State ex rel. Heyside v. Calabrese , 2022 Ohio 1245 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State ex rel. Heyside v. Calabrese, 2022-Ohio-1245.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE EX REL., NEIL HEYSIDE, :
Relator, :
No. 111200
v. :
THE HONORABLE JUDGE DEENA R. :
CALABRESE,
Respondent. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: WRIT DISMISSED
DATED: April 8, 2022
Writ of Prohibition
Motion No. 552584
Order No. 553465
Appearances:
Lester S. Potash, for relator.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Nora E. Poore, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for respondent.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
Relator, Neil Heyside (“Heyside”), seeks a writ of prohibition
preventing respondent, Judge Deena R. Calabrese, from exercising jurisdiction in
Heyside v. Heyside, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-21-954944. We grant respondent’s
motion to dismiss and dismiss the complaint for writ of prohibition for the following
reasons.
I. Background
On January 12, 2022, relator filed a complaint for writ of prohibition
alleging that he and nonparty Erica Heyside (“Erica”) were previously married. In
2016, they litigated to conclusion a divorce proceeding in the Domestic Relations
Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. As part of those
proceedings, Heyside and Erica entered into a separation agreement that was
incorporated into a final decree of divorce.1 The separation agreement called for
various payments to be made to Erica by Heyside. According to the instant
complaint, on October 27, 2021, Erica instituted a breach-of-contract action that
sought monetary damages from Heyside totaling $486,679.06. Erica’s complaint in
the underlying action, which is attached to relator’s complaint in the present action,
points to the separation agreement and divorce decree as the source of her breach-
of-contract claim. Erica’s complaint also referenced an additional agreement for
payments of $5,000 per month commencing in September 2019, which Heyside
allegedly breached as well. Heyside filed a motion to dismiss the underlying action,
which respondent denied. After that, Heyside filed the instant action seeking to
preclude respondent from hearing Erica’s claims.
1 Only partial copies of the divorce decree and separation agreement are in the record
before this court.
In his complaint, Heyside asserted that an action for breach of the
separation agreement must be brought in the appropriate domestic relations court,
pointing to R.C. 3105.10(B)(3) and the holding in paragraph four of the syllabus of
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976). This holding provides
that a separation agreement “loses its nature as a contract the moment it is adopted
by the court and incorporated into a decree of divorce. (Law v. Law, 64 Ohio St.
369, 60 N.E. 560 (1901); Newman v. Newman, 161 Ohio St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649(1954), and Mozden v. Mozden, 162 Ohio St. 169, 122 N.E.2d 295 (1954), modified).”
On February 15, 2022, respondent timely filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Respondent argued that prohibition was
inappropriate for several reasons. First, she argued that, as a common pleas court
judge, she does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over an action for
breach of contract. She further argued that the domestic relations case was litigated
to its conclusion, meaning that court no longer had exclusive jurisdiction. Next,
respondent argued that the holding is Wolfe was abrogated as recognized by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in Morris v. Morris, 148 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-5002,
69 N.E.2d 664, ¶ 23-27. Finally, she asserted that R.C. 3105.10(B)(3) did not apply
to Erica’s claims asserted in the breach-of-contract action.
On February 17, 2022, relator filed a brief in opposition arguing that
Morris did not overrule paragraph four of Wolfe, which is still valid law in Ohio. He
also argued that sole and exclusive jurisdiction to enforce a divorce decree rests with
the domestic relations court pursuant to statute.
Respondent filed a reply brief in support of her motion to dismiss on
February 24, 2022.
II. Law and Analysis
Standards Applicable to This Action
The case is before this court on respondent’s motion to dismiss
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) — failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. “Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate when it appears beyond
doubt, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint
and making all reasonable inferences in the relators’ favor, that relators are not
entitled to extraordinary relief in prohibition.” State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday, 164
Ohio St.3d 121, 2021-Ohio-194, 172 N.E.3d 114, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Zander v.
Judge of Summit Cty. Common Pleas Court, 156 Ohio St.3d 466, 2019-Ohio-1704,
129 N.E.3d 401, ¶ 4.
“[W]ith few exceptions, ‘a writ of prohibition “tests and determines
‘solely and only’ the subject[-]matter jurisdiction” of the lower court.’” State ex rel.
Thomas v. McGinty, 164 Ohio St.3d 167, 2020-Ohio-5452, 172 N.E.3d 824, ¶ 26,
quoting State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 N.E.2d 1002(1998), quoting State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster, 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 534
N.E.2d 46 (1988), quoting State ex rel. Staton v. Franklin Cty. Common Pleas
Court, 5 Ohio St.2d 17, 21, 213 N.E.2d 164 (1965). A writ of prohibition will only
issue when a relator shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the respondent
“is about to exercise or has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. Novak,
L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 156 Ohio St.3d 425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, ¶ 9, citing
State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138,
¶ 13. However, where a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, a writ
will issue regardless of whether an adequate remedy at law exists. State ex rel.
Bohlen at ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals for Sixth Appellate Dist.,
130 Ohio St.3d 326, 2011-Ohio-5456, 958 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 12. A writ will not issue in
a doubtful case because a writ is an extraordinary remedy granted with great
caution. Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 2019-
Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d
551, 554, 740 N.E.2d 265 (2001).
Judges of the Domestic Relations Division of the Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Court have “all the powers relating to all divorce, dissolution of
marriage, legal separation, and annulment cases, except in cases that are assigned
to some other judge of the court of common pleas for some special reason.” R.C.
2301.03(L)(1). However, the general division of a common pleas court usually has
subject-matter jurisdiction over matters of breach of contract so long as the claims
meet the jurisdictional minimums set forth in R.C. 2305.01. Further, the
jurisdictional priority rule is not implicated in this case because both parties agree
that the domestic relations case has concluded.
Heyside argues that the separation agreement is no longer
enforceable as a contract and R.C. 3105.10(B) bestows exclusive jurisdiction on a
domestic relations court, where one exists in the relevant jurisdiction, to hear and
determine the claims raised in the underlying action. Cuyahoga County has a
domestic relations court. R.C. 2301.03(L). Heyside asserts, that consequently,
respondent patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction.
Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction
Relying on paragraph four of the syllabus in Wolfe, 46 Ohio St.2d 399,
350 N.E.2d 413 (1976), Heyside argues the separation agreement lost its nature as a
contract when it was incorporated into the divorce decree. Heyside relies exclusively
on this case for this point. Respondent argues that Wolfe has been overruled by
statute as recognized in Morris, 148 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-5002, 69 N.E.2d
664, ¶ 28 (“the General Assembly swept away all the common law enunciated in
Wolfe”). The Morris Court specifically mentioned two of the three cases that were
modified by paragraph four of Wolfe as felled by the General Assembly’s actions in
enacting statutes that abrogated the holdings in Wolfe. Morris at ¶ 28. In fact,
Heyside acknowledges at page five of his brief in opposition to respondent’s motion
to dismiss that “other courts, including [the Eighth District Court of Appeals], have
held that a separation agreement retains its contract nature following its
incorporation into the divorce decree.” Heyside objects to these holdings by various
courts by arguing that paragraph four of Wolfe precludes them.
However, this argument does not demonstrate that a court patently
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hear an action. The nonexistence of a
contract is a defense to a breach-of-contract action; it usually does not affect the
general subject-matter jurisdiction of a court. The argument that the separation
agreement is unenforceable as a contract after incorporation into a divorce decree is
a reason to deny the claim in the underlying action. Heyside is essentially asking for
immediate appellate review of respondent’s denial of his motion to dismiss in the
underlying action — something prohibition generally precludes. See State ex rel.
Gross v. Marshall, 39 Ohio St.2d 92, 314 N.E.2d 170 (1974), syllabus.
Further, Erica’s complaint in the underlying case references an
agreement other than the separation agreement whereby Heyside agreed to make
certain payments at set intervals, which Heyside is also alleged to have breached.
This claim must be considered when determining whether respondent patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. “If a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter
involved in litigation, a writ of prohibition will not issue to prohibit it from exercising
such jurisdiction. Issuance of this writ is dependent upon the issue of whether it
appears that the court in which an action is sought to be prohibited has no
jurisdiction of the matter under adjudication.” State ex rel. Dayton Power & Light
Co. v. Riley, 53 Ohio St.2d 168, 169, 373 N.E.2d 385 (1978), citing State ex rel.
Carmody v. Justice, 114 Ohio St. 94, 150 N.E. 430 (1926).
Other courts interpreting various claims related to this area of law
have essentially determined that courts have jurisdiction to determine their own
jurisdiction.
The Ninth District Court of Appeals found that remedies might exist
in either the domestic relations court or the general division of the common pleas
court when confronted with a similar request for writ of prohibition to the one
presently before us. State ex rel. Gray v. Kimbler, 9th Dist. Medina No. 20CA0077-
M, 2021-Ohio-2868. In Gray, a husband and wife were granted a divorce into which
a separation agreement was incorporated. Id. at ¶ 6. The wife passed away and the
husband filed a claim in the probate court for alleged violations of the separation
agreement. Id. at ¶ 7. The husband also filed an action in the common pleas court.
Id. The executor of the wife’s estate filed counterclaims in the common pleas court
action alleging breach of the separation agreement related to the division of
property. Id. at ¶ 8. The husband then sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the
common pleas court judge lacked jurisdiction over the counterclaims because the
domestic relations court was the exclusive forum to adjudicate those claims. Id. at
¶ 9. In denying a writ of prohibition, the Gray Court addressed the same holding in
Wolfe that Heyside points to, stating:
[Relator] relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s conclusion that “[a]
separation agreement of the parties loses its nature as a contract the
moment it is adopted by the court and incorporated into a decree of
divorce.” Wolfe, 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976), [at]
paragraph four of the syllabus.
But that is not the end of the inquiry. This court has held that
“[i]t has long been the rule in Ohio that if the parties voluntarily enter
into a separation agreement, the agreement becomes a valid and
binding contract between the parties.” Haas v. Bauer, 156 Ohio App.3d
26, 2004-Ohio-437, 804 N.E.2d 80, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), quoting Russell v.
Russell, 5th Dist. Stark No. 98-CA-0127, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2689(June 7, 1999), citing Tullis v. Tullis, 138 Ohio St. 187, 34 N.E.2d 212(1941). The Seventh District Court of Appeals recognized earlier this
year that there may be two remedies: contempt in domestic relations
court and breach of contract in the trial court. Rossi v. Rossi, 7th Dist.
Mahoning No. 20 MA 0086, 2021-Ohio-2348, ¶ 27. Likewise, the
Third District Court of Appeals has recognized that a “separation
agreement is a contractual agreement.” Johnson v. Johnson, 3d Dist.
Hancock No. 5-07-34, 2008-Ohio-514, ¶ 12. In another case, the Fifth
District, and the trial court, were apparently not persuaded by
appellants’ argument that no breach of contract action could exist
because the separation agreement could only be enforced through a
contempt proceeding. Boulden v. Estate of Boulden, [5th Dist.
Richland] No. 01-CA-21, [2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4576], ¶ 1.
A review of the caselaw on this topic demonstrates that courts
have taken different approaches to explaining the rights and
obligations parties have related to separation agreements. This is
significant because, in order to issue a writ of prohibition, this Court
must find that [respondent] patently and unambiguously lacks
jurisdiction to act. Based upon our review of the caselaw, we cannot
conclude that [respondent] patently and unambiguously lacks
jurisdiction to act.
Id. at ¶ 14-16.
Similarly, the Seventh District Court of Appeals determined that the
jurisdiction priority rule did not prevent a party to a divorce decree from bringing
an action for breach of a stock purchase agreement and guaranty in a common pleas
court even though the party also filed a motion for contempt of the separation
agreement and divorce decree to which these other agreements were incorporated
in the domestic relations court. Rossi, 2021-Ohio-2348, 175 N.E.3d 43 (7th Dist.).
The court looked to the agreements at issue and determined that the claims for
breach of the agreements related to the separation agreement could be maintained
in the general division of the common pleas court. The court analyzed the
agreements at issue and the language of the separation agreement. It determined
that relief could be afforded in the general division. Id. at ¶ 17.
Heyside does not point us to any case that specifically addresses the
jurisdiction of the general division of the common pleas court to hear the underlying
breach-of-contract action in the face of the cases raised by respondent. These cases
support the proposition that a court has discretion to determine whether it has
jurisdiction based on the claims raised in the action. Given Heyside’s limited
argument, the similar arguments raised and rejected in the above cases, and the
disparate treatment by various courts to the same issue, respondent has carried her
burden to demonstrate that she does not patently and unambiguously lack
jurisdiction based on the arguments presented.
However, none of these cases addressed R.C. 3105.10(B)(3), and the
apparent delegation of jurisdiction to the domestic relations court. Unless a statute
conclusively removes jurisdiction, a judge of the common pleas court has general
subject-matter jurisdiction and the discretion to determine her own jurisdiction.
Novak, 156 Ohio St.3d 425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, at ¶ 12. “‘“A statutory
assignment to one division of a court confers on that division exclusive jurisdiction
to determine the matters assigned, and deprives the court’s other divisions,
including its general division, of jurisdiction to determine those same matters.”’”
State v. Lindstrom, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96653, 2011-Ohio-6755, ¶ 10, quoting
Perkins Local Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Wooster City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 183 Ohio
App.3d 638, 2009-Ohio-4251, 918 N.E.2d 198, ¶14 (6th Dist.), quoting Keen v. Keen,
157 Ohio App.3d 379, 2004-Ohio-2961, 811 N.E.2d 565, citing Comer v. Bench, 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 19229, 2003-Ohio-2821. To succeed in prohibition, the
removal of jurisdiction must be unequivocal and conclusive. Novak at ¶ 15 (“We
grant writs of prohibition only when the General Assembly clearly intended to limit
the statutory authority of a court.”).
Heyside claims that R.C. 3105.10(B)(3) bestows exclusive jurisdiction
on a domestic relations court, in a county where one exists, to resolve the dispute in
the underlying case. Respondent argues that this statute has no bearing on the
underlying action because this provision applies to motions brought under R.C.
3105.10(B)(2) — things like contempt motions — not to a breach-of-contract action
that relies on the separation agreement.
R.C. 3105.10, titled “[a]nswer, hearing, and judgment,” provides in
part,
(A) The court of common pleas shall hear any of the causes for divorce
or annulment charged in the complaint and may, upon proof to the
satisfaction of the court, pronounce the marriage contract dissolved
and both of the parties released from their obligations.
(B) (1) A separation agreement providing for the support of children
eighteen years of age or older is enforceable by the court of common
pleas.
(2) A separation agreement that was voluntarily entered into by the
parties may be enforceable by the court of common pleas upon the
motion of either party to the agreement, if the court determines that it
would be in the interests of justice and equity to require enforcement
of the separation agreement.
(3) If a court of common pleas has a division of domestic relations, all
cases brought for enforcement of a separation agreement under
division (B)(1) or (2) of this section shall be assigned to the judges of
that division.
(Emphasis added.)
Case law interpreting R.C. 3105.10(B)(3) is sparse. Heyside has not
directed us to any court that has found the statute to apply to the present situation.
At least one court has interpreted R.C. 3105.10(B)(3) to mean that a domestic
relations court retains jurisdiction to enforce a separation agreement in
postjudgment contempt proceedings. Kell v. Verderber, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
120665, 2013-Ohio-4223, ¶ 19-20. Also, at least one treatise may support Heyside’s
interpretation, stating:
[I]f a court of common pleas has a division of domestic relations, all
cases brought for enforcement of a separation agreement providing for
the support of children 18 years of age or older, and all cases brought
for enforcement of a separation agreement voluntarily entered into by
the parties, must be assigned to the judges of that division.
46 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Family Law, Section 507.
However, R.C. 3105.10(B)(2) speaks in terms of motions to enforce,
but R.C. 3105.10(B)(3) indicates that all actions for enforcement brought pursuant
to R.C. 3105.10(B)(1) or (B)(2) shall be referred to the domestic relations court
where one exists. This apparent incongruity is pointed out by respondent but is not
adequately addressed by Heyside.
The purported removal of jurisdiction in this statute is not
unequivocal and conclusive. The statute provides that a domestic relations court,
where one exists, must hear all motions to enforce a voluntary separation
agreement. The action prosecuted by Erica is not a motion, but a complaint for
breach of contract. There are nontrivial differences between a motion and a
complaint. See Martin v. Wayne Cty. Natl. Bank Trust, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
03CA0079, 2004-Ohio-4194, ¶ 11-12. Erica’s action is one that seeks to enforce
terms of the separation agreement and another agreement, but it was not brought
by motion. Therefore, it is unclear if the statute applies. Because it is unclear, this
court cannot say that respondent patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction.
Respondent has general subject-matter jurisdiction and the ability to determine her
own jurisdiction. Respondent may ultimately lack jurisdiction, but from the record
and arguments in this case, she does not patently and unambiguously lack
jurisdiction.
Adequate Remedy at Law
As a result of the above determination, that respondent does not
patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction, Heyside must have no other adequate
remedy at law to succeed in this action. “In general, appeal is a remedy sufficient to
preclude a writ of mandamus or prohibition.” State ex rel. Durrani v. Ruehlman,
147 Ohio St.3d 478, 2016-Ohio-7740, 67 N.E.3d 769, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Caskey
v. Gano, 135 Ohio St.3d 175, 2013-Ohio-71, 985 N.E.2d 453, ¶ 2. “[T]o be an
adequate remedy at law, the remedy must be ‘complete, beneficial, and speedy.’” Id.
at ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Ullmann v. Hayes, 103 Ohio St.3d 405, 2004-Ohio-
5469, 816 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 8. Heyside does not raise any issue that would lead to the
conclusions that an appeal from an adverse judgment in the common pleas court
case would not constitute an adequate remedy at law. Generally, “‘contentions
that appeal from any subsequent adverse final judgment would be inadequate due
to time and expense are without merit.’” State ex rel. Estate of Nichols v. Russo, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107508, 2018-Ohio-3416, ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Lyons v.
Zaleski, 75 Ohio St.3d 623, 626, 665 N.E.2d 212 (1996), citing Whitehall ex rel.
Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 74 Ohio St.3d 120, 124, 656 N.E.2d 684(1995); State ex rel. Gillivan v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 70 Ohio St.3d 196, 200, 638
N.E.2d 74 (1994).
Therefore, an appeal from a final judgment in the underlying case
constitutes an adequate remedy at law.
Respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted. Costs assessed against
relator. The clerk is directed to serve on the parties notice of this judgment and its
date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B).
Writ dismissed.
_________________________
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR