Only as to Assignment of Error I.
For the Court,
BY: ______________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
BY: ______________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
BY: ______________________________
Marie Hoover, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.