State v. Rinella ( 2018 )

[Cite as State v. Rinella, 2018-Ohio-1922.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 28460
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
LOUIS M. RINELLA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR-2015-05-1570
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 16, 2018
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Louis Rinella, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas. This Court reverses and remands.
I.
{¶2} On June 2, 2015, the Summit County Grand Jury indicted Rinella on one count of
passing bad checks in violation of R.C. 2913.11. After initially pleading not guilty to the charge
at arraignment, Rinella pleaded guilty to the sole count in the indictment. The trial court
sentenced Rinella to an 18-month term of community control. In so doing, the trial court set
forth the conditions of Rinella’s community control sanction, including that he “complete six (6)
months of the Oriana House Work Release Program as directed.” The trial court further
informed Rinella that a violation of those conditions could result in a 12-month term of
incarceration.
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{¶3} Less than a year later, Rinella pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his
community control. The trial court imposed a 12-month prison term and determined that Rinella
was entitled to two days of jail time credit toward his sentence.
{¶4} Thereafter, on August 31, 2016, Rinella filed a motion for “prison time credit[,]”
arguing that he should be credited 164 days for the time he participated in the work release
program while he was on community control. On November 14, 2016, the trial court issued a
journal entry denying the motion on the basis that the Oriana House Work Release Program did
not constitute a “lockdown” program for the purposes of calculating jail time credit.
{¶5} Rinella subsequently filed a supplemental motion for prison time credit as well as
a motion for reconsideration. The trial court did not rule on either motion prior to the time that
Rinella filed a timely notice of appeal from the November 14, 2016 judgment entry denying his
initial motion for prison time credit. Now before this Court, Rinella raises one assignment of
error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT RINELLA CREDIT
FOR THE 164 DAYS THAT HE SERVED IN THE ORIANA HOUSE WORK
RELEASE PROGRAM.
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Rinella contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for prison time credit for the time he served in the work release program.
{¶7} Rinella’s foremost argument in support of his assignment of error is that the time
he spent in the Oriana House Work Release Program constituted confinement for the purposes of
R.C. 2967.191. Rinella cites to a number of cases in support of his argument that the time he
served in Oriana House was sufficiently restrictive to constitute confinement for the purposes of
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calculating jail time credit, most notably the Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Nagle, 23
Ohio St. 3d 185 (1986) and State v. Napier, 93 Ohio St. 3d 646 (2001). Rinella also attempts to
draw a parallel between this case and State v. Snowder, 87 Ohio St. 3d 335 (1999), where the
Supreme Court upheld a defendant’s conviction for escape because he was in “detention” while
serving time in a community based corrections facility. Id. at 337. Rinella posits that if an
offender can be convicted of escape for leaving a community based correction facility, then
necessarily an offender should receive credit for the time served in that facility.
{¶8} R.C. 2949.08(B) states:
The record of the person’s conviction shall specify the total number of days, if
any, that the person was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for
which the person was convicted and sentenced prior to delivery to the jailer,
administrator, or keeper under this section. The record shall be used to determine
any reduction of sentence under division (C) of this section.
R.C. 2967.191, in turn, provides as follows:
The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the stated prison term
of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for
any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and
sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial * * *.
{¶9} The Supreme Court’s decisions in Nagle and Napier focused on the meaning of
“confinement” for the purposes of calculating jail time credit. In Nagle, the court examined the
time Nagle spent in a rehabilitation facility and determined that his time there was not
sufficiently restrictive to constitute confinement in order to justify an award of jail time credit
under R.C. 2949.08(C). Nagle at 186-187. Largely because Nagle was permitted to leave the
facility on his own volition, the high court concluded that he was not confined for the purposes
of calculating jail time credit. Nagle at 187.
{¶10} In Napier, the Supreme Court examined the scope of R.C. 2967.191 as it
pertained to time served in a community based corrections facility. Analogizing the facts to its
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prior decision in Snowder, the court determined that Napier was entitled to credit for time served
in the facility due to the restrictive nature of the program. Napier, 93 Ohio St. 3d at 648. “In
Napier, the level of the defendant’s participation at the [community based corrections facility]
was such that he was not permitted to come and go as he pleased [and] ‘[h]e was subject to the
control of the staff regarding personal liberties[.]’” (Internal citation omitted.) State v. Edwards,
9th Dist. Summit No. 20840, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1940, *3 (Apr. 24, 2002), quoting Napier
at 648.
{¶11} As noted above, Rinella challenges the trial court’s November 14, 2016 order
denying his motion for jail time credit. Though Rinella’s motion referenced the “Client
Handbook” from Oriana House, the handbook was not attached to the motion. The only exhibit
attached to Rinella’s motion was the “Release Report Summary” that confirmed he had served
164 days in the work release program and that he was terminated for a violation. After the trial
court issued its order denying the motion, Rinella filed a supplemental brief and attached the
Client Handbook to provide evidence about the details of the work release program. Rinella also
filed a motion for reconsideration and attached an affidavit wherein he described his experience
at Oriana House. Significantly, the Client Handbook and the affidavit were not before the trial
court prior to the issuance of its November 14, 2016 order, nor are those documents properly
before this Court on appeal. See generally State v. Babb, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23631, 2007-
Ohio-5102, ¶ 5. Given the limited record before the trial court at the time it issued its ruling on
the motion, there was not a sufficient evidentiary basis to make a substantive determination
regarding whether or not Rinella’s participation in the program in question constituted
confinement under R.C. 2967.191. Rinella’s assignment of error is sustained to the extent that
this matter must be remanded for the trial court to consider evidence regarding the nature of the
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work release program at Oriana House and then make a determination regarding whether
Rinella’s participation in that program constituted confinement pursuant to R.C. 2967.191. See
State v. Neff, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 00CA007578, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 406, *3-4 (Feb. 7,
2001). At the proceedings on remand, the defendant will bear the burden of demonstrating
whether his participation in the work release program at Oriana House constituted confinement.
Edwards at *5.
{¶12} The assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶13} Rinella’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.
Judgment reversed
and cause remand.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed to Appellee.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P.J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
DOMINIC J. VITANTONIO, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.